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While many studies examine the relationship between labor repression and economic 
development, few address the developmental implications of state-labor relations in 
democratic countries.  Yet the rapid spread of democracy through the developing world 
highlights the need for such an investigation.  In this dissertation, I show that in a 
democratic context, politically affiliated unions respond differently to changing local and 
global economic conditions than nonaffiliated unions.  In particular, I argue that political 
parties are encompassing organizations that internalize the externalities associated with 
the protest of their affiliated unions.  Thus, unions affiliated to major political parties 
respond to more competitive markets by restraining union protest and encouraging 
institutionalized forms of grievance resolution.  In contrast, nonaffiliated unions are more 
likely to use worker frustration to ratchet up militancy against recalcitrant employers and 
encourage the use of extreme and violent forms of protest.  I support these arguments 
with data gathered during 18 months of field research in four regions of South Asia:  Sri 
Lanka and the Indian states of Maharashtra, Kerala and West Bengal.  The findings of the 
dissertation call into question the conventional wisdom that partisan unions are inimical 
to economic development.     
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xv CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The same repressive face that makes the developmental state an anathema 
to labor makes it useful to capital.  Useful, that is, as long as traditional 
repressive methods work.  Once labor gains enough power to make peace 
depend on more sophisticated forms of industrial relations, the absence of 
legitimate ties to labor becomes a disadvantage.  The developmental state 
may begin to look more like an albatross than a valued protector of 
entrepreneurial interests.   
 
--Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy, 1995 
 
In low- and middle-income countries, organized labor plays a key role in 
influencing developmental trajectories.  If confrontational, heightened working-class 
mobilization can increase consumption at the expense of investment, precipitate capital 
flight, or impede the passage and enactment of beneficial economic policies.  At the same 
time, there can be clear benefits to unionization.  For example, economists have 
demonstrated that unions provide a constructive ‘voice function’, increasing productivity 
and decreasing turnover by institutionalizing industrial conflict.  Further, recent studies in 
political science and sociology have pointed to instances in which synergistic ties between 
political parties and unions allow parties to harness working-class mobilization to 
facilitate class compromise, bringing workers ‘on board’ to support the enactment of key 
reforms and encouraging workers to restrain militancy in an effort to attract new 
investment. 
Through a study of unions and politics in South Asia, this dissertation examines 
the political dynamics of class compromise and demonstrates how class compromise 
facilitates economic reform.  In particular, this study explores how union affiliation to 
political parties affects the behavior of unions in the industrial relations arena.  Through 2 
exploring the relationship between parties and unions, I address some key questions that 
have gained increasing attention in the field of political economy in recent years.  When 
do unions mobilize to facilitate economic reform and when do they mobilize in 
opposition to reform?  Are political unions more or less willing to entertain the possibility 
of class compromise than other types of unions?  How does the participation of 
organized labor in politics affect the prospects of reform?  Does the association of labor 
unions to powerful political parties hinder the implementation of beneficial economic 
policies?  Is the exclusion of unions from the political arena necessary for or conducive to 
high levels of investment and rapid economic growth?   
From a policy perspective, questions regarding the political participation of 
unions are timely.  Despite a rapid spread of democratic institutions and stated 
commitments to International Labour Organization (ILO) core conventions
1, arguments 
in favor of labor repression continue to influence policy in the developing world.
  2  
Colombia, Bangladesh, and Burma are just a few long-term signatories to core ILO 
conventions in which there were recent reports of the torture and/or killing of partisan 
                                                 
1 The number of electoral democracies increased seventy percent since the mid-1980s and the Freedom 
House Index now classifies fifty-nine percent of low-income countries and eighty-seven percent of middle-
income countries as “free” or “partially free” (Freedom House 2004).  The number of signatories to the 
ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, No. 87, 1948 
increased from 89 nations in 1980 to 142 nations in 2003 and the number of signatories to the Convention 
on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, No. 98, 1949 increased from 103 nations to 154 
nations during the same time period.   
 
2 In this dissertation, I use the terms “developing world” and “developing countries” in a literal sense to 
refer to countries that have begun a process of industrial development but have not achieved the level of 
development exhibited by advanced industrial countries.  This group of countries includes most countries 
in Latin America, most countries in Asia excluding Japan and the East Asian Tigers, and some countries in 
Africa.  I do not use the term to refer to the group of countries international organizations refer to as the 
“least developed countries (LLDCs).”  These countries are sometimes euphemistically included in the 
category “developing countries,” but have not begun a process of process of industrialization and are 
therefore not immediately relevant to a discussion of the role of unions in industrial development. 
 3 
union activists (ICFTU 2004).
3  Available evidence suggests that these examples are 
representative of a broader pattern.  According to calculations based on the Cingranelli 
and Richards (2006) dataset, labor rights were ‘severely restricted’ in 41 percent of 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America and only ‘somewhat protected’ in 58 percent 
of these countries in 2004.
4  Out of the 134 countries listed in these three regions, labor 
rights were ‘fully protected’ in just one (Japan).
5         
The assumption that the political mobilization of organized labor is inimical to 
development also permeates the pronouncements and policies of international 
organizations.  While acknowledging some benefits of unionization, the World Bank 
(1995; 2005) recommends that union activities be restricted to collective bargaining and 
that governments be shielded from union pressure to implement redistributive policies 
and regulate labor markets.  Similarly, although the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
requires countries to report on worker rights as a requirement for beneficiaries of the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), its definition of worker rights is limited to the 
formation of unions, collective bargaining, freedom from forced labor, a minimum age 
for the employment of children, and minimally acceptable work conditions.  There is no 
discussion, in other words, of the right of workers to organize politically or a need to 
protect the political freedoms of the working class.      
While many policymakers continue to act on the assumption that political unions 
hamper growth, the intellectual tide in the academic community has begun to shift.  For a 
                                                 
3 Colombia experienced 90 assassinations of union activists in 2003 alone.   
4 Cingranelli and Richards code 195 countries for the degree to which core worker rights are protected on a 
three point ordinal scale—‘fully protected’, ‘somewhat protected’ and ‘severely restricted’.   
 
5 The most repressive of the three regions is Asia, where worker rights are ‘severely restricted’ in 57 percent 
of countries.  In Africa, the figure is 26 percent and in Latina America 24 percent.   
 4 
time, an academic consensus held that labor repression was a necessary evil associated 
with the early stages of development.  The rapid economic growth of a handful of newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) in East Asia and Latin America gave rise to arguments 
that repression and exclusion facilitate development by reducing consumption, boosting 
investment and permitting the implementation of growth-enhancing economic reforms.
6   
More recently, however, social scientists have questioned the wisdom of the 
political exclusion and repression of organized labor.  Research by Przeworkski and 
Limongi (1993, 1997) suggests that authoritarianism, in and of itself, does not contribute 
to developmental success; developmental successes and failures are equally distributed 
among authoritarian and democratic regimes.  Further, researchers have noted the 
destabilizing effects of state repression in pursuit of economic objectives (Freeman 1994; 
Przeworski 1992; Przeworski et. al. 1995; Seidman 1994), while a growing number of 
studies demonstrate the specific developmental benefits associated with the political 
mobilization of organized labor.  Murillo (2001), for example, argues that union political 
ties have dampened labor opposition to liberal economic reforms in Latin America.   
Similarly, Heller (1999) shows how political unions have helped to forge class 
compromise both in the political and industrial relations arenas in Kerala, India.  Studies 
of union behavior in the collective bargaining arena have argued that union political ties 
reduce wage militancy (Battacharjee 1987; Roxborough 1984).  
This study contributes to this discussion through an exploration of the 
developmental effects of union political affiliations in South Asia.  I argue that in a free 
market democracy, unions with voluntary affiliations to major politically parties, which I 
                                                 
6 I present a detailed examination of the arguments presented in favor of repression below.  
 5 
refer to as ‘major party unions’ (MPUs), are more likely to exercise caution with respect 
to the demands they present and protest tactics they employ than non-affiliated unions 
because they are constrained by the encompassing interests of the political party.  Since 
major political parties internalize the externalities associated with aggressive protest by 
their affiliated unions (such as unemployment and lost investment) they restrain the 
protest of their unions and encourage union members to pursue institutionalized forms 
of grievance resolution.  In short, when presented with evidence that the health of a given 
firm would be substantially jeopardized as a result industrial protest, MPUs ‘mobilize 
restraint’.     
I refer to unions not affiliated to major political parties as ‘narrow interest unions’ 
(NIUs) because their actions are narrowly guided by the interests of the union leadership.   
Because they are not constrained by the interests of a broader constituency, NIU leaders 
are more inclined to ratchet up militancy in pursuit of self-interested goals such as greater 
notoriety, increased union membership, and the extraction of bribe payments from 
management.  Further, the difference between MPU and NIU leaders becomes 
increasingly salient as the bargaining power of organized labor declines.  NIU leaders are 
more likely to encourage the presentation of more aggressive demands and the use of 
more extreme forms of protest such as hostage takings, damaging company property, and 
assaults on management when routine strike action fails.     
To support these arguments, I draw on original data gathered from hundreds of 
surveys and interviews of employers, union leaders, and government officials in four 
regional cases in South Asia—Sri Lanka and the Indian states of Kerala, Maharashtra, and 
 6 
West Bengal.  These interviews provide data for qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
the relationships between political incorporation and union behavior.   
The remainder of this introductory chapter reviews relevant literature and 
elaborates on the dissertation’s major themes.  I begin by reviewing the standard 
arguments that labor mobilization hinders investment and that repression facilitates 
economic growth. I then present an alternative theory of union behavior in developing 
countries and conclude by outlining the methodology of the study and sketching some of 
its major findings. 
  
1.1  Two standard perspectives on labor and development 
Since the late 1950s, a number of social scientists have argued that rapid 
economic growth requires controls on organized labor.  These writings define two 
distinct perspectives.   
The first perspective emphasizes the effects of labor mobilization on investment 
and suggests that rapid growth requires short-term restrictions on all union activities.   It 
generalizes from the experiences of a small number of ‘closed’ (authoritarian) societies 
that successfully pursued a dirigiste (state-led) path of economic development.  This 
perspective emerged in the 1950s and gained widespread acceptance following the rapid 
economic development of NICs in East Asia and Latin America. 
The second perspective, favored by the World Bank, is a set of recommendations 
for developing democracies based, in part, on the historical experiences of industrial 
democracies.  It distinguishes between the constructive role of unions in channeling 
industrial conflict, on the one hand, and monopolistic behavior and detrimental political 
activities on the other.  The World Bank perspective argues that unions can facilitate 
growth, but only if their activities are restricted to collective bargaining at the enterprise 
level.    
 7 
The argument for labor controls based on the experience of authoritarian countries  
The first debates over the relationship between democracy and growth took place 
in the 1950s among economists who worried that the premature mobilization of working-
class interests would increase consumption at the expense of investment.   
Karl de Schweinitz (1959) provided the most forceful and unqualified statement 
of this view.  De Schweinitz’ argument is rooted in a Rostowian understanding of growth, 
in which development is characterized by an initial transitional or ‘takeoff’ period in 
which investment must jump from about five percent to over ten percent of GDP 
(Rostow 1956; 1960).  Rostow anticipated that growth would be self-sustaining once 
takeoff was initiated; however, the difficulty was in mobilizing the investment needed to 
initiate a takeoff in low-income countries where capital is scarce.  Because unions raise 
consumption at the expense of much-needed investment, governments in developing 
countries would be compelled to control organized labor: “If the conditions propitious 
for economic growth are threatened by the activities of a nascent labor movement, 
society, acting through the constituted political authority, must in its turn formulate a 
policy for controlling labor” (1959, 389).   
De Schweinitz distinguished between two types of controls: ‘permissive’ and 
‘totalitarian.’  ‘Permissive’ controls allow the formation of unions but limit strikes, 
demonstrations, and other forms of protest through a hostile legal environment.   
‘Totalitarian’ controls involve the complete subordination of the trade union movement 
to the interests of the state.   
De Schweinitz argued that ‘permissive’ controls were the luxury of early 
developing countries in the West, which could develop slowly and steadily.  In contrast, 
late developers face greater population pressures and technological barriers to 
development that can only be overcome through massive state-led investment projects.  
Heavy state involvement in the early stages of development reduces the role of 
 8 
entrepreneurship and thereby the scope for collective bargaining between private-sector 
employers and politically independent unions.  Additionally, the rapid transition to 
industrial society and frustrations derived from observing the standard of living enjoyed 
by Western workers make workers in developing countries restive, and thus prone to 
highly disruptive protest.  In sum, the higher degree of state control over the economy, 
lower level of entrepreneurship, and greater dissatisfaction among workers in late-
developers made the use of ‘totalitarian’ controls more likely than in Western countries.    
The basic thrust of de Schweinitz’ argument—that union activities need to be 
strictly controlled to facilitate investment in the initial stages of growth—was echoed in 
more qualified terms by a number of his contemporaries (Galenson 1959; Mehta 1957; 
Strumthal 1960),
7 but gained its broadest acceptance following the rapid industrialization 
of a handful of countries in Latin America and East Asia.   
According to Guillermo O’Donnell (1973; 1978), the rise of ‘bureaucratic 
authoritarianism’ in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico during the 1960s and 1970s was 
a result of the transition to a more capital-intensive stage of import substitution 
                                                 
7 Galenson, Mehta and Strumthal agree with de Schweinitz that trade unions increase consumption at the 
expense of investment, but are more skeptical of government repression as a justified and/or viable policy 
response.  On the one hand, Galenson argues that due to union competition, unions cannot restrain worker 
militancy without losing members.  Thus, trade unions in a democratic society appeal to the worker on an 
‘all-out consumptionist platform’ (1959, 13).  Thus, ‘the natural reaction of a government seeking to 
maintain a high rate of investment is to suppress the consumptionist proclivities of unions’ (14).  However, 
Galenson goes on to argue against long-term repression of the labor movement:  ‘tempting as this course 
may be, its economic, to say nothing of its political, wisdom is questionable.  Except in the communist 
totalitarian states, permanent suppression of unions has not been achieved.  When finally working-class 
organizations succeed in breaking the bonds of constraint, they are apt to demonstrate a high degree of 
instability and ‘irresponsibility’ (14).”  Mehta (1957) thought that ideally, politically independent unions 
were capable of aiding development by preventing industrial conflict in the state sector, restraining worker 
consumption, providing a moderate political voice to working-class interests, and aiding workers with the 
adjustment from traditional society to the life of an industrial worker.  Mehta argued that unions can 
achieve these goals with the ‘aid’ of the state and employers (23), although it is not clear what incentives 
would compel unions to cooperate.  Strumthal (1960) advocates a balanced cooperative approach in which 
unions partially restrain their wage demands while state planners scale back their growth targets.       
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industrialization (ISI).
8  This transition required heavy investments in technology and 
capital, a related reduction in consumption, a disciplined and efficient workforce, and a 
demobilization of working-class opposition to more disciplined economic policies--goals 
that could not be achieved absent repression of organized labor.
9   
By a similar logic, labor repression has been associated with rapid export oriented 
industrialization (EOI) in East Asia, and especially that of the four Asian Tigers—Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.  Haggard (1990) contends that authoritarian 
responses to labor enabled East Asian countries to overcome pressures for immediate 
consumption in pursuit of successful adjustment policies.  Sharma (1985), Bjorkman et. 
al. (1988), and Kuruvilla (1993; 1996) argue that states and employers repress labor during 
low-end EOI to contain labor-costs and are more accommodating in more advanced 
stages of EOI.  Deyo (1989) argues that the political exclusion of labor in East Asia 
“encouraged and sustained an industrialization strategy centered on the exploitation of 
low-cost labor in the production of manufactured exports for world markets” (4).   
According to Deyo, labor controls begin with paternalism at the factory level and expand 
upward as increases in the organizational capacity of the working-class bring about heavy 
doses of state intervention.
10  
                                                 
8 O’Donnell’s work consciously built upon a body of previous literature in which scattered observations 
amounted to a similar but less cogent and comprehensive argument.  For a representative sample, see 
Cardoso (1973), Iannni (1970), Stepan (1971), Stepan (1978), and Skidmore (1967).    
9 “A state dancing at the rollings [sic] of civil society could not undertake the deepening or attract the 
international capital that would have made it [industrialization] possible. . .[E]liminating the threat. . . by 
deactivating the popular sector, beheading its leadership and curbing its autonomy vis-à-vis the state and 
the dominant classes. . .was a necessary condition for. . .the reconstruction of capital accumulation 
mechanisms and. . .for the weakening of workers’ organizations at the factory level which would guarantee 
the social peace necessary for these faltering capitalisms to obtain new transfusions of international capital”  
(O’Donnell 1978, 13).   
10 While labor was politically excluded in all four East Asian tigers, South Korea witnessed the highest 
degree of state repression of labor.  From 1972 onwards, only state-approved unions could engage in 
collective bargaining, strikes were banned, and the government automatically intervened to settle industrial 
disputes (S.-I. Park 1993).  In Singapore, the government outlawed strikes and disbanded communist 
unions; however, aside from a seven-year period (1972-79), other unions were free to bargain for wages and 
wages were largely determined by market forces (Lim 1990; Pang and Lim 1989).  In Hong Kong and 
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Responses to the argument that repression facilitates growth 
While the rapid growth of East Asian and Latin American countries brought the 
argument that repression facilitates growth to prominence, a number of authors have 
shed doubt on its central assumptions and whether it derives enough empirical support 
from the historical record.  Freedman (1960) questioned whether increased wages 
necessarily led to increased total consumption and whether unions were incapable of 
foregoing short-term wage increases in the interest of democracy and long-term growth.
 
11  Similarly, Fisher (1961) argued that in developing countries, organized labor is too 
small a percentage of the labor force and too fragmented to substantially affect aggregate 
consumption.  Fisher further suggests that organized labor’s role in promoting 
progressive policies and institutionalizing industrial conflict outweigh any minor effects 
its activities might have on capital formation.        
The findings of studies based on the experiences of East Asian and Latin 
American NICs can also be criticized based on the size and selection of the sample.  As 
Geddes (1991) notes, the selection of countries used to support the view that repression 
facilitates growth is biased.  By selecting only countries achieving developmental success, 
these observers fail to consider cases in which repression coincided with developmental 
failures.  For example, Chile, Argentina, Burma, and Bangladesh are countries with high 
levels of labor repression and historically low growth rates.       
Moreover, a number of authors argue that even among the East Asian tigers, the 
link between repression and economic growth is unclear.  Freeman’s (1993) study of six 
                                                                                                                                              
Taiwan, EOI industrialization was accompanied by relatively little repression and a gradual relaxing of 
existing labor controls (Deyo 1984).    
11 “By what logic is it required that the working man, particularly the organized working man, purchase 
beer, cigarettes and luxury imports?  Perhaps enhanced income and power will lead to better government, 
an incentive tax system, the improvement of worker morale and production, the confidence of foreign 
governments and private investors—ad infinitum.”  Other of de Schweinitz’ contemporaries might have 
shared Freedman’s concerns regarding his assumptions.  For Kaldor (1956), the propensity to consume was 
lower for wages than for profits and Pasinetti (1962) believed it was lower for workers than for capitalists.   
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“successful” East Asian countries argues that adherence to core labor standards had no 
effect on economic growth and that East Asian growth rates did not result from labor 
repression.  Similarly, the World Bank (1993) argues that wage repression in South Korea 
and Singapore did not contribute significantly to their economic growth.  Fields (1994) 
argues that the economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have 
performed well despite differences in the structure of their labor markets.   
Finally, there is reason to believe that repression can backfire.  Some evidence 
suggests that labor repressive countries experience more labor market distortions than 
non-repressive countries (Ghanem, et. al. 1995).
12  A number of country studies show 
that repression might generate more disruptive patterns of industrial protest.  Freeman 
(1994) argues that the East Asian “crush strategy” of the 1970s led to a sudden “burst” of 
labor discontent and unionization in East Asian countries in later periods.  Similarly, 
Evans (1995) suggests that repression in South Korea led to a surge of industrial protest 
in the late 1980s.  Seidman (1994) shows how state-led efforts to deepen industrialization 
“manufactured militance” among industrial workers in Brazil and South Africa. 
While these critiques of the standard repressive hypothesis are informative, they 
stop short of examining how organized labor might actually benefit development.
13  
Further, the debate over whether the wholesale, Soviet-style repression of labor benefits 
development is increasingly irrelevant.  Whatever their initial merits, the rapid spread of 
democratic ideals and institutions in the developing world has largely rendered arguments 
based on the experiences of authoritarian countries obsolete.  A more relevant topic for 
                                                 
12 The extent to which labor market distortions are relevant for growth is unclear.  Agarwala (1983) finds 
that labor market distortions account for less than 10 percent of cross-country variation in economic 
growth.  Tzannatos (1996) concludes that labor market characteristics or policies are not related to 
variations in economic growth rates.   
13 The exception is Evans (1995) who argues that ‘synergistic’ ties between labor and the state may be an 
essential factor contributing to the successful stewardship of the economy over the long term.       
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contemporary circumstances is whether and what types of political controls should be 
placed on organized labor in newly democratic countries.  
The argument for labor controls based on the experience of democratic countries 
The most relevant discussion of state-labor relations in developing democracies is 
that John Pencavel (1997), whose conclusions and policy recommendations have won 
endorsement by the World Bank (1995). Pencavel believes that while labor unions can 
help bring about democracy by pressing for democratic reforms, once democracy is 
achieved, unions are potentially counterproductive for two reasons.   
First, unions become counterproductive to growth by pressing for higher wages 
in the collective bargaining arena.  Stressing the effects of union monopoly power, 
Pencavel echoes the findings of studies in the United States and Britain that find 
unionization leads to wage markups
14 and a series of related monopoly costs, including 
higher unemployment, inflation, reduced investment
15 and capital flight.
16  F u r t h e r ,  
Pencavel states that the monopoly costs associated with unionization increase when large, 
federated unions control a significant percentage of the labor supply and diminish 
competitive pressures in the product market by negotiating centralized industry- or 
national-level agreements.   
                                                 
14 The precise estimates of the wage effects of unionization vary, but studies in Britain and the United 
States suggest the markup is between 10 and 15 percent (Aidt and Tzannatos 2002, 41-44).   
15 Studies based on data from the United States (Hirsch 1990) and the United Kingdom (Denny and Nickell 
1991) show that unionization has a negative effect on investment in physical capital.  Grout (1984) presents 
the more qualified finding that investment falls with unionization in the absence of binding contracts.  In 
the United Kingdom, where Trade Union Immunity Laws prevent employers from suing unions for losses 
associated with industrial protest (and thus prevent binding contracts), unionization lowers investment.  In 
the United States, where binding contracts are possible, firms can anticipate the cost of wages and 
investment is unaffected by unionization.  Other studies find that unionization reduces spending on 
research and development (Acs and Audretsch 1987; Connoly, Hirsch, and Hirschey 1986; Ulph and Ulph 
1989).   
16 Wage markups spur a reallocation of capital from high-wage union sectors and regions to nonunion 
sectors and regions (Rees 1963), resulting in unemployment among unionized workers and reduced 
productivity and output if the new workers possess less experience and/or fewer skills (Sapsford and 
Tzannatos 1993, 325-28).   
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Second, unions can be counterproductive to economic development when they 
act as political pressure groups because they advocate economic policies that interfere 
with market processes and retard economic growth.  More specifically, in democratic 
societies, unions advocate a high minimum wage, restrictions on hiring and firing of 
workers, restrictions on free trade, greater government regulation of industry, state 
ownership of industry, and “in macroeconomic policy. . .have tended to support a goal of 
minimizing employment and have been tolerant of inflation”  (42).  These policies tend to 
benefit organized labor but hinder the economic prospects of other groups in society, 
namely nonunion workers and consumers.  Thus, Pencavel concludes that often, “the 
conflict is not between people receiving their incomes in the form of wages and people 
receiving their income in the form of profits or dividends; the conflict is among wage-
earners” (43). 
Thus, Pencavel argues that potential ‘participatory benefits’ of unionization, such 
as helping management find ways to increase productivity and enhancing bargaining 
efficiency,
17 can be realized when unions remain apolitical and bargaining occurs at the 
enterprise-level.  Excluding unions from politics reduces the likelihood that political 
parties will implement adverse economic policy.  Enterprise-level collective bargaining 
unleashes the competitive forces of the product market, taming the monopoly power of 
unions: “If collective bargaining takes place at the enterprise or plant level, the ability of 
the union to effect monopoly wage increases is tempered. . .and yet the potential exists 
for the union to act as a participatory organization for the workers.”    
                                                 
17  Pencavel is not alone in citing these benefits.  Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1979; 1984) 
show that by providing a unified voice for worker preferences, unions save management time, reduce 
disputes over work rules and seniority provisions, and reduce turnover.  Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) refer to 
these as ‘participatory benefits’ since they are the result of improvements to the efficiency of 
communication between managers and workers.     
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Pencavel’s policy recommendation, then, is that while in general governments 
should neither encourage or discourage union organization, governments should a) adopt 
policies that discourage unions from acting as a political pressure group and b) enact laws 
that encourage collective bargaining at the enterprise, as opposed to industry or national 
level. 
Shortfalls in Pencavel’s reasoning 
While Pencavel’s arguments represent an improvement on arguments based solely 
on the experiences of authoritarian countries, they also raise a series of questions.    First, 
Pencavel fails to consider the implications of party control over affiliated unions.  While it 
is clear that unions use their connections with political parties to promote working-class 
interests in the political arena, it is also likely that parties use their connections with 
unions to influence union behavior in the collective bargaining arena.   Ideally, a theory of 
union behavior should articulate expectations about how political parties influence union 
bargaining tactics and industrial protest and, further, the conditions under which the 
interests of the party’s broader constituency might trump those of the narrow interests of 
the union.  
Second, Pencavel’s critique of federated unions assumes that union federations 
bargain at the national or industry level while only enterprise-level unions enter into 
enterprise-level agreements.  Clearly, however, unions belonging to federations can enter 
into enterprise-level agreements and, in so doing, subject themselves to the same 
competitive market pressures as enterprise-level unions.  In other words, to the extent 
that national- and industry-level federations negotiate enterprise-level agreements, they 
exercise no greater monopoly power than enterprise-level unions.  
In fact, it is highly likely that a federation would enter into enterprise-level 
agreements in developing countries because conditions are typically not favorable to 
national or industry-level agreements. A common problem for union federations in 
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developing countries is the inability to find suitable partners with whom to sign an 
industry- or national-level agreement.  Employers’ associations with sufficient 
encompassment and institutional capacity to enforce an industry- or national-level 
agreement simply do not exist.  Additionally, employers may balk at signing generous 
industry- or national-level agreements when they face significant international 
competition or competition from the domestic nonunion sector. Finally, a union 
federation, while having many members in many enterprises, may not be encompassing 
enough to effectively implement industry- or national-level agreements.   
The behavior of union federations that sign enterprise-level agreements and/or 
are subject to intense pressure from competitive markets may differ from federations that 
exercise significant monopoly power.  Further, a union’s response to market pressures 
may depend on the incentives its leaders have to respond to those pressures.   
Competitive markets will put pressure on all union leaders to restrain protest due to 
increased risk of factory closures, factory relocations and job loss.   
However, union leaders may be more or less sensitive to these market pressures 
depending on their political external affiliations.  In the next section, I develop the 
argument that leaders of MPU and NIU federations have differing sets of incentives to 
respond to market competition. More specifically, I argue that MPUs are more likely to 
respond to market pressures by restraining protest when they are constrained by the 
broader interests of a political party.   
 
1.2  The political logic of industrial protest 
In  The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson argues that the behavior of 
encompassing organizations differs from that of individuals or narrow interest groups 
because encompassing organizations internalize the externalities associated with their 
actions (Olson 1982, 47-53).    
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Olson applies the logic of encompassment to explain the behavior of a number of 
types of organizations, including labor unions.  Olson argues that the more encompassing 
a union, the more likely it is to balance wage demands with the prosperity of a given firm 
or industry.  This theory fueled the research of a generation of scholars, who showed how 
variations national levels of union encompassment and the centralization of collective 
bargaining affect macroeconomic outcomes (see, for example Alvarez, Garrett and Lange 
1991; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Cameron 1984; Garrett and Way 2000; Golden 1993; 
Hibbs 1978; Iverson 1999; Korpi and Shalev 1980; Lange and Garrett 1985). 
However, Olson also applied his insights to the behavior of other organizations, 
including political parties, and for a number of reasons, the encompassment of political 
parties may be more relevant in explaining union behavior in developing countries than 
the encompassment of unions themselves.  First, the centralized collective bargaining at 
the national or industry level that makes encompassment relevant to economic outcomes 
in the OECD is virtually nonexistent in developing countries.  Second, in developing 
countries, very few unions are encompassing to the extent of unions in advanced 
industrial countries such as Germany, Norway or Sweden.  
On the other hand, most unions in developing countries have close ties with 
political parties, some of which are very large and powerful.  As Olson notes, large 
political parties are encompassing organizations that impose a more universalistic 
perspective on their members, including leaders of affiliated labor unions and business 
associations: 
 
[O]ne sometimes sees labor or socialist parties that emerged from trade 
unions, but with leaders that sometimes take a less parochial view than the 
parent unions, presumably because the party leader has a more 
encompassing constituency.  There are also parallel cases of conservative 
parties that draw their core support from business and professional 
associations, yet sometimes withhold certain favors from these lobbies in 
the interest of a thriving national constituency (Olson 1982, 52).                
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It is easy to see how this same logic can explain decisions of union leaders to employ 
disruptive protest tactics or restrain union militancy when faced with severe employer 
resistance.   
Aggressive bargaining, unorthodox protest and industrial violence produce 
obvious externalities that are counterproductive to economic development. Demands for 
remuneration placed too far above a firm’s capacity to pay lead to lengthy disputes that 
threaten the firm’s viability.  Extreme and violent forms of protest often transform 
industrial disputes into media spectacles, creating the perception of social instability, 
discouraging investment and damaging managerial authority and control. 
    Thus, according to the Olsonian logic of encompassment, we would expect 
powerful political parties to protect the interests of its broader constituency by 
discouraging leaders of its affiliated unions from employing aggressive bargaining tactics 
or using extreme and violent forms of protest.    
At the same time, individual union leaders have fewer incentives to bargain 
moderately and discourage extreme and violent protest among union members.  In fact, 
aggressive bargaining and violence may benefit union leaders if they result in large and 
rapid settlements for some workers or attract more members by bringing greater 
notoriety to the leader.  Additionally, union leaders can use violence to force bribe 
payments from managers.
18  Thus, absent the influence of a powerful political party, we 
would expect union leaders to more frequently resort to extreme and violent forms of 
protest. 
To sum up, although all unions are exposed to greater market competition when 
bargaining at the enterprise level, MPUs have greater incentives than NIUs to respond to 
market pressures by exercising greater caution in their bargaining and protest tactics.   
                                                 
18 Indian employers frequently noted the tendency for union leaders to use the threat of violence to extract 
bribe payments from management during interviews conducted between October 2002 and May 2004. 
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More specifically, we expect that leaders of NIUs are less risk averse than leaders of 
MPUs because they are not constrained by the broader interests of a political party.     
Thus, from the perspective of rapid economic growth, the most advantageous 
configuration of circumstances is competitive markets combined with collective 
bargaining dominated by MPUs who sign enterprise-level agreements.   
Organizational capacity and union restraint 
The basic prediction of the previous section is that in the context of more 
competitive product markets, political parties will restrain the protest of firm-level union 
leaders and members in the interest of investment and growth.  Crucially, however, we 
must consider the mechanisms through which political parties might “mobilize restraint” 
and the conditions that might impede or facilitate their coordination of class compromise 
at the firm level.   
In particular, in order to convince workers to refrain voluntarily from aggressive 
union behavior, the interests of the party leadership must filter down through the 
leadership of affiliated parent union organizations to firm-level leaders and members.  
Thus, the successful coordination of restraint depends on the ability of political parent 
union leaders to provide the appropriate incentives to firm-level leaders and members to 
secure their cooperation.   
In a democratic environment in which unions are voluntary organizations 
competing against many other unions for membership, effective long-term incentives are 
more likely to be inducements than constraints.  While some unions may occasionally 
resort to violence against workers for defecting to competing union organizations, 
violence is only likely to work as long as workers cannot find protection from competing 
union organizations upon defection.  Additionally, violence against union members can 
diminish the reputation of union leaders and thus over the long term may encourage 
more workers to defect.  In a competitive union environment, a more effective method 
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of securing worker allegiance is to promise workers success in defending their interests; 
thus a key mechanism for securing the allegiance of workers is success in the collective 
bargaining arena.   
This general argument about the interaction of union control and party affiliation 
can be stated more concisely in terms of the following hypotheses: 
1) The ability of affiliated unions to restrain union aggression is 
conditional upon the control of MPU leaders over firm-level leaders and 
members.   
2) The salutary effect of parent union control over firm-level leaders and 
members is conditional upon the affiliation of the parent union to a major 
political party.   
Diagram 1.1 presents a set of predictions regarding union behavior associated 
with these hypotheses.  The left side of the diagram distinguishes between unions 
affiliated to major political parties and those that are not.  The top of the diagram 
distinguishes between parent unions with control over firm-level leaders and members 
and those lacking control over firm-level leaders and members.   
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The cell labeled ‘A’ in the upper left-hand corner of the diagram represents the 
prediction that workers controlled by an MPU will engage in less aggressive protest 
against the management.  Examples from South Asia of unions falling into this category 
include the Center for Indian Trade Unions (CITU), affiliated to the CPM or Communist 
Party of India (Marxist), and the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), 
affiliated to the Congress Party.   
The cell labeled ‘B’ in the lower left-hand corner represents the prediction that 
workers controlled by an NIU will ratchet up militant union behavior in order to attract 
more members and pressure the management for higher rents.  Examples from South 
Asia of unions falling into this category include Datta Samant’s Maharashtra General 
Kamgar Union (MGKU) and the Ceylon Industrial Workers’ Union (CIWU).     
Cell ‘C’ represents the prediction that a loss of control by an MPU over its 
members will lead to higher levels of aggression when firm-level leaders and members 
take matters into their own hands by engaging in wildcat actions.  Here, workers enjoy 
the protection of a political parent union, but do not respond to the calls of the parent 
union for voluntary restraint.  Instead, workers use the political connections of the parent 
union organization as a shield against repercussions for their militant and/or illegal 
protest actions.  An example of this type of union is the Sri Lanka Nidahas Sevaka 
Sangamaya (SLNSS), affiliated to the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP).   
Finally, cell ‘D’ represents the prediction that company-specific or ‘enterprise’ 
unions will be quiescent.  Enterprise unions are, by definition, not controlled by an 
external union leadership.  Thus, unlike affiliated unions, enterprise unions have no 
affiliation to a political parent union and therefore no protection against the 
repercussions associated with militant union behavior.  Unlike NIUs, enterprise unions 
are not beholden to the interests of nonaffiliated union leaders.  In other words, although 
enterprise union leaders may have incentives to engage in aggressive protest behavior, 22 
they do not have the capacity for collective action necessary to do so.  Lacking external 
leadership and resources, they behave in an atomistic fashion, engaging in subdued 
negotiations with management.   
 
1.3  The potential costs of union violence and corruption 
Studies of industrial relations typically assume that union tactics are restricted to 
routine forms of protest such as marches, gatherings, pickets, and most commonly, strike 
protest.  As the social movement literature has emphasized, however, movement 
organizations have a variety of protest tactics at their disposal.  Social movement theorists 
have termed the sum of a group’s available tactics its protest “repertoire.”
19  I n  
developing countries, unions are no different from other movement organizations in the 
expansiveness of their protest repertoires and their willingness to employ non-routine 
protest tactics.     
For example, a more aggressive union might generate embarrassing publicity for 
the firm and the government through high profile fasts and occupation of company 
property.  In China and Sri Lanka, for instance, workers have publicized their anguish by 
occupying water towers or other high structures and threatening either to jump or fast 
until death if their demands went unmet.
20  In India, unions have perfected a unique form 
of occupation called the “gherao.”  “Gherao” means “encirclement” and is a form of 
protest in which workers surround the manager and refuse to allow the manager to leave 
his or her seat until their demands are met.   
                                                 
19 Charles Tilly defines “repertoires” as “a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out 
through a relatively deliberate process of choice” (Tilly 1995).  For comprehensive reviews of this concept, 
see Tarrow (1998) and Traugott (1995). 
20 The Washington Post reported on February 13, 2003, that “suicide threats by workers seeking to collect 
unpaid wages have become increasingly common in many parts of China, a telling sign of the frustrations 
felt by the nation's working class as the ruling Communist Party presses ahead with efforts to build a 
market economy while limiting political reform.”  I provide a detailed documentation of suicide threats by 
Sri Lankan workers in Chapter 6.   
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Even more disruptive than occupations or gheraos are violent episodes in which 
workers threaten or carry out significant acts of vandalism, hostage takings, or violent 
assaults.  Violence has been characteristic of union protest in many countries at many 
points in time, including the American labor movement in the first half of the 20
th 
century.
21  
Beyond generating negative publicity and scaring off investment, violent protest 
causes severe damage to the confidence, authority, and morale of managers.  It is not 
surprising that companies often suspend operations or withdraw investments following 
major episodes of union violence.   
Further, even short of carrying out violent acts, unions can use a credible threat 
of violence to extract concessions from the management.  These concessions can be 
higher wage agreements, but more often take the form of bribe payments to union 
leaders.  Thus, because violence facilitates corruption, it can potentially reduce the size of 
an eventual wage settlement if a significant portion of the company’s value-added that 
might have gone to union members instead goes to the pockets of union leaders.   
The potential for the use of violence increases when the payoffs of routine 
protest or the costs of violent protest for the union fall.  For instance, the payoffs of 
routine protest may fall if the employer is likely to replace workers or shift production to 
another location following a routine strike action.  The costs of violent protest fall when 
the state fails (due to corruption or lack of capacity) to enforce laws prohibiting violent 
forms of protest.   
                                                 
21 Although employers and the government initiated most industrial violence during this period, unions 
were no strangers to violence themselves.  Take, for instance, the famously violent tactics of the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW) in their efforts to overthrow the capitalist system.  Even more mainstream 
unions were more prone to violence at that point in American history.  In the Homestead Strike of 1889, 
for instance, members of the A.F. of L. engaged employer security forces in a thirteen-hour-long gun battle 
that killed 3 security guards and 8 workers (Foner 1980, 209).    
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These are precisely the conditions prevailing in many developing countries today.  
Economic liberalization has brought about a situation in which unions face the constant 
threat of job loss associated with footloose capital. At the same time, although employer-
friendly, states often lack the institutional capacity to enforce laws prohibiting violent 
forms of protest.  Faced with increased resistance from employers in the collective 
bargaining arena, many unions in developing countries fight back by threatening or 
carrying out acts of violence.     
 
1.4 The difficulty with inducing an enterprise unionism 
The perception that political unions are inimical to growth is not confined to 
academia; it shapes policy in important ways.  Despite adopting democratic institutions 
and becoming signatories to ILO core conventions, many governments repress unions on 
the grounds that they are ‘political’.  In the most extreme cases, governments have 
adopted policies to weaken or terminate relationships between political parties and 
unions, in effect inducing an enterprise unionism.               
The anticipated result of such policies is they type of atomistic and quiescent 
industrial relations found in East Asia, where each employer ‘bargains’ independently and 
cooperatively with its own enterprise union in the context of a constructive, non-
adversarial forum.  Ideally, this scenario would result in a highly paternalistic relationship 
between workers and employers as it did in East Asia (Deyo 1989).  
But what are the actual effects of such policies?  In this dissertation, I argue that 
the primary problem with forcibly inducing enterprise unionism is that in the process of 
repressing political unions, governments increase the likelihood of more aggressive and 
violent industrial protest by causing MPUs to lose control over worker behavior or by 
pushing workers out of MPUs and into more aggressive NIUs.  This argument is easily 
summarized in reference to Diagram 1: in trying to move from the scenario represented 
 25 
in box ‘A’ to the scenario represented in box ‘D’, I argue that governments risk producing 
the scenario represented by box ‘B’ or ‘C’.     
  The basic problem with inducing an enterprise unionism, then, is union 
competition. The argument in favor of the East Asian model of industrial relations 
assumes that it can be stable in a competitive union environment; that workers will 
support the enterprise union leadership and not defect by pursuing the support of an 
external (MPU or NIU) leader.  However, in a competitive union environment, the 
possibility of “defection” to an external parent union is high because external unions will 
constantly seek to expand their membership base by appropriating enterprise unions 
(Ramaswamy 1983).   
  A related problem pertains to the level of education among union members and 
the information gap between management and workers.  Naturally, the likelihood of 
defection from an enterprise union increases as the information/power imbalance 
between workers and management increases and cannot effectively bargain with 
management on their own.  Another way of stating this argument is to say that in a 
competitive union environment, firm-unions self-select into enterprise unions.  Only 
firm-unions with a well-educated membership and a great deal of bargaining experience 
can hold their own in negotiations with management to the extent that the costs of 
affiliation to a parent union (control, union dues, corruption, etc.) outweigh the benefits.   
In South Asia, as in many developing countries, the level of education among 
workers is low and the information/power gap between workers and management high.  
Thus, given a choice, workers are in developing countries are more likely to select 
external over enterprise-level leadership.         
Forcing a transition to an in-house union model by crushing strikes and forcing 
workers to sever ties with an external union may not necessarily result in long-term labor 
quiescence.  Because of the vast power imbalance between workers and management, 
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workers will have a continuing incentive to seek outside leadership.  Moreover, if workers 
have experienced repression, they will correctly perceive that a more militant leader than 
the last is required to stand up to a recalcitrant and repressive management.  Obviously, 
even if the ‘crush strategy’ yields short-term quiescence, the overall set of dynamics 
results in a highly volatile industrial relations scenario in which labor and management are 
on the continual verge of an explosive confrontation.  This argument is discussed in 
greater detail and is supported with evidence from Sri Lanka in chapter 6.     
 
1.5  Political parties and industrial relations in democratic South Asia 
To support the arguments about the benefits of political unionism and the 
negative effects of repressing political unions, this study draws on original data from 
surveys and interviews in four regions in South Asia.  The regional cases include Sri 
Lanka and the Indian states of Kerala, Maharashtra, and West Bengal (see figure 1.1).  
These cases were selected based on variations in the structures of their labor movements 
and the character of state-labor interactions that allow for rigorous testing of the 
dissertation’s central claims.   
Case study analysis and event-based statistical models test the hypothesis that 
voluntary affiliations between unions and major political parties facilitate economic 
development.  Interviews with managers, union leaders, and government officials provide 
evidence of the mechanisms through which political unions convince workers to restrain 
militancy and how repression erodes the social capital represented by these voluntary 
party-union ties.    
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Figure 1.1:  Regional Cases 
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Case selection and research design 
South Asia boasts tremendous linguistic, cultural, economic, and political 
diversity.  Social scientists have begun to recognize the benefits of this diversity for social 
scientific research, particularly in India, which is comprised of 29 states and 6 union 
territories.
22  As Dréze and Sen (1995, 51; 1996) and Sachs et. al. (2002) point out, Indian 
states vary widely in terms of their developmental success.   
Indian states also vary in terms of the structure of their labor movements and, 
more specifically, with respect to their levels of centralization and politicization.  This 
study uses regional variations in the structure of the labor movement South Asia’s 
manufacturing sector to test the theory set out in this introductory chapter.  If the 
hypothesis that MPUs facilitate cooperative industrial relations is correct, we will expect 
to see lower levels of industrial unrest in regions where the union movement is 
dominated by MPUs and higher levels of unrest in regions where the union movement is 
more competitive among NIUs.   
                                                 
22 For example, Dréze and Sen (1996) show how variations in levels of social capital explain varying levels 
of human development in Indian states.  Jeffery Sachs et. al. (2002) explore the determinants of widely 
varying rates of economic growth among Indian states.  Kohli (1990) examines wide variations in political 
stability.  Herring (1983) uses regional variation in South Asia to explore the efficacy of various models of 
tenure reform.  Sinha (2005) explores variations in development policy in Indian states to explain sub-
national investment flows.   
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Sri Lanka   NIUs compete for control of union 
movement, large presence of small-
party and politically independent parent 
union organizations     
Maharashtra  Highly competitive union movement 
with presence of MPUs, NIUs, and 
enterprise unions     
Kerala  Union movement controlled by two 
political union centers—the CITU and 
the Congress-affiliated Indian National 
Trade Union Congress (INTUC) 
West Bengal   Unions unified under the banner of the 
Center for Indian Trade Unions 
(CITU), affiliated to the Marxist CPM 
Political/ 
Centralized 
 
 
Figure 1.2:  Summary of union structure in regional cases 
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The regional cases selected for this study include Sri Lanka and the Indian states 
of West Bengal, Kerala, and Maharashtra.  The union movements in these regions vary 
from most to least centralized and most to least political (see Figure 1.2).  West Bengal’s 
trade union movement is the most centralized and political union movement in South 
Asia.  In West Bengal, the Center for Indian Trade Unions (CITU), affiliated to the CPM 
or Communist Party of India (Marxist), organizes the vast majority of workers in the 
manufacturing sector.  In Kerala, two political union centers vie for control over the 
union movement—the CITU and the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), 
which is affiliated to the Congress Party.   
In contrast, the union movements of Maharashtra and Sri Lanka are more 
decentralized and competitive.  In Maharashtra, a number of MPUs and NIUs vie for the 
allegiance of the working class and a large percentage of manufacturing firms have in-
house unions.  The dominance of politically independent parent unions and parent 
unions affiliated to small political parties makes Sri Lanka’s union movement uniquely 
competitive (and unstable).     
Surveys and interviews 
I followed a two-step process for selecting individual manufacturing firms in each 
regional case for participation in surveys and interviews.  First, in order to establish the 
frequency of violent, non-routine, and routine protest events in each regional case, I 
randomly selected approximately 100 firms from directories of manufacturers for 
participation in a brief telephone survey.  These surveys were answered by senior 
management and included questions about recent industrial protest and the affiliations of 
any unions in manufacturing units owned by the firm.    
Next, I randomly selected a sub-sample of approximately 40 firms for 
participation in an in-depth interview from the list of 100 firms participating in the 
telephone survey.  An in-depth survey regarding protest events experienced by the union 31 
and the political affiliations of the company’s unions comprised a large portion of each 
interview.  These in-depth surveys yielded data on hundreds of protest events used to 
construct statistical models of industrial protest, including a logistic model of dispute 
violence and a logistic model of lockouts.  In addition, the in-depth company interviews 
and interviews with union leaders yielded valuable qualitative interview evidence 
regarding the relationship between union incorporation and union behavior.   
As I will show, the results of the surveys and the qualitative interview evidence 
provide strong support for the hypothesis that political incorporation is associated with 
greater union restraint.  Interviews delivered a wealth of anecdotes suggesting differences 
preferred tactics of MPU and NIU leaders.  Statistical analyses of industrial disputes 
occurring in participating manufacturing firms show that affiliation to a major political 
party decreases the likelihood of a firm-union engaging in extreme or violent protest or 
forcing a lockout.     
 
1.6 The importance of organized manufacturing to India’s development 
To most observers, the importance of organized labor to economic development 
is obvious, but surprisingly the issue of working-class mobilization has received little 
attention in writings on Indian political economy.  There are at least two explanations for 
why India’s working class gets overlooked in standard social scientific accounts.  First, the 
traditional working class is made up of wage laborers in industry and the number of 
workers in the organized industrial sector is small relative to the total workforce.  The 
small size of India’s working class leads some scholars to conclude that working-class 
mobilization is unimportant in India.   
This view is relatively easy to dismiss on theoretical grounds.  The political and 
economic importance of the working class lies in its ability to monopolize existing labor 
markets and thereby challenge the structural power of capital.  In this equation, the 
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mobilizational capacity of the working class vis-à-vis industrial capital is the crucial factor 
to consider, not the size of organized manufacturing relative to the informal sector.   
Further, although organized manufacturing is small relative to the informal sector, it 
remains critical to the future of India’s industrial development.   
Thus far, the Indian government has pursued two developmental strategies that 
attempt to skirt the issue of industrialization.  The first has been to expand employment 
in the informal sector and to improve the productivity of informal sector workers, a 
strategy that appears to be related to a traditional Gandhian ideology that eschews large-
scale urban-based industrial development.
23  The second strategy involves, as Francine 
Frankel writes, “leapfrogging the industrial revolution” by focusing on the development 
of the service sector and, in particular, the high-skill high-wage information technology 
(IT) sector (2006, 610).   
These strategies are bound to fail.  Both the informal and IT sectors are unlikely 
to provide ‘good jobs’ (those with high pay and benefits) to the masses of poor Indians.  
By its very nature, informal sector employment leaves workers highly vulnerable to 
exploitation.
24  The IT sector will benefit only the tiny percentage of Indians who are 
fortunate enough to graduate from one of India’s elite universities.  Comparing India’s 
industrialization strategy with China’s, Dréze and Sen argue that “[e]ven if India were to 
take over the bulk of the world’s computer software industry, this would still leave its 
poor, illiterate masses largely untouched.  It may be much less glamorous to make simple 
pocket knives and reliable alarm clocks than to design state-of-the-art computer 
programmes, but the former gives the Chinese poor a source of income that the latter 
does not provide—at least not directly—to the Indian poor (1995, 39).”              
                                                 
23 According to Agarwala (forthcoming) the Indian government officially recognized the informal sector as 
the primary source of future employment of all Indians and has set up an official committee to give 
recommendations on improving productivity in the informal sector. 
24 One might go even further, arguing that the relationship between workers in the informal sector is largely 
despotic and therefore pre-capitalist (Weiner 1991; Heller 1999).   
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 Further, India’s ability to compete in the manufacturing sector is hampered by 
the inefficiencies associated with production in the informal sector.  Put simply, backyard 
operations in Dharavi and small-scale units in Umbergaon cannot begin to compete with 
the economies of scale enjoyed by manufacturers in China, where entire cities (e.g. ‘Sock 
City’, ‘Underwear City’) devote their energies to manufacturing a single product.  The 
development of medium- and large-scale manufacturing units in urban centers is 
therefore crucial to the growth of Indian industry.  The importance of understanding the 
role of organized labor is difficult to overstate.    
The second reason that the Indian working class is not taken seriously by social 
scientists relates to faulty historical analysis suggesting that organized labor in India is 
organizationally debilitated as a result of close ties with political parties.  This analysis has 
led many to conclude that since organized labor is co-opted by political parties it cannot 
be an important actor in collective bargaining or in politics.  I address this issue in 
Chapter 7, where I draw on original survey data, government statistics, and a discussion 
of Indian industrial and labor law to show that the Indian labor movement has been 
much more unified, much more contentious in the collective bargaining arena, and much 
more politically influential than previously assumed.   
 
1.7   Overview 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation elaborate on the major themes 
developed in this introduction. The dissertation divides into two parts.  Part I is 
comprised of Chapters 2-5 and explores the political economy of industrial protest in 
South Asia.  Chapter 2 examines the decline of union bargaining power in India since the 
late 1970s.  In contrast to previous explanations that have focused on the structural 
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weakness of the labor movement and the effects of globalization, I find that unions were 
weakened primarily by the political rise of the rural sector and a subsequent rural bias in 
development policy that hurt urban-based manufacturing units and led to widespread 
unemployment among workers in the manufacturing sector.   
Under these adverse economic circumstances, organized labor faced a choice: to 
mobilize resistance or restraint.  In Chapter 3, I present a political theory of union protest 
to explain why MPUs respond to their declining bargaining power with restraint while 
NIUs respond with more aggressive demands and more violent protest tactics.  More 
specifically, I develop a game-theoretic model of industrial protest that illustrates how the 
divergent preferences of MPU and NIU leaders over protest outcomes result in differing 
strategic behavior during the course of disputes with employers.  The model predicts that 
MPUs will only use routine protest tactics and will concede defeat to employers when the 
costs of protest are high, but that NIUs will frequently engage in violent and extreme 
forms of protest and will not concede defeat prior to engaging in some form of protest 
action.   
Chapters 4 and 5 test the predictions generated by game theoretic model 
developed in Chapter 3 using original survey data.  Chapter 4 presents data from a 
telephone survey of 385 employers to demonstrate a correspondence between regional 
variations in union structure and patterns of union protest.  The regional analysis shows 
that violent and extreme protest tactics are more frequent in Sri Lanka and Maharashtra, 
where NIUs dominate the labor movement and less frequent in Kerala and West Bengal 
where unions are organized into two major political union centers. 
  Chapter 5 presents a series of event-based models of protest violence and 
lockouts occurring at production units in the four regions to test the importance of party 
encompassment in generating union restraining relative to other explanatory factors.  Key 
competing explanations include the encompassment of the union itself, whether the 
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affiliated party is in power or out of power, the degree of union competition and rivalry in 
a given factory, the quality of management-worker interactions, and prevailing economic 
conditions.  The analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates that controlling for these factors, 
workers controlled by an MPU are significantly less likely to engage in violence or force a 
lockout than workers controlled by an NIU.    
Part II is comprised of chapters 6 through 8 and explores the broader 
implications of the theory developed in this dissertation for state-labor relations in 
developing countries.  Chapter 6 focuses on the issue of state repression by examining the 
history of state-labor relations in Sri Lanka.  I demonstrate how the Sri Lankan 
government’s repression of party-affiliated unions gave rise to a chaotic industrial 
relations situation.  Traditional left MPUs had been the primary negotiating partners in a 
somewhat centralized system of wage bargaining.  By marginalizing these traditional left 
unions, the government diminished worker faith in the collective bargaining process and 
created a space for the emergence of more radical left NIUs.  Ultimately, this destructive 
process culminated in the explosion of highly visible and threatening protest actions, 
which resulted in a substantial loss of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).   
Chapters 7 and 8 explore some of the potential downsides of the political 
incorporation of unionis.  Chapter 7 addresses to the argument that union political ties 
resulted in state domination and the splintering of India’s union movement shortly 
following Independence.  I argue that these conclusions are largely myths based on a 
flawed reading of industrial relations statistics.  In fact, political interference in the 
collective bargaining arena is relatively rare and the union movement has become slightly 
more unified since Independence.  Finally, I look at strike volume in 15 Indian states to 
find that, far from demonstrating quiescence, unions were increasingly aggressive in the 
industrial relations arena following Independence.      
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Another potential downside of political unionism is that union influence in the 
political arena can translate into pro-union policies that hinder investment and growth.  
Chapter 8 looks at the effects of pro-union legislation on investment and growth at the 
state level in India.  Focusing on state amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act, I show 
that whether pro-labor legislation affects investment and growth depends on the time 
period analyzed.  Pro-labor legislation had negative effects on investment, output and 
employment prior to economic liberalization but not after, suggesting the decreasing 
commitment of state governments to pro-labor legislation in recent years.   
Chapter 9 concludes by considering areas for future research and outlines some 
of the policy implications of the study.  Most importantly, my findings cast doubt on the 
strategy pursued by many countries of permitting democratic reforms while continuing to 
repress labor.  By severing the external ties of enterprise-level unions to political union 
centers, repression can transform a centralized MPU movement into a more fractious and 
volatile NIU movement.  In the end, labor repression destroys the social capital 
represented by voluntary party-union ties, leading to more unstable capital-labor relations 
over the long term.   
  
CHAPTER 2 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN INDIA 
 
[T]he most important class conflict in the poor countries of the world 
today is not between labor and capital.  Nor is it between foreign and 
national interests.  It is between rural classes and urban classes. 
 
--Michael Lipton, 1977 
 
As in most parts of the world, the strength of organized labor in the collective 
bargaining arena has been on the decline in recent years.  This decline is partly 
demonstrated by trends in industrial conflict.  The frequency of industrial disputes has 
declined while the average duration of disputes has increased (see Figure 2.1), indicating 
the inability of union leaders to mobilize workers for strikes and the need for unions to 
fight longer in the course of industrial disputes to defend their interests.   
At least three explanations have been offered for union weakness in India.  Some 
observers have pointed to the fragmentation resulting from state interference and 
repression of the union movement as the primary cause of union weakness in India. Most 
notably, Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) popularized the view that the political cooptation 
and domination of unions results in a continual fragmentation of the Indian union 
movement, leading to the increasing union weakness in collective bargaining and politics 
over time.  They refer to this process as ‘involution’ and to the politics it generates as an 
‘involuted pluralism.’
1
A second explanation for the weakness of Indian labor centers on the competitive 
pressures introduced by economic liberalization and increased exposure to international 
trade (Bhowmik 1998).  This argument bears a high degree of plausibility because of the 
                                                 
1 ‘We use involution as a metaphor for the decline or loss of vigor that results when a viable intensively 
elaborated pattern of development is extensively elaborated by continuous replication of units.  Such 
replication not only weakens each successive unit but also weakens all units collectively and thus the activity 
as a whole.  In this sense, more becomes less.  Involution is thus a regressive, debilitating process that 
results in decreasing effectiveness or entropy, the reverse of evolution’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 257).  
See Kennedy (1966) and Raman (1967) for similar arguments.   
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adverse impact global competition had on unionization rates in advanced industrial 
democracies (Western 1997).  Among Indian union leaders and employers, the perception 
that union weakness results from trade is magnified by the rapid development of Chinese 
export-oriented industry and competition from Chinese imports.
2  
A third potential explanation for union weakness in India pertains to the rise of 
identity politics in India.  Since the early 1990s, the Indian political system has undergone 
dramatic changes.  Namely, the party system has been transformed from ‘catchall’ system 
dominated by the Congress party to a more fragmented, ‘cleavage-based’ system 
dominated by parties whose constituencies are one or a handful of caste (jati) or ethno-
religious groups (Chhibber 1999).  Arguably, the rise of identity-politics in recent years 
could have undercut the salience of class-based politics and, more generally, the potential 
for class-based mobilization.                      
While each of these arguments bears an initial plausibility, each fails to explain the 
gradual downward trend in dispute frequency and rise in dispute duration seen in Figure 
2.1.  State intervention and repression are unlikely explanations because the trends are so 
gradual. Union fragmentation is an unlikely explanation because the mechanisms are 
unclear.  While fragmentation may harm the efforts of unions to present a unified front in 
the political arena, it is not obvious why union competition would produce weakness in 
the collective bargaining arena.  In fact, one might argue that a healthy competition 
between unions to promote worker interests should lead to higher levels of worker 
protest and quicker settlements—the opposite of the trends displayed in Figure 2.1.    
 
 
 
2 Employers and union leaders commonly expressed this view in interviews conducted during the 2002-
2003 academic year.     
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Dispute frequency is the number of industrial disputes per 1000 workers.  Dispute duration is the number of workdays lost 
per striking (or locked out) worker.  National-level data on the annual number of disputes, workdays lost, and number of 
workers involved in disputes in the manufacturing sector are available in the Laborsta database, published online by the 
International Labour Organization.  National-level data on the number of workers in manufacturing are taken from the 
Annual Survey of Industries, Central Statistical Organisation, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and 
Programme Implementation, Government of India. 
Figure 2.1: Trends in dispute frequency and duration in India’s manufacturing sector 
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Economic liberalization and the rise of identity politics suffer from the common 
problem of timing.  India’s economic reform process began in earnest in 1991 following a 
severe balance of payments crisis.  The changes in the frequency and duration of 
industrial disputes witnessed in Indian manufacturing clearly predate 1991, making it 
difficult to point to the competitive pressures of global trade as the primary cause of 
union weakness.   
The downward trend in dispute frequency and upward trend in duration also 
preceded the rise of identity politics.  As Chhibber notes, the rise of caste politics began 
with conflicts over the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations by 
V.P. Singh’s government in 1989, which set up a system of caste-based reservations for 
government jobs (1999).
3  Ethno-religious politics only gained widespread prominence 
after Hindu nationalists destroyed Babri Masjid in 1991 and the Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won national elections for the first time 1996.  Thus, the 
trends highlighted in Figure 2.1 had played themselves out well before the rise of caste-
based and ethno-nationalist politics.
4  
Challenging these conventional explanations, I suggest that the proximate cause 
of union weakness from the late 1970s onwards was due to an important, but often 
overlooked, transformation in Indian politics--the programmatic political mobilization of 
rural constituencies in the late 1970s and 1980s.  This mobilization precipitated 
agricultural procurement policies that shifted the terms of trade in favor of agriculture 
                                                 
3 Chhibber argues that the Commission’s recommendations generated caste conflicts that fractured the 
Congress Party’s local cross-caste (cross-jati) coalitions.  Subsequently, caste-based parties such as the 
Bahujan Samaj Party, the Samajwadi Party, and the Bharatiya Janata Party were able to capitalize on these 
new cleavages and the Congress’s inability to take a stance on the Mandal Commission recommendations.     
 
4 Additionally, as Varshney (2002) notes, unions often check the rise of identity politics by fostering a sense 
of civic community and providing social networks through which ethnic groups can communicate and 
resolve their grievances.  If Varshney is correct, unionized workers should be less susceptible to ethno-
nationalist appeals than the average voter. 
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and contributed to a rise in the product wage (wages relative to producer prices).
5  
Further, as the rural sector grew in political importance, legislators became more 
concerned with generating employment in rural areas and consequently instituted a series 
of tax incentives designed to stimulate production in small-scale, rural units.       
Ultimately, the pressure of a rising product wage combined with new competition 
from small-scale and rural industries led to a decline in the profitability of large and 
medium-scale urban production units.  The tax breaks and lower wage costs helped rural, 
non-unionized, small-scale units to compete in product markets once dominated solely by 
unionized large and medium-scale urban units.  The crisis that followed put unions on the 
defensive as large and medium-scale producers fought hard to control wage costs.   
Instead of freely engaging in frequent strikes, unions either found themselves restraining 
militancy to maintain the viability of their companies or locked out by employers who 
were no longer profitable and demanding wage cuts.  In short, the strength of two classic 
distributional coalitions—unions and urban industry--was circumscribed by the expansion 
of democratic participation to rural areas.          
In the next section, I develop a general theory of industrial disputes to explain 
why disputes are more numerous but shorter when firms are profitable and fewer in 
number and longer when firms are unprofitable.  In particular, I point to the union’s need 
to attract members through strategic use of the strike weapon to explain this pattern.  In 
section 3, I outline the rural political mobilization in India that occurred during the late 
1970s and 1980s, and show how this mobilization affected development policy and the 
structure of production.  In section 4, I explain how these policy changes affected labor 
                                                 
5 The product wage is defined as the total wage bill divided by the number of production worker hours (or 
days) deflated by the sectoral producer price.  It is distinct from the real wage, for which the deflator is an 
index of consumer prices.  I discuss the merits of this measure of inflation in greater detail below.      
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and present basic regression models to support my argument about the relationship 
between rural bias and the declining bargaining power of organized labor.  
 
2.1  Taking muscle power seriously: a theory of dispute frequency and duration 
  A theory of industrial disputes that explains both the frequency and duration of 
disputes has long remained elusive to students of union behavior.  In this section, I argue 
that we can understand the consistently observed patterns of a pro-cyclical rise in dispute 
frequency and a counter-cyclical rise in strike duration by examining the interests of 
unions in calling out strikes and the interests of employers in settling disputes.  My theory 
comports with Hicks’ (1963) intuition that strikes are often a show of force by unions, 
but in contrast to Hicks, I argue that displays of force by unions are not “mistakes.”  
Instead, displays of force help unions to expand membership and generate monopoly 
rents in the labor market.   
  Econometric studies have established a relationship between economic cycles and 
patterns of strike activity.  Most of these studies focus on a pro-cyclical rise in strike 
frequency.  Using the Burns-Mitchell-NBER tools for business cycle analysis to analyze 
strike data, Jurkat and Jurkat (1949) uncovered strong evidence of procyclical variations in 
strike activity in the United States between 1915 and 1938.  This analysis was extended by 
Rees (1952), Weintraub (1966) and Kennan (1986) to cover the period 1915-1986.  Pigou 
(1927), Griffin (1939), Yoder (1940), and Knowles (1952) also pointed to evidence of 
procyclical variation in strike frequency in the United States and Britain.  There is also 
evidence of a counter-cyclical rise in strike duration.  Kennan (1985) finds a statistically 
significant negative relationship between strike duration and levels of industrial 
production.    
  The key to explaining the patterns of a pro-cyclical rise in strike frequency and a 
counter-cyclical rise in strike duration lies in the fact that unions have two separate 
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motivations for calling out strikes.  The first generally agreed upon motivation is to secure 
a greater share of the value added produced by a firm.  A second motivation, often 
overlooked by scholars, is to maximize union membership.  As Golden (1997) notes, one 
primary motivation for strikes is the retention of key union members when firms cut the 
size of the workforce during economic downturns.   
  Additionally, unions engage in strikes to expand union membership through a 
show of force.  Hicks (1963) first raised the possibility that unions use strikes more for a 
display of “muscle power” than a tool for extracting higher wages from employers.  Hicks 
was trying to suggest an escape from the paradox he is famous for demonstrating:  since 
strikes decrease the size of the economic pie in a given firm, if there is a theory of strikes 
which predicts the outcome of a strike, both parties have an incentive to agree to this 
outcome in advance and avoid the economically damaging strike.   
  Citing this paradox, Hicks argued that strikes are mistakes from a purely 
economic perspective.  Thus, a masculine show of force by the union leader is the 
irrational non-economic reason that unions strike.  Yet, if we look beyond the level of the 
firm, there may be a very good economic explanation for “muscle power,” namely the 
expansion of union membership.   
  As Farber (1986) notes, the conception of unions in most economic research is 
that “unions are fundamentally organizations that seek to create or capture monopoly 
rents available in an industry” (Farber 1986, 1044).  Unions can capture rents by 
exploiting existing product market imperfections or regulations in an industry.  Unions 
can also create rents by monopolizing the sale of labor when they are able to organize a 
significant portion of the labor force.  Thus, to the extent that a demonstration of a show 
of force helps to attract and retain union members, the use of ‘muscle power’ makes 
perfect sense from a classical economic standpoint since it helps unions in the 
development of monopoly power in the market. 
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  In order for strikes to be effective as a show of force, the union needs to win a 
substantial demand.  Unions are most likely to win substantial demands in economic 
upturns, when the demand for a firm’s products is high and the firm will settle quickly to 
avoid losing valuable orders and market share.  Thus, in economic upturns, unions can 
maximize their share of the value added and reap the reputational/membership benefits 
of successful strikes by going on short strikes.  Further, we would expect unions to 
engage in short strikes in economic upturns even if the firm agrees to the wage demand prior to the 
strike, because the membership gain associated with a show of force exceeds the loss of 
revenues from a brief strike.          
  In economic downturns, the demand for the firm’s products will be low and the 
firm will have less incentive to settle.  Since strikes will take longer to win in an economic 
downturn, they become more expensive for unions and consequently unions will engage 
in fewer short ‘frivolous’ strikes for a show of force.  Instead, strikes in an economic 
downturn are likely to be defensive in nature and protracted, and are more likely to be 
over wage cuts than wage hikes.   
   This theory of industrial disputes supports three predictions of union and firm 
behavior following the expiration of a collective agreement: 
Prediction 1.  When a firm is profitable, the union provokes a short dispute as a show of 
force. 
 
Prediction 2.  When a firm is unprofitable, the firm provokes a long dispute over a wage 
cut. 
 
Prediction 3.  When a firm is just breaking even, a dispute will not occur. 
 
  If true, these predictions help to explain the pro-cyclical rise in dispute frequency 
and countercyclical rise in dispute duration observed in econometric studies of industrial 
disputes in the United States and Britain.  They should also apply to other contexts.  In 
India, for instance, a fall in strike frequency and rise in strike duration have accompanied 
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changes in the structure of production that have reduced the profitability of employers in 
medium and large-scale sector units.  I provide a detailed outline of these structural 
changes in the next section and argue that they originated from the political mobilization 
of India’s agrarian sector.  I then demonstrate the correlation between these structural 
shifts, a decreasing trend in dispute frequency, and an upward trend in dispute duration.    
 
2.2  From urban to rural bias in Indian development policy 
The populist mobilization of India’s rural voters and the transition from urban to 
rural bias in India’s agricultural and industrial development policies has been clearly 
documented. Following Independence in 1947, with the support of Jawaharlal Nehru, the 
logic of urban bias prevailed.  Because he was primarily concerned with rapid industrial 
development that required heavy state investments into industry and infrastructure that 
India could only pursue in the absence of heavy spending on the agrarian sector, Nehru 
advocated tenure reform to increase agricultural productivity in place of expensive 
agricultural inputs and price subsidies that would eventually bring about India’s Green 
Revolution.
6   
The government directed the vast majority of industrial investment towards 
medium and large-scale units in urban areas, meaning that it effectively reserved high 
paying jobs in industry for urban dwellers.  Nehru’s industrial policy ran starkly counter 
to the Gandhian ideal, which was to foster a more democratic distribution of investment 
through  support  for  labor-intensive  small-scale  sector  industry  in  the  countryside.            
   After Nehru’s death, agricultural and industrial development policies underwent 
substantial shifts away from Nehruvian principles.  Agricultural development policy 
shifted almost immediately towards stimulation of agricultural growth through higher 
                                                 
6 For a detailed discussion of Nehruvian tenure reform policy, see Ronald Herring, Land to the Tiller: The 
Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in South Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1983. 
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procurement prices and agricultural subsidies.  Slowly, industrial development policy 
began to privilege small-scale rural production over large and medium-scale urban 
production. 
Shifts toward rural bias in agricultural development policy 
Following Nehru’s death, C. Subramanium, India’s powerful Food and 
Agricultural Minister between 1964 and 1966 pushed India’s new Prime Minister, Lal 
Bahadur Shastri, to implement policies which would stimulate growth in the agrarian 
sector.
7  These policies included above-market procurement prices set by the 
Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) for the Food Corporation of 
India’s (FCI) purchase of food for the public distribution system.  Since the FCI 
purchases approximately 10 percent of food grains every year (Mooij 1999), FCI 
purchases at above-market rates constitute an artificial stimulus for food grain prices and 
a production incentive for farmers.  The government also introduced policies to increase 
subsidies for fertilizers and tube wells, which would enable farmers to respond to these 
price incentives.  This combination of price incentives and subsidies is credited for India’s 
Green Revolution during the late 1960s.     
This initial shift in food price policy was largely at the bureaucratic level and 
involved debates among technocrats.  Producer prices eventually faded as a political 
imperative in the early 1970s.  Indira Gandhi championed the agrarian cause in a much 
more politicized manner in the mid- and late-1970s.  Indira’s rural populism was followed 
by the even more potent mobilization of Chowdhry Charan Singh’s Janata Party.
 8  Singh 
argued that Gandhi’s urban political base compromised her dedication to the concerns of 
the rural sector.  Singh’s movement matured and gained momentum at
 
7 The most comprehensive analysis of the politics of rural-urban terms of trade in India is Ashutosh 
Varshney (1998).   
 
8 The “Janata Party” was, in actuality, a coalition of smaller agrarian-based parties.   
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The gross agriculture-industry terms of trade is measured by the ratio of agriculture to manufacturing GDP deflators.  The 
product wage in manufacturing is the total wage bill divided by the number of production worker days deflated by the 
wholesale price index of manufactured products.  Data on manufacturing and agriculture output used to calculate the 
GDP deflators are from the National Accounts Statistics.  Data on wages and production worker days are from the 
Annual Survey of Industries.  The National Accounts Statistics, Annual Survey of Industry, and wholesale price index 
are published by the Central Statistical Organization, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Programme 
Implementation, Government of India.   
Figure 2.2: Trends in India’s agriculture-industry terms of trade and the product wage
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the state level through the 1980s by mobilizing a series of large price demonstrations and 
winning large numbers of seats in state assemblies.   
As Ashutosh Varshney notes, Singh’s mobilization made the producer price issue 
a fixed part of the political landscape that no party could ignore.  Consequently, even 
though the power of the Janata Party was short-lived in the national parliament, food 
grains were consistently procured at above market rates from the 1980s onwards because 
producer prices became an essentially irrevocable privilege for farmers.  The extent of this 
privilege is now such that even “deficit states”, which take more food from the central 
distribution system than they contribute and so have an interest in low food prices, 
demand price increases for their agricultural products (Varshney 1998, 85).       
As one would expect, absent a similar stimulus for manufactured products, over a 
period of two decades the artificial stimulus to food prices substantially influenced the 
urban-rural terms of trade.  The best measure of the terms of trade for time series analysis 
is the gross terms of trade which is calculated as the ratio of agriculture and 
manufacturing price deflators:
9
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Figure 2.2 displays the gross terms of trade from the late 1970s through the late 1990s.  
From the early 1980s onwards, the gross terms of trade show a consistent trend in the 
terms of trade toward agriculture.
10
 
9 The gross terms of trade index is superior to indices based on surveys or baskets of goods (such as barter 
terms of trade indices) for a number of reasons.  Unlike barter terms of trade indices, the gross terms of 
trade index measures the returns to investment and corrects for productivity increases in both sectors.  
Additionally, the gross terms of trade index is both a broader and more consistently accurate indicator of 
terms of trade than barter terms of trade indices.  This is because a) the baskets of goods, commodity 
weights, and groups surveyed for barter terms of trade indices either change or become less representative 
of the economy over time and b) the quality of goods produced in a basket of goods is not uniform across 
firms.  Nonetheless, in the Indian context, the movements and turning points of the gross and barter terms 
of trade indices closely mirror one another (Hazell, Misra, and Hojatti 1995). 
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The shift toward rural bias in industrial policy  
  The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969-74) marked a watershed in Indian industrial 
policy.  In it, the Planning Commission stressed the “competitive rather than 
complementary aspects of the development of the small-scale and the large-scale sectors” 
and advocated a set of financial incentives and protections for small-scale and rural 
industries designed to increase the regional dispersal of labor-intensive economic growth 
(Ahluwalia 1998, 265).  Members of the planning commission believed that targeting the 
small-scale sector would boost industrial development in rural areas because the average 
rural entrepreneur has only a very small amount of resources to invest.  Thus, the 
planning commission viewed the goals of regional dispersal of growth and growth of the 
small-scale sector as one-and-the-same.
11   
  The incentives provided to small-scale sector industries included subsidized loans, 
preferment in public procurement, but most importantly, reservations and exemptions 
from sales and excise taxes.  Starting with a handful of reservations in the late 1960s, the 
                                                                                                                                              
10 Surprisingly, in the most recent scholarly treatment of the subject, Ashutosh Varshney argues that 
agrarian political mobilization has had very little effect on the terms of trade in India and that there is no 
evidence of a trend in favor of agriculture (Varshney 1998, 149-152).  Varshney relies on the ratio of prices 
of manufactured products to prices of agricultural products in the Wholesale Price Index—a crude barter 
terms of trade index to support this conclusion.  However, the more scientific barter terms of trade index 
published by India’s Department of Economics (which is lagged for four years to account for missing data) 
shows a clear upward trend in the terms of trade during the 1980s and 1990s.  Varshney also uses 1971 as 
the starting point of his analysis and 1989 as the endpoint.  Full time series of either the gross or barter 
terms of trade show a peak in the terms of trade in favor of agriculture around 1970 after the Shastri 
government’s stimulation of prices during the late 1960s, a sharp drop during the 1970s as Indira Gandhi 
ignored the producer price issue, and a rise in favor agriculture again during the 1980s and 1990s following 
widespread political mobilization of farmers by the Janata movement.  In short, there is good evidence to 
suggest that artificial stimulation of prices results in changes in the agriculture-industry terms of trade.   
  
11 Although the planning commission’s logic behind using SSI development to target rural areas makes 
sense, the belief that incentives to small-scale industry would occur solely or even primarily in rural areas 
was an article of faith based on the Ghandian ideal of rural development.  In fact, most small-scale sector 
production occurs in urban areas.  According to the Ministry of Small Scale Industry’s 2000 sample survey, 
53 percent of small-scale sector units operated in areas designated as ‘urban’ and 47 percent in areas 
designated as ‘rural’.  Yet, as I demonstrate below, the expansion of the productive capacity has the effect 
of driving up competition in product markets regardless of the actual location of the small-scale units.     
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number of products reserved for exclusive production by small-scale sector industries 
grew to almost 900 by the 1990s (Joshi and Little 1996, 200).   
Additionally, to ensure the growth of small-scale industries (SSIs) in rural areas, 
the Government of India (GOI) began using the industrial licensing system to restrict the 
expansion of large and medium-scale units in urban areas and favor the growth of 
production in industrially “backward” districts.  Finally, the GOI offered tax exemptions 
for companies setting up production units (including medium- and large-scale units) in 
“backward” or “no-industry” districts and invested in special economic zones in rural 
areas (Ahluwalia 1998).    
  These incentives were highly successful in transforming the structure of 
production in India’s manufacturing sector.  Figure 2.3 illustrates trends in the growth of 
small-scale industry, measured as the ratio of total output produced in SSI units to total 
output in the registered manufacturing sector.  The index climbs from .35 in 1974 to 
almost .60 in 1996.      
Available evidence suggests that these incentives ultimately led to a movement of 
overall productive capacity from rural to urban areas.  Figure 2.4 displays trends in the 
percentage of total investment, output, and employment in rural areas.  These data are 
published in the Annual Survey of Industries from 1987 onward.  As Figure 2.4 indicates, 
there has been a clear upward trend in the percentage fixed capital investment, value of 
output produced, net value added, and workers employed in rural areas during the period 
for which the data are available.5
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The SSI Output Index is the ratio of total output produced in small-scale industrial (SSI) units to total output in the 
manufacturing sector.  The pricing power of manufacturing is measured as the gross terms of trade between 
manufacturing and all other sectors, or the ratio of manufacturing to non-manufacturing GDP deflators.  Data on 
SSI output comes from Small Scale Industries in India, Office of the Development Commissioner, Ministry of 
Small Scale Industries, Government of India.  Data on total output in manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
sectors is from the National Accounts Statistics, Central Statistical Organisation, Department of Statistics, Ministry 
of Planning and Programme Implementation, Government of India.   
Figure 2.3:  Trends in SSI output and pricing power in India’s manufacturing sector 
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Source:  Annual Survey of Industries, Central Statistical Organisation, Department of Statistics, Ministry of 
Planning and Programme Implementation, Government of India 
 
Figure 2.4: Percentage of industrial investment, employment and output in 
India’s rural areas 
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2.3  The effects of rural bias on manufacturing and organized labor 
The changes in industrial and agricultural development policy outlined above 
adversely affected the fortunes of the manufacturing sector and with it those of organized 
labor.  Diagram 2.1 identifies the precise chain of causal relationships linking rural 
political mobilization to union protest behavior in the industrial relations arena.   
As explained in the previous section, rural political mobilization leads to two sets 
of pro-rural development policies—remunerative pricing for agricultural products and 
incentives designed to shift industrial production to the small-scale and rural sectors.  
Both sets of policies produce higher levels of unemployment among workers in the 
manufacturing sector.   
The increased production capacity of SSI and rural units resulting from incentives 
to SSI and rural sectors produces unemployment both directly by generating greater 
competition in product markets and indirectly by putting upward pressure on the product 
wage (wages deflated by producer prices).  The increased terms of trade to agriculture 
resulting from remunerative pricing affects unemployment only indirectly through the 
product wage.  Rising unemployment, in turn, decreases the bargaining leverage of 
unions, leading to shorter and less frequent strikes.  I provide a more detailed discussion 
of these relationships in the remainder of this section.      
 
  
Diagram 2.1: Hypothesized links between rural political mobilization and trends in strike activity 
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The relationship between rural bias and the product wage 
The product wage measures the movement of wages relative to producer prices 
(Anant and Sundaram 1996).  It is defined as the total wage bill divided by the number of 
production worker hours (or days) deflated by the sectoral producer price.
   A rising 
product wage indicates that producer prices are not keeping pace with the rising costs of 
labor.  Conversely, a declining product wage indicates that producer prices are rising 
faster than the cost of labor.  Assuming a constant rate of investment and no increases in 
productivity, a rising product wage will reduce company profits. 
Movements in the product wage can differ from those of real wage, which 
deflates wages by a cost of living index.  The product wage can rise as real wages fall if 
inflation of consumer prices outpaces inflation of producer prices and vice versa.  As is 
demonstrated in the statistical analysis below, the effects of the product wage and real 
wage on worker protest are also distinct.  From the perspective of union bargaining 
power, we are more interested in the effects of the product wage because a higher 
product wage has more impact on the employer’s ability to pay a higher wage than the 
real wage.       
The effects of the terms of trade on the product wage 
  The agriculture-industry terms of trade have implications for the product wage in 
the manufacturing sector and thus the bargaining power of organized labor.  All things 
being equal, rising food prices generate inflation, thereby placing upward pressure on 
wages.  If the terms of trade are going in favor of agriculture, wages (in tandem with food 
prices) will grow faster than the prices of manufactured goods and the product wage will 
rise.  On the other hand, if the terms of trade are going in favor of industry, the prices of 
manufactured goods will grow faster than wages and the product wage will fall (Anant 
and Sundaram 1996).   
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In India, the relationship between the terms of trade and the product wage is 
likely to be magnified by two factors.  First, a large percentage of wage agreements are 
tied to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) through cost of living adjustments (COLAs).  
Additionally, as in most developing countries, food items constitute a large portion of the 
basket of goods used to calculate the CPI.  If wages are closely tied to inflation through 
COLAs and if food prices are heavily weighted in the CPI, the product wage is almost 
certain to rise as the terms of trade go in favor of agriculture.  As Figure 2.2 
demonstrates, the trends in gross terms of trade are indeed closely related. There is a 
close correspondence between the upward trend in the product wage and the upward 
trend in terms of trade from 1975 to 1996.  The turning points are similar and the 
correlation coefficient between the two variables is .89. 
The effects of competition from small-scale industry on the product wage 
The growth in the small-scale sector has also had a significant impact on the 
product wage in India.  Because the vast majority of SSI units are not unionized and 
many are located in rural areas where the cost of living was low, small-scale sector units 
had much lower wage bills in the 1980s.  As we said earlier, small-scale units also 
benefited enormously from tax breaks, subsidies, and restrictions on the growth of large 
and medium-scale units through industrial licensing and production quotas.  All of these 
benefits made production much cheaper in small-scale units and consequently small-scale 
units posed enormous competition for large and medium-scale units.  Small-scale 
production was especially competitive in sectors with low entry barriers such as in 
pharmaceuticals, textiles, and fast moving consumer products.  However, even heavy 
industry began to feel the pinch as small-scale units began eating away at their market 
share in portions of their products lines that required less capital investment.     
The competition from small-scale units led to a marked decline in the pricing 
power of manufactured products.  As Figure 2.3 demonstrates, trends in the growth of 
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the productive capacities of the small-scale sector are inversely related to the pricing 
power of manufacturing.  Here, the pricing power of manufacturing is measured by a 
gross terms of trade index of manufactured products relative to all products.  It is clear 
from Figure 2.3 that a marked decline in the pricing power of manufacturing 
accompanied the rise in SSI output.  The turning points of the two variables are similar 
and the correlation coefficient is -.91. 
The relationship between rural bias and unemployment  
  Ultimately, a rising product wage and incentives to small-scale and rural industries 
likely had a significant impact on employment in the manufacturing sector.  The rising 
product wage and shift in production to rural and small-scale sector industries led to a 
large rise in the level of unemployment among workers in the manufacturing sector 
during the 1980s as workers in large- and medium-scale urban units were thrown out of 
work.  Figure 2.5 displays the trend in unemployment in the manufacturing sector.   
Unemployment more than doubled in the manufacturing sector during this period, rising 
from 10% in 1979 to 24% in 1991.  Unemployment in manufacturing continued to rise 
during the 1990’s, although at a slower rate, moving from 24% in 1991 to 30% in 1997.  
In one sense, this is surprising since productivity growth was quite substantial 
during 1980s relative to earlier periods.  According to Unel’s (2003) calculations, the 
average annual increase in labor productivity was 6.3 percent during the period 1979-
1990—approximately three times higher than the growth rate of labor productivity in the 
1960s and 70s.  Additionally, the growth rate of the capital-output ratio was lower in the 
1980s (1 percent) than in the 1960s and 70s (2.3 percent), implying a higher growth rate 
in capital efficiency.  Total factor productivity growth was also higher in the 1980s 
(between 1.8 and 3.2 percent) than in the 1970s (approximately -.1 percent).  One might 
expect that these gains in productivity would have offset the rise in the product wage, 
thereby saving jobs.  5
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Figure 2.5: Unemployment index for manufacturing workers in India, 1974-1997 
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However, the productivity gains were in large measure due to an overall 
restructuring of industry in response to greater product market competition.  This 
restructuring involved both a higher level of investment in capital and technology and a 
shedding of labor, which is reflected in the rapid increase in capital intensity during the 
1980s.  From 1979 to 1990, the capital-labor ratio increased at an average annual rate of 
7.3 percent, one percentage point faster than the growth rate of labor productivity during 
the same period (Unel 2003).     
The restructuring process is also clearly reflected in trends in value added and 
profits (see Figure 2.6).   The bars in Figure 2.6 display trends in the share of net value 
added accruing to capital, labor and finance (rent and interest paid on invested capital).  
Despite the increases in productivity just discussed, capital’s share of net value was 
declining during most of the 1980s, falling from about 22 percent in 1979 to about 12 
percent in 1987.  The primary culprit was the share of net value added accruing to rent 
and interest, which increased from about 22 percent in 1979 to about 32 percent in 1987.  
In other words, companies were using a higher share of the net-value added to finance 
their investments in capital and technology.  The line in Figure 2.6 represents the trend in 
profits in expressed in constant 1993-94 rupees.  Profits clearly stagnated during most of 
the 1980s, hovering at around the 100 billion rupee mark until 1988.  Finally, labor’s share 
of value added held constant until about the time that profitability returned to the 
manufacturing sector.  Labor’s share of value added declined from 56 in 1987 to 39 
percent in 1997. 
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Figure 2.6: Trends in profits and net value added in Indian industry 
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These trends are consistent with the argument that manufacturing companies 
were under strain due to new competition in the product market.  The productivity gains 
witnessed in the 1980s were more a response to that competition than a resource for 
preserving jobs despite competition.  In order to remain competitive, manufacturing 
companies were spending a larger share of net value added on new investments.  At the 
same time, companies were shedding excess labor and shifting production to the low-
wage rural and SSI sectors.  Thus, when the manufacturing sector returned to profitability 
in the late 1980s, it was at the expense of labor, the bargaining power of which had been 
eroded over the last two decades.    
 
2.4  Statistical models of strike activity      
In this section, I present statistical models of industrial dispute frequency and 
duration to support the argument that the economic changes outlined above led to the 
increasing defensiveness of organized labor in the industrial relations arena.  More 
specifically, these models test the hypothesis that trends in strike frequency and duration 
are related to rising trends in the product wage, SSI output and unemployment.  I present 
national-level time series models of dispute frequency and duration as well as pooled 
cross section time series analyses of dispute frequency and duration in Indian states. Both 
the national and state-level models are of the time period 1976-1997.
12  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
12 This time period was chosen for theoretical and practical reasons.  Theoretically, it makes sense to begin 
the analysis right before the rise of widespread agrarian mobilization in the late 1970s and to end the 
analysis after the mobilization took its full course and had its full impact by the end of the 1990s, when the 
government of India began to reverse many of the subsidies and tax breaks to rural industries.  Practically, 
data limitations made a longer period of analysis problematic.  The real wage data were only available from 
1976.  At the time of the analysis, the trade union fragmentation and density data were only available until 
1997.  Additionally, the Annual Survey of Industries began a new classification scheme for its data in 1997 
and linking the new data to the old series presented its own set of difficulties.   
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National Time Series Models 
Table 2.1 presents the results of national-level time series models of strike 
frequency and strike duration of the form, 
 
 FREQUENCY = β0 + β1INDVAR t-1 + β2 IMPORTSt-1 + β3 RWAGEt-1 + β4 TOTALOUTPUTt-1 
   + β5 FRAGMENTATION + β6 DENSITY +ε                  
 
and 
 DURATION  =  β0 + β1INDVAR t-1 + β2 IMPORTSt-1 + β3 RWAGEt-1 + β4 TOTALOUTPUTt-1 
   +β5 FRAGMENTATION + β6 DENSITY + β7 1982 + ε        
where INDVARt-1  is one of the three lagged independent variables of interest 
(UNEMPLOYMENTt-1, PWAGEt-1, SSIOUTPUTt-1), IMPORTSt-1 is the lagged value of 
imports as a percentage of gross domestic product, RWAGEt-1 is the lagged level of real 
wages, TOTALOUTPUTt-1 is the lagged level of total industrial output,   
FRAGMENTATION is the number of registered unions, and DENSITY is union 
density.
13    
  1982 is a dummy variable for the year 1982.  It is included in the national duration 
model to control for effects of the exceptionally long Bombay textile strike, which 
otherwise skews the results of the model.  Datta Samant, a union leader with a reputation 
for exceptional militancy, led the Bombay textile strike, which involved 250,000 textile 
workers and lasted for more than a year (Lakha 2002).  
 
 
13 In each set of models, the dependent variable was regressed separately on each of the independent 
variables of interest (UNEMPLOYMENTt-1, PWAGEt-1, SSIOUTPUTt-1) because these three variables 
were so closely correlated.  Variance inflation factor (VIF) scores indicated a high degree of collinearity.  
When DURATION was regressed on the three IVs of interest simultaneously, the VIF scores were as 
follows:  UNEMPLOYMENTt-1 = 91.86; PWAGEt-1 = 14.01; SSIOUTPUTt-1 = 61.46; mean VIF = 21.45.  
When FREQUENCY was regressed on the three IVs of interest simultaneously, the VIF scores were as 
follows:  UNEMPLOYMENTt-1 = 84.25; PWAGEt-1 = 13.98; SSIOUTPUTt-1 = 56.07; mean VIF = 21.86.         6
3
Table 2.1: National time series regression models of strike frequency and duration in India, 1976-1997 
 
  FREQUENCY 
 
DURATION 
            
UNEMPLOYMENTt-1 
 
-.01364*** 
(.00463) 
   3.8025*** 
(1.1187) 
  
PWAGE t-1 
 
 -.01381** 
(.00475) 
  2.1059 
(1.4152) 
 
SSIOUTPUTt-1 
 
  -.00644* 
(.00307) 
 
 
 1.4861* 
(.80971) 
            
IMPORTS t-1
 
-.01395 
(.01274) 
-.03009* 
(.01541) 
-.00947 
(.01375) 
-.06053 
(3.1124) 
.78736 
(4.6048) 
-1.7211 
(.80971) 
RWAGE t-1
 
.00042 
(.00385) 
.00500 
(.00490) 
-.00144 
(.00409) 
-.55197 
(.93009) 
-.50014 
(1.4484) 
.16260 
(1.0800) 
TOTAL OUTPUTt-1
 
.00023 
(.00034) 
.00063 
(.00043) 
.00067 
(.00036) 
-.08026 
(.08217) 
-.07386 
(.12727) 
-.01683 
(.09535) 
FRAGMENTATION 
 
   1.68e-6 
   (1.18e-5) 
  3.49e-6 
  (1.2e-5) 
-.00006 
(.00001) 
-.00490 
(.00287) 
-.00445 
(.00363) 
-.00294 
(.00339) 
DENSITY 
 
-.00083 
(.00316) 
.00110 
(.00310) 
.00054 
(.00339) 
.89563 
(.79031) 
.36351 
(.95502) 
.49483 
(.93178) 
1982 
 
    60.612*** 
(11.517) 
65.333*** 
(14.273) 
62.717*** 
(13.813) 
Constant 
 
 
.49062*** 
(.22973) 
.85840*** 
(.23198) 
.72369*** 
(.24521) 
47.662 
(55.676) 
-33.090 
(69.480) 
-15.656 
(64.787) 
Number of 
Observations                  
23  23 23  23 23 23 
Adjusted  R-Squared  .6253  .6002  .7408  .7090  .7594  .7574 
Notes:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 10 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.  For 
information regarding the construction of variables and data used to in this analysis, see Appendix 1.                              
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 RWAGEt-1 and TOTALOUTPUTt-1 control for the impact of general economic 
conditions on the strength of organized labor.  IMPORTSt-1  tests the alternative 
hypothesis that exposure to pressures from global competition after economic 
liberalization in 1991 are the primary cause of the defensiveness of organized labor.  If 
this argument were true, we would expect IMPORTSt-1 to be negatively correlated with 
FREQUENCY and positively correlated with DURATION.   
FRAGMENTATION and DENSITY test the alternative hypothesis that union 
defensiveness is due to a declining institutional strength and cohesiveness of the union 
movement.  Union fragmentation is measured by the number of unions submitting 
returns
14 while union density is the number of unionized workers as a percentage of paid 
employees.
15  If the argument about institutional weakness is correct, we would expect 
FRAGMENTATION to be negatively correlated with FREQUENCY and positively 
correlated with DURATION.  We would expect DENSITY to be positively associated 
with FREQUENCY and negatively correlated with DURATION.    
  Except for the institutional variables FRAGMENTATION and DENSITY, I test 
the models with lagged rather than current effects of each independent variable.
16  This is 
because we expect that the effects of economic and structural changes take time to affect 
the behavior of unions and employers.  Union density and fragmentation are not lagged 
because the effects of the organizational strength of unions should have a more 
                                                 
 
14 Some authors use the number of registered unions as a measure of union proliferation.  This is a poor 
measure because many of the unions on the registry are inactive.  A better measure is the number of unions 
submitting returns.   
 
15  The union density data should be viewed with caution.  The number of union members (the figure in the 
nominator of the union density measure) is dependent on union self-reported membership which is not 
strictly audited by the government.  This measure is, therefore, prone to artificial inflation.    
 
16 However, the results of models in which only present effects are tested are virtually the same as those of 
the lagged-effects models reported here.     
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immediate impact on their ability to call out strikes or quickly achieve favorable results in 
industrial disputes. 
The results of the national time-series models support for the hypotheses 
advanced in this chapter.  UNEMPLOYMENTt-1 and SSIOUTPUTt-1  are statistically 
significant in both the frequency and duration models.  They are negatively correlated 
with FREQUENCY and positively correlated with DURATION. The effect of 
PWAGEt-1 is statistically significant in the frequency model and its sign is in the predicted 
positive direction in the duration model.
17   
  The models provide little evidence in favor of the argument that liberalization 
and/or globalization led to union weakness.  The level of imports displayed a statistically 
significant correlation with industrial disputes in just one of the frequency models.   
However, we should not conclude from this analysis that imports have had no effect on 
the bargaining power of workers in the manufacturing sector since 1991 because the 
time-series is quite short.  What we can say is that the initial downward trend in strike 
frequency and rise in duration began well before liberalization is better explained by 
domestic shifts in production and a rising product wage than by openness to international 
trade.  
The national time series models provide no evidence in favor of the institutional 
weakness hypothesis.  DENSITY and FRAGMENTATION were not statistically 
significant in any of the models.  
 
 
                                                 
 
17 I tested each model for serial correlation using a Durbin-Watson test and by running the regressions with 
a Prais-Winston estimator.  The Durbin-Watson tests for each model indicated no evidence of serial 
correlation.  The Durbin-Watson statistics for the models of strike frequency are as follows:  
unemployment model = 1.65; product wage model = 1.27; small-scale output model = 1.57.  The Durbin-
Watson statistics for the models of strike duration were as follows:  unemployment model = 2.16; product 
wage model = 1.74; small-scale output model = 2.05.  Running the regressions with a Prais-Winston 
estimator did not substantially change the results.        
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Pooled cross-section time-series analysis of 15 states 
Pooled cross-section time-series (CSTS) models of industrial disputes in fifteen 
Indian states provide further support for the hypothesis that rural bias led union 
weakness in the 1980s.  I estimate these models with panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995).  The state-level models are of the 
form  
  
FREQUENCYst = β0 – INDVARs t-1 + β2RWAGEst-1 + β3 TOTALOUTPUTst-1 +  
  β5 . . . βX STATE INDICATORS + ε                 
 
and 
 DURATIONst = β0 + β1INDVAR st-1 + β2 RWAGE GROWTHst-1 + β3 TOTALOUTPUTst-1 +MR1982 
   β5 . . ..βX STATE INDICATORS + ε            
 
In these models, the dependent variables are measures of dispute frequency and duration 
in the entirety of the organized sector rather than just manufacturing as in the national 
model.  EMPLOYMENTt-1 is the total per capita number of workers employed in the 
industrial sector and serves as a proxy for unemployment in the manufacturing sector for 
which there are not data available at the state level.  SSIOUTPUTt-1 is measured as the 
level of per capita output in the unregistered manufacturing sector.  The unregistered 
sector includes all firms with fewer than 10 workers having power or firms with 20 or 
fewer workers having no power.  This serves as an approximation for SSI output, for 
which state-level data is not available.  MR1982 is an indicator variable for the state of 
Maharashtra in 1982 to control for the effects of the unusually long Bombay textile strike.  
The models include indicator variables for each state to control for fixed case effects and 
allow the state of West Bengal to vary freely.  The results of these models are presented in 
Table 2.2.
18   
 
18 State-level data for import growth is not available while the data for fragmentation and union density are 
highly inconsistent across states so these variables could not be included in the analysis.  
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Table 2.2: Pooled CSTS models of dispute frequency and duration in the Indian states 
 
  FREQUENCY DURATION 
         
EMPLOYMENTt-1 
 
.00629*** 
(.00175) 
  -2.0010** 
(.82429) 
  
PWAGEt-1  
 
 -.00245*** 
(.00086) 
   -.04487 
(.26126) 
 
SSIOUTPUTt-1
 
   -.00730*** 
(.00237) 
  -1.1621 
(.98172) 
           
RWAGEt-1 
  
-.00155*** 
(.00038) 
.00048 
(.00088) 
-.00184*** 
(.00035) 
.38228*** 
(.10638) 
.53468** 
(.25869) 
.50063*** 
(.10529) 
TOTAL OUTPUTt-1 
 
-8.34e-06*** 
(2.50e-06) 
-2.65e-07 
(3.17e-06) 
5.99e-06 
(4.08e-06) 
.00165 
(.00101) 
.00079 
(.00090) 
.00251 
(.00156) 
MAHARASHTRA 1982 
 
     133.11*** 
(28.282) 
128.91*** 
(30.446) 
129.21*** 
(29.951) 
         
Fixed  State  Effects  YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
          
Constant 
 
 
.16067*** 
(.04474) 
.24106*** 
(.02780) 
.24276*** 
(.02897) 
30.853** 
(12.817) 
1.4488 
(8.2964) 
.08441 
(8.3101) 
Number of Observations        345  345  345  345  345  345 
R-Squared .5524  .5593  .5492 .5723 .5572 .5602 
Notes:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses, * significant at 10 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.  For 
information regarding the construction of variables and the data used in this analysis, see the Appendix 1.                                68 
The results of the CSTS model of strike frequency and duration provide further 
support for the hypothesized link between rural bias and industrial conflict.  The results of 
the frequency models provide particularly strong support in favor of the theory that levels of 
employment, movements in the product wage, and small-scale industry output are related to 
levels strike frequency.  Higher levels of employment in organized industry 
(EMPLOYMENTt-1) are related to higher levels of strike frequency, while a higher product 
wage (PWAGEt-1) and higher levels of small-scale industry output (SSIOUTPUTt-1) correlate 
with lower levels of strike frequency.  The relationships are statistically significant at the .01 
level.   
The results of the duration models are more mixed.  Employment in industry has the 
expected negative effect on strike duration.  However, the product wage and small-scale 
industry output display no statistically significant relationship with strike duration.  This may 
be due to the tendency of particularly large strikes to cause spikes in average duration in 
particular states at particular times.  A larger sample and/or log transformations of the 
dependent variable might help to smooth these aberrations and determine whether the 
product wage and small-scale output relate to protest duration.   
 
Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this chapter has implications for the debate over the causes 
of the quiescence of Indian labor as well as broader implications for the political economy of 
development.  Many observers suggest that the recent defensiveness of organized labor in 
India is due either to the effects of globalization, economic reform, or the institutional 
weakness and fragmentation of the Indian labor movement.  The results presented in this 
chapter suggest that this defensiveness is in fact due to domestic changes in the structure of 
production.   
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In particular, I have argued that agrarian mobilization and pro-rural policies led to a 
shift in the terms of trade towards agriculture, a related rise in the product wage, and a shift 
in the flow of investment away from urban medium and large-scale units to rural small-scale 
industries.  These developments led to a crisis in the profitability of the organized 
manufacturing sector that stiffened employer resistance to wage demands and made strikes 
more protracted and expensive for unions.  Thus, as time went on, unions engaged in fewer 
strikes of longer duration.   
This set of dynamics has broader implications for the political economy of 
development.  First, it has implications for the literature pertaining to rural-urban struggles.  
Although there has been some exploration of rural bias in East Asia, most of the rural-urban 
struggles literature focuses on inequalities that favor urban areas in developing countries and 
in particular on how urban elites bias the terms of trade in favor of industry to favor 
industrial over agricultural development (Lipton 1978; Bates 1981).
19  Thus, the literature 
pertaining to rural-urban struggles has been aptly coined the “urban bias” literature.   
The experience of India is valuable in showing how rural populist mobilization can 
shift developmental priorities away from urban centers in favor of the countryside and how 
such a tremendous shift in developmental priorities affects urban dwellers.  In this chapter, I 
have focused on how agrarian mobilization affected industry and diminished the strength of 
organized labor, but similar analyses are possible with respect to the effects of rural bias on 
urban workers in the unorganized sector.   
Second, this chapter has implications for the political economy of labor and 
development.  The findings presented here indicate that in addition to institutional and 
global forces, labor is vulnerable to the effective mobilization of rural economic interests.  
This type of mobilization would seem most likely in democratic settings where a large 
percentage of the GDP is from agricultural production and a large percentage of the 
                                                 
19 Urban bias, however, is theoretically not limited to artificially low food prices.  It includes, among other 
things, the heavily biased level of state investment in urban as opposed to rural areas.  For an argument that the 
urban/rural bias literature has relied to heavily on price data, see Lipton (1993).   
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population lives in rural areas.  Since these are the prevailing conditions in many developing 
countries, there seems a very real potential for exploration of these dynamics in other parts 
of the developing world.    
  
 
  
CHAPTER 3 
A POLITICAL THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL PROTEST 
 
In chapter two, I showed how labor unions in democratic South Asia came under 
tremendous strain during the 1980s and 1990s when the political mobilization of the rural 
sector led to a shift in development policy that favored rural, small-scale producers.   
During this period, the bargaining power of all unions was greatly reduced as production 
shifted from unionized large- and medium-scale units to non-unionized small-scale units.  
Threats by employers to outsource production to small-scale units made it difficult for 
unions to raise demands.  The higher level of product-market competition generated by a 
larger number of non-unionized small-scale producers put downward pressure on wages, 
making it difficult for unions to win demands.  Additionally, during the 1980s and 1990s, 
the ability of employers to pay higher wages was further squeezed by a rising product 
wage in manufacturing that resulted from higher procurement prices for food grains and 
a shift in the terms of trade in favor of agriculture.   
Ultimately, these political and economic developments of the 1980s and 1990s 
made routine strike tactics less effective.  Routine strikes became fewer in number and 
when unions did strike they had to fight longer to win their demands.  Faced with these 
circumstances, union leaders could respond in one of two ways.  One option was to 
explain the new reality to workers and to bring union demands in line with declining 
bargaining power and decreased ability of employer capacity to pay, i.e., to mobilize 
restraint.  A second option was to mobilize resistance--to attempt to overcome 
employer recalcitrance at the bargaining table by ratcheting up demands and applying 
more aggressive and unorthodox protest tactics (including the use of violence) to 
overcome the ineffectiveness of the routine strike weapon.   
In this chapter, I show how the leaders of parent union organizations have 
responded differently to the new political and economic realities of the 1980s and 1990s 
71 72 
based on the political affiliations (or lack thereof) of their parent union organizations.  My 
analysis draws on the insights of Mancur Olson (1982), who argued that leaders of 
organizations work harder to curb the socially costly behavior of members as the 
organization encompasses a larger percentage of the population.  This occurs because the 
larger an organization becomes, the more likely its members are to benefit from sacrifices 
for the common good or to suffer the consequences of socially disruptive behavior.   
Olson applies this logic to explain the behavior of a variety of organizations including 
unions and political parties.   
A voluminous literature investigates the effects of union  encompassment on 
union behavior in OECD countries (e.g., Alvarez, Garrett and Lange 1991; Calmfors and 
Driffil 1988; Cameron 1984; Garrett and Way 2000; Hibbs 1978; Iverson 1999; Korpi and 
Shalev 1980; Lange and Garrett 1985).  These studies conclude that encompassing unions 
restrain wage demands because they reap a greater share of the benefits from better 
macroeconomic performance and suffer a greater share of the pain from economic 
downturns than smaller unions.  However, this literature largely ignores the fact that 
many encompassing unions are closely affiliated to encompassing political parties, which 
have an even broader constituency than their affiliated unions.  Thus, the potentially 
important effects of party encompassment on union behavior have not been adequately 
considered.      
In South Asia, leaders of parent union organizations affiliated to major political 
parties, or major party unions (MPUs), have electoral incentives to respond to soft 
product markets and weak bargaining power by mobilizing restraint.  More specifically, 
with the increasing pace of economic reform and a subsequent reduction in the number 
public sector manufacturing jobs available as a source of patronage, politicians have 
become increasingly concerned with attracting investment in the private manufacturing 
sector to provide ‘good jobs’ to their constituents during the 1990s and 2000s.  The fact 73 
that politicians from major political parties double as MPU leaders permits them to 
translate their political desire for restraint into union policy.   
In contrast, leaders of what I have referred to as narrow interest unions (NIUs), 
were not constrained by the interests of a broader constituency and therefore had a 
greater tendency to mobilize resistance.  NIU leaders have responded to more 
competitive product markets by bringing more aggressive demands to the bargaining 
table and encouraging workers to employ more aggressive protest tactics.  Over the long-
term, these aggressive tactics led to factory closures.  In the short-term, however, NIUs 
benefited from increased worker militancy, which enhanced their reputation as no-
nonsense defenders of worker rights, swelled their membership rolls, and sometimes 
resulted in fantastically large settlements.  In some cases, NIU leaders appear to have 
profited directly from their aggressive approach.  While interviews with employer reveal 
that both MPU and NIU leaders sometimes engage in corrupt collusion with employers, 
the more aggressive approach of NIU leaders allows them to extract larger payments 
from employers.      
This chapter draws on qualitative interview evidence to show how a union’s 
affiliation to a major political party transforms the preferences of its leadership.  I develop 
a game theoretic model that helps to illustrate how the differing preferences of MPU and 
NIU leaders give rise to differing approaches in collective bargaining.  The interview 
evidence I use comes from in-depth, in-person interviews with managers, directors, and 
leaders of unions operating in 153 companies in the four regions selected for this study.
1    
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the methodology used to select these companies, see Appendix 3.   74 
3.1  How economic reform provides incentives for restraint 
As we noted in chapter 2, economic liberalization was not the primary reason for 
the decline in the bargaining power of India’s unions, which began in the 1980s and had 
more to do with increased product market competition from domestic firms and changes 
in the domestic structure of production than with the competition from imports caused 
by trade liberalization.  Economic reforms did, however, affect the way that unions 
responded to their declining bargaining power.   
Economic reform compelled major political parties to moderate the protest of 
affiliated unions for two reasons.  The first is that the effectiveness of economic reforms 
became a central campaign issue for major political parties.   
In Sri Lanka, political support for liberal economic reform emerged early.  In 
1977, the center-right United National Party (UNP) came to power winning 83 percent of 
the seats in parliament on a platform of economic liberalization.  While the extent and 
effectiveness of Sri Lanka’s reforms are open to question, the landslide victory 
represented a broad mandate in support of the reform process. 
In India, economic reform began as an elite-led enterprise following the country’s 
1991 balance of payments crisis and slowly gained wider support during the 1990s.  The 
most striking consequence of broadening enthusiasm for reform was the electoral success 
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) during the 1990s, whose victory resulted from the 
support of high-caste, middle- and upper-class voters encouraged by the BJP’s promises 
to expand and accelerate the reform process (Chhibber 1999).  Rajagopal (2002) argues 
that support for economic liberalization has increased as a result of the rise of Hindu 
ethnic chauvinism.  The desire to portray India as a modern nation on the ascent and to 
eschew stereotypes of Hindu culture as outdated and backward has led nationalist Hindus 
to embrace liberalization.  For these nationalists, surpassing the infamous ‘Hindu rate of 
growth’ has become the path to national redemption.     
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The second reason that economic reform compelled major parties to moderate 
union protest was that reforms decreased available patronage resources in the public 
sector, thus increasing the importance of private sector investment.  The importance of 
political patronage in winning elections in South Asia is a well-known secret.  Kanchan 
Chandra (2004) points out that one of the most important sources of patronage are 
government jobs, highly prized because of the relatively high pay and high degree of job 
security that they provide.  Economic reforms, and in particular, privatization measures 
have the potential to eliminate government jobs and thus an important source of political 
patronage.        
Figure 3.1 displays time-series trends for public and private organized sector 
employment from 1960 through 2000.  From 1960 until 1990, public sector employment 
growth was much more rapid than that of the private sector.  However, at about that 
India began its reform process, public employment stalled at about 194 million jobs and 
began to trend downwards toward the end of the 1990s.  Private sector employment, on 
the other hand, continued to grow throughout the 1990s.   
These two trends--a declining number of jobs in the public organized sector and 
an increasing number of jobs in the private organized sector--have been most 
pronounced in manufacturing.  By the decade, the absolute number of public sector 
manufacturing jobs dropped by about 30 percent from 1.9 million in 1992 to 1.4 million 
in 2000.
2  As Kapur and Ramamurti (2002) note, while the Indian government has 
generally taken a gradualist approach to privatization, it has been quicker to privatize large 
public manufacturing companies like BALCO, India’s third largest aluminum company, 
and IPCL, India’s second largest producer of petrochemicals. 
                                                 
2 Figures from data provided by the Central Statistical Organization, Government of India, as compiled by 
Indiastat.com.  76 
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Figure 3.1: Total number of jobs in India’s public and private organized sector 
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    In contrast, the number of private-sector manufacturing jobs increased 13 percent 
by the end of the decade from 4.5 million in 1992 to 5.1 million in 2000.
3  Thus, the 
growth of private-sector jobs was primarily driven by increased employment in 
manufacturing, which accounts for a little better than half (55%) of all private organized 
sector employment.
4  Taken together, this evidence suggests that manufacturing jobs are 
shifting from the public to the private sector.  Figure 3.2 demonstrates this, displaying a 
consistent increase in the percentage of manufacturing jobs in the private sector (from 71 
to 79 percent) in the decade following the reforms.   
As a result of the rise in the relative importance of the private manufacturing 
sector as a source of job creation, the leaders of major political parties began to increase 
their efforts to attract investment, both domestic and foreign, to their states (Venkata 
Ratnam 2001).  Part of this effort involved providing evidence of a investor-friendly 
environment, which in turn involved moderating protest by affiliated unions.  This was 
true of all parties, including those with a left ideology.  Patrick Heller (1999) describes the 
efforts of leaders of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) to forge class 
compromise in Kerala as part of a broader effort to woo private investors back to the 
state.  Jyoti Basu, CPM politburo member and Chief Minister of West Bengal from 1977 
to 2000, traveled far and wide to attract international investors in the 1990s.  West 
Bengal’s current Chief Minister, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, also a CPM politburo member, 
has closely followed the example of his predecessor.       
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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In sum, due to the increasing importance of economic reform as a campaign issue 
and the need to attract investment in manufacturing, aggressive protest behavior by 
affiliated unions became a liability to major political parties.  Party leaders, who also 
served as union leaders, began lobbying enterprise-level leadership and workers to 
moderate their protest by refraining from violent protest and, above all, ensuring the 
economic viability of individual production units.  In the next section, I draw on 
qualitative interview evidence to develop a game-theoretic model of industrial protest that 
demonstrates the implications of the preference of MPU leaders to exercise a greater 
degree of moderation in the industrial relations arena. 
 
3.2  The structure of the game 
The purpose of the game-theoretic model presented in this section is to generate 
basic predictions about the protest behavior of two types of unions—narrow interest 
unions (NIUs) and major party unions (MPUs).  For the purposes of this chapter an 
MPU can be defined as a union with an affiliation to a major political party and an NIU is 
any union lacking such an affiliation.
5  
The basic structure of the game is presented in Diagram 3.1.  The game begins 
after the union presents the employer with a demand.  Each player moves once.  The 
employer moves first, deciding whether to concede or contest a given demand. If the 
employer concedes, the game ends, but if the employer contests the demand, the union 
chooses between three actions: 1) conceding defeat; 2) a routine strike action 
accompanied by institutionalized bargaining; and 3) a course of extreme or violent 
protest. 
                                                 
5 I present a more thorough discussion and operational definitions of these two types of unions in Chapter 
4. 
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Since the outcome of industrial protest is always uncertain, chance decides the 
outcome of the last move.  There is a probability   that the union will win its demand 
using routine protest, a probability of 
r p
r p − 1  that the union will lose its demand following 
routine protest, a probability   that the union will win by using violence, and a 
probability of   that the union will lose using violence.  
v p
v p − 1
There are six possible outcomes in the game:     
 a     the union wins X demand following routine protest and bargaining;   
  b    the union loses X demand following routine protest and bargaining; 
 c    the union wins X demand following aggressive protest and bargaining; 
 d   the union loses X demand following aggressive protest and bargaining; 
 e     the employer contests but the union concedes X demand without protest; 
 f   the employer immediately concedes X demand 
Before discussing employer and union preference orderings in the game, it is 
important to ask whether the game itself, in modeling the presentation of one demand 
adequately reflects a real-world bargaining situation.  Do unions always raise demands 
first or do employers sometimes start industrial disputes?  Do unions typically present 
just one demand in negotiations with employers?  For each demand the union presents, is 
it realistic to assume that a union presents its actual demand or might it present a demand 
that is higher than what it will actually settle for?   
The bargaining process  
The first issue to consider with respect to how well the game theoretic model 
captures the reality of the bargaining process is whether all or even most industrial 
disputes begin with demands raised by the union.  It is true that occasionally, employers 
will initiate a dispute with employees.  For example, in India employers sometimes try to 
force a lockout to close an unprofitable factory.  This is because industrial help employers 
to circumvent chapter 5B of India’s Industrial Disputes Act, which is designed to prevent 
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layoffs and closures.  Employers sometimes find it easier to close their factories when 
they can demonstrate a substantial problem, such as an ‘intransigent’ workforce.  
In general, however, it is realistic to assume that unions and not employers initiate 
industrial disputes. The basic reason is that industrial disputes are substantially more 
costly to the employer than to any individual worker.  Obviously, for a profitable 
company, a day’s profits are greater than a day’s wage.  Additionally, the economic pain is 
more short-lived for the worker than the employer.  For workers, industrial disputes 
result in the loss of a few days pay.  For employers, industrial disputes result in the loss of 
current production and profits, plus orders for future production.  Thus, an employer 
running a profitable business has very little incentive to call a lockout.  
A second issue to consider is whether the model accurately captures the complex 
process through which unions present their demands.  Realistically, a union may present 
more than one demand per negotiation.  Employers in South Asia reported in interviews 
that unions sometimes present a ‘charter’, or list, of demands.  Can a game that models 
bargaining over a single demand capture the complexity of a real-world bargaining 
situation in which a union simultaneously presents multiple demands?    
In fact, the model deals with the presentation of multiple demands quite easily.  
This is because not all of the demands presented by a union are of equal importance to 
the union and, ultimately, the union is bargaining over one or a handful of issues.  In 
interviews, employers described many demands as ancillary or superfluous and reported 
being able to quickly sift through a charter of demands and distinguish between the ‘real’ 
and ‘filler’ demands.  Thus, in the first step of the model, employers investigate each 
demand and quickly contest those that are filler, taking time to consider only those 
demands that are serious.   
The fact that unions are seriously bargain one or a very small handful of issues is 
demonstrated by the fact that in most of the hundreds disputes I discussed with 83 
employers, only one dispute at a rolling mill in Calcutta was over a full charter of 
demands.
6  Another dispute, at a paint factory in Kerala, was over three demands—a 
bonus increase, transfer policy, and changes in production norms
7.  The vast majority of 
disputes were over one or at most two issues.  Typically, these were wage disputes, but 
sometimes they were disputes over disciplinary actions taken against union members, or 
job security.   
A third issue to consider with respect to the bargaining process is whether the 
model captures the disjuncture between the demands a union presents and what it 
actually wants. Employers reported their strong suspicion that demands were often 
placed well beyond the level at which representatives of the workers expected the 
management to negotiate.  At a company that produces high precision metal components 
in West Bengal, for example, workers demanded that the company double their wages but 
in the end settled for a relatively modest wage increase.
8   
Employers had three explanations for this tactic.  The first was that unions placed 
demands higher than ‘actual’ demands in order to demonstrate toughness to the 
employer.  The second explanation was that unions inflated demands in order to 
demonstrate toughness to their members and to match the demands made by unions at 
other factories.  The third was that inflating demands was a tactic purposefully employed 
by union leaders to create uncertainty about the union’s actual demand.  The hope 
associated with this tactic is that the employer would overshoot, providing a larger 
settlement than if the leadership had presented complete and perfect information about 
the union leadership’s expectations.   
The fact that the demands a union presents are higher than its ‘actual’ demands 
presents a slight challenge for the model.  With respect to the majority of disputes, the 
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model would short circuit if we were to take union demands at face value.  Unable to pay 
a union’s exorbitant ‘fake’ demand, employers would always contest.  In addition, the 
union would always ‘lose’ in the last move, not because of the probabilities defined by pr 
or pv, but simply because of the employer’s inability to pay.  
The easiest way to deal with this challenge is to assume that the employer knows 
that the union is ‘faking it’ and can discern, within a reasonable margin of error, the 
union’s ‘baseline demand’.  A baseline demand can be defined as a minimum acceptable 
demand upon which the union leadership decides prior to approaching the management 
that is lower than the demand it presents to employers.  The employer is deciding 
whether to concede or contest the union’s baseline demand (within some margin of 
error) and the union is deciding to protest or concede defeat based on the employer’s 
response to its baseline demand.     
With this assumption in place, the model captures the reality of the bargaining 
situation quite well.  The union’s initial demand may be higher than the baseline demand 
and include other ancillary demands that are insignificant to the outcome of the dispute.  
However, this obfuscation does not prevent rational negotiation if employers can 
determine a core set of baseline demands.   
 
3.3  Game-theoretic models 
  There are two versions of the game.  The preferences of the employer are constant, 
whereas the preferences of the union change across the two versions based on whether 
the union is an MPU or an NIU.  
  Employer preferences are constant across both versions of the game.  Obviously, the 
employer’s first preference is that the union concedes without a fight (payoff  ).  If the 
union protests, the employer prefers that the union lose rather than win its baseline 
demand and prefers routine to violent protest.  Thus, the employer’s second most 
1 e85 
preferred outcome is a union loss following a course of routine protest, , and the 
employer’s third most preferred outcome is a union loss following a course of violent 
protest,  .  If the union will win its demand, the employer prefers to concede defeat,  , 
rather than incur the costs associated with union protest.  Finally, the employer prefers 
the that union win with routine protest, , rather than violent protest,  .  To 
summarize, the employer’s preference ordering is   > > > > . 
1 b
1 d 1 f
1 a 1 c
1 e 1 b 1 d 1 f 1 c
  To a large extent, this preference ordering is based on discussions I had with 
employers.  While a minority of managers expressed a cavalier attitude towards union 
violence, the majority preferred routine to violent protest even if routine protest meant a 
long and costly strike.  The first reason is quite simple: employers place personal health 
and well-being above business concerns.  As the manager at a food processing company 
in Sri Lanka put it, employers want to have a nonviolent union because “you won’t risk 
your life for business.”
9   
  A second reason is that by diminishing managerial authority, violence has long-term 
negative effects on labor productivity.  The human resource manager at a company that 
manufactures railway cars in West Bengal discussed this aspect of worker violence.   
Violence erupted in one the company’s factories in July of 2003, leading to the 
hospitalization of one manager and the closure of the production.  The manager stated 
that based on this experience, he would prefer a long routine strike to a short violent 
strike because violence “demoralizes supervisory and managerial personnel on whom you 
have to depend for your production.”
10
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Version 1: a Major Party Union (MPU) 
  In version 1 of the game, the union is an MPU that internalizes the externalities of 
aggressive union behavior.  Because of the size of its membership and the constraints it 
faces in the political arena, the political union balances the benefits of industrial protest 
against the costs to the incomes of workers, the profits of employers and the flow of 
investment.  The political union attempts to win its demand in the least disruptive 
manner possible and avoid violence at all costs.   
The MPU preference ordering 
  The most preferred outcome of the MPU is to concede the union’s demand without 
a fight (outcome  ).  The second most preferred outcome for an MPU leader is that it 
win its demand through a course of routine protest (outcome  ).  Absent a win with 
routine protest, the political union prefers to concede,  , rather than witness a fruitless 
loss of worker income and company profits,  .  The political union will avoid violence 
at all costs, but prefers to winning with violence, (outcome  ) to losing with violence, 
. To summarize, the MPUs preference ordering is f
2 f
2 a
2 e
2 b
2 c
2 d 2 >a2>e2>b2>c2>d2.   
Qualitative interview evidence provides substantial support for this preference 
ordering.  In interviews, employers and trade union leaders repeatedly suggested that 
MPUs have responded to changing economic circumstances with greater restraint than 
NIUs.  Far from playing on worker frustrations or whipping up anti-globalization 
sentiment, MPUs have generally responded to the ineffectiveness of routine strike protest 
by attempting to restrain demands, institutionalize industrial relations, encourage 
productivity-linked waged agreements, and educate workers about new product market 
conditions.   
The emphasis on restraint by MPU leaders is common in all four regions exists 
without respect to the ideology of the party to which the union is affiliated.  For example, 
in 1995, leaders of the CPM-affiliated CITU (a left union) and the Congress-affiliated 87 
INTUC (a centrist union) led 1500 workers on strike at a tire manufacturing facility in 
Kerala, India.  No violence occurred during this strike and the matter was resolved in a 
few hours.  The strike was a rare occurrence of conflict in a factory where management 
and the unions continuously broker three-year-collective bargaining agreements.  Despite 
the event, the management had high praise for both of the unions, which they said helped 
to increase productivity and contain costs in an increasingly competitive global market.  
One senior manager from the company said this of the union leadership: 
 
“Of late, I see a positive attitude from both of the outside leaders. . . 
.They advise their ranks, ‘You have to understand the reality.  Times are 
changing.  These are not earlier times.  You have to get along with the 
management to run the business.  Otherwise, managements now can just 
close down and walk away.  So you have to produce a conducive 
atmosphere to run the industry in a profitable manner.  So that was the 
advice given by the union leadership.  Even though, you know, some of 
the [local] elements, they will grumble.”
11     
 
However, ideology matters with respect to timing:  when MPUs adopted a policy 
of restraint was heavily influenced by whether or not the MPU was affiliated to a left 
political party.  While unions affiliated to center and center-right parties have more clearly 
emphasized and articulated a policy of restraint in recent years, they have always 
maintained that union demands should be balanced against the health and progress of 
industry.  In contrast, restraint among unions affiliated to left parties appears to be a 
more recent development stemming from economic and political pressures arising in the 
1990s.   
Thus, in Maharashtra, where MPUs are primarily affiliated to right and center-
right parties, employers emphasized the continuation of long-standing positive synergy 
between the management and the union.  The personnel manager of a major automobile 
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manufacturer echoed a common sentiment among managers in Maharashtra when he 
stated that relative to the enterprise union in the company’s Pune-based factory, the Shiv 
Sena-affiliated Bharatiya Kamgar Sena (BKS) were better able to “take charge” of 
workers and did better job of “selling agreements” and ensuring their implementation.
12  
Managers in Maharashtra viewed MPUs as helpful in negotiating even the most difficult 
agreements.  For instance, the management at a plastics factory in Bombay indicated that 
the BKS was helpful in negotiating and implementing a voluntary retirement scheme 
(VRS), which required the heavy restrictions placed on layoffs and closures by firms in 
the organized sector in chapter 5B of the Industrial Disputes Act.
13   
Beyond implementing agreements, managers reported that MPU leaders were 
helpful in providing an environment conducive to investment.  For example, the 
managing director at a lubricants factory based in the Thane-Belapur industrial belt 
outside of Bombay discussed the efforts made by the leadership of the MPU in his 
company—the INTUC-affiliated Association of Chemical Workers (ACW) to moderate 
worker demands and to restrain worker protest.  According to the manager, the Secretary 
General of the union, K.H. Dastoor, considers the company’s economic position and 
makes an effort to convince workers of the importance of competitive pricing and 
savings in operating costs.
14   
The lubricant factory manager contrasted Dastoor’s stance with that of the late 
Datta Samanth, the renowned union leader who organized workers in many of Thane-
Belapur’s factories prior to Dastoor’s dominance.  Whereas Samanth was indifferent to 
the fact that his militant trade union actions had led to the closure of dozens of units in 
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Thane-Belapur industrial belt, Dastoor has taken a great interest in the well-being of 
establishments. Dastoor has taken the initiative to organize joint conferences with 
industrialists in the region to determine whether his union might have contributed to the 
exit of factories from the Thane-Belapur industrial belt and to encourage companies to 
refrain from moving their production facilities elsewhere.   
In an interview, Dastoor confirmed this impression by comparing his style of 
unionism with that of Bai Jagtap, the leader of the Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari 
Mahasangh (BKKM), an aggressive independent union known for its heavy use of violent 
tactics.  Dastoor was adamant that his union does not “compete on that level”, stating 
that he eschews violence and “thinks ten times before taking action.”
15  
Other MPU leaders in Maharashtra echoed this philosophy.  Ganesh Naik, leader 
of the Sharmik Sena union articulated the conservative philosophy to which many BKS 
and INTUC leaders adhere.  Naik argued that the purpose of trade unionism is just as 
much to get the worker to “understand his responsibilities” and the financial position of 
the company as it is to get the management to agree to higher wages and benefits.  Naik 
likened trade unionism to horse racing, stating that “if you want to go the distance, you 
have to be patient.”
16  Using violent and aggressive tactics destroys opportunities for 
negotiated settlements and ultimately leads to factory closures, which is counter to the 
interests of workers.    
Jitendra Joshi, leader of the INTUC-affiliated Kamgar Utkarasha Sabha (KUS), 
stressed that rather than threatening to withhold labor, INTUC’s basic strategy is to 
achieve wage gains by using productivity as a bargaining chip:   
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“We control the productivity.  Our basic approach is this.  First, the 
company should survive.  If the company survives, then there is 
continued employment.  The government lays down laws regarding the 
minimum wage.  If you want more than the minimum wage, then you 
have to support the company.  You have to allow the company to 
rationalize the deployment of persons, to modernize technology, and to 
increase productivity.”
17
 
In Joshi’s view, the union plays a crucial role in convincing workers of the need for 
mutually beneficial productivity increases.  The management is unable to convince 
workers themselves, because a large percentage of workers are illiterate: “To convince the 
worker, they require a really strong person who can deliver the goods. . .They cannot 
negotiate with every person because our people are not that much educated.”
18   
The stories of cooperative behavior by MPU leaders were no less striking in 
Kerala and West Bengal, where the union movement is more heavily dominated by left 
unions, and, in particular the CPM-affiliated CITU.  For example, the managing director 
at a packaging company in West Bengal said that with the CITU is so good that the CITU 
leader tries to drum up business for the firm when sales are low.
19  While most companies 
set their sites on three- or four-year agreements, this company signs agreements lasting as 
long as seven years with the union.  
At the same time, the cooperative behavior of left MPU leaders was said to be a 
more recent development in West Bengal and Kerala.  In these two states employers 
emphasized the radical transformation of the left’s stance toward management since 
liberalization.  The human resources manager at an electronics factory in Kerala described 
the transformation of union behavior as being linked to the recognition of the need to 
face the challenges of a more open economy: 
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“The unions have become more practicable, more pliable.  They are 
willing to listen to what management says.  They are willing to learn about 
the issues related to productivity, issues related to marketing, issues related 
to finance, et cetera.  They are now willing to study how the business 
runs, what are the difficulties faced by business.  They are also willing to 
give their part, to play their part to help this organization survive and face 
the globalization.”
20
 
Many employers in Kerala conveyed a similar sentiment, including the director of a 
company in the cashew sector, traditionally the stronghold of the radical left unions.  The 
employer stated his opinion that Kerala’s “period of radicalism is over” and that a new 
generation of union leaders and workers was more likely to consider the economic 
constraints faced by management.
21   
The sentiment was even more strongly conveyed by employers in West Bengal, 
who emphasized the radical transformation of union leaders’ attitudes with respect to 
employer constraints and the character of union demands and protest tactics since 
liberalization.  The managing director of a steel company stated that in the 1970s and 
1980s, CITU was a “nightmare, but today it is the easiest union to handle.”
  22  H e  
attributed this turnabout in the CITUs behavior to the CPMs policy of avoiding 
confrontation and violence in the factories and indicated that the CPM government is 
willing to help managers deal with violent workers by removing them from the factory.   
Other employers also emphasized the helpfulness of central CITU and CPM 
leadership in resolving disputes with local leaders and workers.  The general manger of 
human resources at a company that manufactures industrial clothing suggested that a 
divergence between the public statements to workers, which often rail against employers 
efforts to introduce labor-saving technology or to outsource production, and its actions, 
which are employer-friendly.  He emphasized the ease with which he could seek the help 
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of CITU central leadership, or even the assistance of the Chief Minister, to prevent 
disagreements from becoming full-fledged industrial disputes.
23  The director of a 
company that manufactures cooling towers stated that he was so enthusiastic about the 
professionalism of the central CITU leadership and the control they exerted over workers 
that he invited CITU leaders to organize his factory to prevent the entry of a more 
aggressive, politically independent union.
24   
One consequence of the willingness of MPUs to more carefully consider the 
economic constraints of employers in Kerala and West Bengal is the increasing 
commonality of productivity-linked wage agreements.  Several employers in Kerala and 
West Bengal indicated that MPUs were instrumental in convincing workers of the need 
for productivity linkages.  For instance, the director of an engineering firm in West 
Bengal stated that his workers signed a productivity-linked agreement because the central 
leadership helps them to “understand the meaning of liberalization and globalization.”
25  
These agreements are well adhered to and are renegotiated every four to five years. 
How do the preferences of political leaders become the preferences of union leaders?  
Before discussing the predictions of the game, it is important address the issue of 
how party preferences translate into union preferences.  Why do union leaders agree to 
efforts by the party leadership to restrain worker protest?  The answer lies in the 
overlapping membership of union leaders in the political party.  More specifically, union 
leaders are or aspire to be powerful political figures and therefore have every incentive to 
respond to the dictates of the party leadership.   
For example, the leaders of the striking tire factory workers discussed earlier in 
this chapter included Ooman Chandy, who was the ruling party convenor in Kerala 
Legislative Assembly.   Ganesh Naik, leader of the Sharmik Sena, is a member of the 
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legislative assembly (MLA) for the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) and belonged to the 
Shiv Sena from 1995 to 1999, during which time his union was affiliated to the BKS.  
Jitendra Joshi, vice president of the Maharashtra branch of the INTUC is also the 
secretary of the Rashtrawadi Congress Party (RCP).   
In other words, union leadership is a platform for a political career.  The manager 
at a small packaging company in Kerala described how union leaders are selected and 
groomed for a political career in his factory.
26  Leaders are either appointed by the party 
or are elected by workers from a very narrow pool of candidates who are, in turn, selected 
by the party.  This relatively undemocratic method of selection prevents union leaders 
from developing a personal power base in the union, making them dependent on the 
central political organization for both their union and future political careers.  Once a 
union leader develops status in the party, the party replaces him with a new, aspiring 
politician.  
Solution and implications of the game 
  It is natural to expect that MPU preferences for routine forms of protest would 
decrease the union’s propensity to undertake violent and aggressive protest actions.  The 
solution to the game theoretic model helps to clarify the dynamics that produce this 
restraint and generates precise predictions regarding MPU protest behavior based on the 
preference ordering outlined above.    
      The political union decides between three courses of action—conceding defeat, 
routine protest, and violent protest—and chooses the course of action with the highest 
expected utility.  The three equations representing these possibilities are 
2 e EUuc =          ( 1 )  
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where   represents the expected utility of conceding defeat,   represents the 
expected utility of routine protest, and   represents the expected utility of violent 
protest for the union.  The following are the implications of this version of the game. 
uc EU r EU
v EU
Since the highest value of  2 2 2 ) 0 ( 1 c d c EUv = + ⋅ = , the lowest value of 
, and a political union prefers    to  , the game predicts that a 
MPU will never choose to use violence.  A political union, then, only chooses between 
conceding defeat and pursuing a course of routine protest action. 
2 2 2 ) 1 ( 0 b b a EUr = + ⋅ = 2 b 2 c
The political firm-union will strike, rather than concede, when , 
which is to say when the expected utility of a course of routine protest is greater than the 
expected utility of conceding defeat:   
uc r EU EU >
2 2 2 2 ) ( e b b a pr > + −         ( 4 )  
Thus, the union is more likely to decide on routine protest as  
  a) the benefits of conceding  fall  ) ( 2 e
  b) the payoffs to winning   increase   ) ( 2 a
  c) the payoffs to losing   increase (or costs of losing decrease)  ) ( 2 b
  d) the probability of winning,  , increases   r p
In short, the model predicts that an MPU’s  actions will be conservative.  It will 
carefully consider the benefits of strike action against the known costs of conceding 
defeat.  
Thus, one basic implication of the model is that MPUs will not engage in a 
routine protest action if that action will harm the company to such an extent that workers 
cannot benefit from their protest.  The model predicts that MPUs will be more sensitive 
to the financial capacity and limits of employers to meet a given demand.  MPUs will 
therefore refrain from making demands that could result in the closure of the company 
either by driving the company out of business or by forcing a lockout against the workers.         95 
The employer decides between conceding and contesting the union’s demand.  
Let   represent the expected utility of contesting and   represent the expected 
utility of conceding defeat.  The employer will contest the demand when .   
cst EU ec EU
ec cst EU EU >
1 f EUec =          ( 5 )  
cst EU  depends on whether the union engages in routine protest.  When   
and the union protests, 
uc r EU EU >
  )) 1 ( ( ) ( 1 1 1 r r cst p b p a EU − ⋅ + ⋅ =       ( 6 )  
but when   and the union concedes,  uc r EU EU <
1 2 e EUcst =          ( 7 )  
Since  , the employer will always contest when  1 1 f e > uc r EU EU <  for the union.   
When  and the union protests, the employer chooses to contest when     uc r EU EU >
1 1 1 1 ) ( f b b a pr > + −         ( 8 )  
Thus, the employer is more likely to contest as 
a) the benefits of conceding   fall  ) ( 1 f
b) the payoff for the union winning ( increases (costs to the firm for 
losing decrease) 
) 1 a
c) the payoff for the union losing   increases (benefits to the firm from 
winning increase)   
) ( 1 b
d) the probability of the union winning with routine protest, , decreases   r p
Like the MPU, the employer is not intent on contesting a demand, but weighs the likely 
costs and benefits of contesting versus conceding defeat.    
Version 2: an NIU union 
  In version 2 of the game, the union is an NIU.  Since the NIU lacks an affiliation to a 
major political party, it is not constrained by the broader social and political implications 
of its protest behavior.  The NIU leadership thus ignores the costs of protest action to 
workers and firms and may even encourage reckless unionism in pursuit of its own 96 
narrow, short-term interests such as enhancing a reputation for toughness, attracting 
more members, or extracting exorbitant bribes from management. 
The NIU preference ordering 
  The NIU wants most of all to win.  Second, it wants to win in the most aggressive 
and showiest manner possible.  The NIU’s first preference, therefore, is to win using 
violence against the management,  .  It’s second preference is to win using routine 
protest,  , and it’s third preference is for the employer to concede defeat, .  If the 
NIU has to lose, it prefers to go down in a blaze of glory by using violence against the 
management, , and prefers losing with routine protest  to not putting up a fight  .  
To summarize, the NIU preference ordering is  >  > > > > .   
2 c
2 a 2 f
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that the tendency of NIUs to respond to their 
declining bargaining power occurs regardless of whether their unions encompass a large 
percentage of the workforce.  For example, in January 1982, Datta Samanth, president of 
the Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union (MGKU), led a quarter of a million textile workers 
on a sector-wide strike in Bombay.  Samanth’s demands included a wage increase of 
between 25 and 50 percent (depending on the factory), a bonus increase of 20%, and 
guaranteed permanent employment for all textile workers.  Although it became clear that 
employers did not have the capacity to meet these demands, Samanth refused to 
negotiate.  Officially, the strike lasted 13 months, led to the closure of dozens of firms, 
and arguably to the decimation of the textile industry in the greater Bombay area (Lakha 
2002).  Workers lost their jobs and fell into abject poverty.  Many sold their homes and 
their possessions.  One activist reported that former strikers felt compelled to sell their 
wives or daughters into prostitution and that many strikers committed suicide.
27     
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Why do some union leaders pursue aggressive protest to the point of closing 
down firms or, in the case of the Bombay textile strike, threatening the viability of an 
entire industrial sector? There are at least two possible explanations.     
One possibility is that union leaders engage in extreme and violent protest 
behavior to enhance their reputation for toughness, which then enhances their bargaining 
power in future negotiations and with other employers.  Additionally, high demands and 
aggressive protest may lead to above-average settlements that attract more workers to 
their unions.  In other words, aggressive protest serves as a recruiting tool for union 
leaders.   
This seems like a likely explanation, especially in the case of high-profile forms of 
extreme protest such as fasting, hostage takings, or threatening suicide.  For instance, the 
protest of the members of the Ceylon Industrial Workers’ Union (CIWU) at a coir factory 
in Sri Lanka attracted media attention when they protested, in part, by climbing to the top 
of the company’s water tower and staging a ‘fast unto death.’
28  Similarly, the Inter-
Companies Employees Union (ICEU) attracted attention when its members attempted to 
set ablaze the manufacturing facility of the shoe company by whom they were 
employed.
29   
       Another possible reason that NIU leaders engage in such destructive forms of 
protest is financial gain.  There are two possible avenues through which union leaders 
could profit from aggressive protest.  The first is through institutional mechanisms that 
permit unions to appropriate a percentage of the annual value of any wage increase that 
they negotiate.  In Maharashtra the law permits the union to take up to ten percent of any 
wage increase, making it a common practice for union leaders to officially serve as 
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‘brokers’ for their members.  The second avenue is a classic labor racketeering scenario—
employers make direct payments to union leaders in response to strike threats.   
These practices were widely reported in interviews with employers in 
Maharashtra.  The production manager of a small manufacturing company in Pune 
referred to the company’s payments to union leaders as a form of ‘internal conciliation’, a 
satiric reference to the conciliation proceedings presided over by officials from the 
Ministry of Labour.
30  The director of a welding equipment company just outside of 
Bombay described his interaction with a NIU leader who, after threatening him with 
violence, demanded money for the purchase of a new vehicle.
31   
In some instances, MPU leaders expressed their frustration with the corrupt 
behavior of NIU leaders.  Jitendra Joshi, vice president of the Maharashtra branch of the 
INTUC, described a famously aggressive NIU leader as a “chain snatcher” who views his 
union as a lucrative business and whose “primary aim is to take money from workers and 
management.”  Joshi questions how NIU leaders, who began their careers as “paying 
guests” now own property in some of the most expensive neighborhoods of Bombay.  
Part of the explanation, he argues, lies in the payoffs these leaders take from employers to 
force workers to sign unfavorable voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) agreements that 
then allow them to outsource production to the informal and small-scale sectors.
32  This 
view was widely shared among MPU leaders and employers, who noted the tendency of 
certain NIU leaders to use violence against workers to force them into VRS agreements.      
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Solution and implications 
  The reordering of preferences results in substantially different predictions for the 
behavior of NIUs relative to political unions.  In light of the fact that the lowest value of 
and the lowest value of  2 2 2 ) 1 ( 0 d d c EUv = + ⋅ = 2 2 2 ) 1 ( 0 b b a EUr = + ⋅ = , the 
preference ordering   has two major implications.  First, the NIU will never 
choose to concede.  Second, the NIU will pursue a course of violent protest even when its 
chances of winning with routine protest   and violent protest   are zero.  The 
model thus predicts that the parochial union will choose a “go for broke” strategy that is 
in line with the selfish interests of the union leaders, ignoring the impact of all forms of 
protest on the company and union members.     
2 2 2 e b d > >
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The NIU will choose violent protest if  , or   r v EU EU >
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This implies that NIUs will be more prone to choose violence when  
a) the probability of winning with violence  increases   ) ( v p
b) the probability of winning with routine protest  decreases  ) ( r p
c) the payoff to winning with violence  increases   ) ( 2 c
d) the payoff to winning with routine protest decreases      ) ( 2 a
e) the payoff to losing with routine protest  decreases (costs of losing 
with routine protest increase) 
) ( 2 b
f) the payoff to losing with violence  increases (costs of losing with 
violent protest decrease) 
) ( 2 d
As in the first version of the game, the employer contests the demand 
when .  Since the union never concedes, the employer weighs the expected 
benefits of braving routine or violent protest versus those of conceding defeat.  If the 
union chooses a course of routine protest, then as in the first version of the game, the 
ec cst EU EU >100 
employer’s expected utility of contesting is   as in equation (6) and the probability 
that the employer will contest is described by equation (8).   
1 cst EU
If the union chooses violent protest, then the employer’s expected utility of 
contesting is  
)) 1 ( ( ) ( 1 1 3 v v cst p d p c EU − ⋅ + ⋅ =       ( 1 0 )  
and the employer will contest if  , or   ec cst EU EU >
          ( 1 1 )   1 1 1 1 ) ( f d d c pv > + −
Thus, if the union chooses violent protest, the employer is more likely to contest as 
a) the benefits of conceding   fall  ) ( 1 f
b) the payoff for the union winning ( increases (costs to the firm for 
losing decrease) 
) 1 c
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Conclusion 
  In this chapter, I employed qualitative interview evidence to develop a game-
theoretic model of industrial protest.  Qualitative interview evidence suggests key 
differences between the preferred methods of protest of MPU and NIU leaders.  Bound 
by the interests of a broader constituency, MPU leaders eschew violence and refrain from 
protest altogether if they are unlikely to win their demands.  Unbound by the constraints 
of the political process, NIU leaders prefer to adopt a more aggressive stance in the 
interest of expanding membership and extracting larger (even if untenable) wage 
settlements from employers.  Because they want to win their demands at any cost, NIU 
leaders often prefer extreme and violent forms of protest to routine forms of protest. 101 
  The game gives rise to a set of predictions regarding the behavior of MPUs and 
NIUs.  The game predicts that MPUs will not engage in violence and that they will 
carefully weigh the costs and benefits of engaging in industrial protest.  MPUs will thus 
back down from a confrontation when they are unlikely to win their demands.  NIUs on 
the other hand will tend to seek out violent confrontation and will protest regardless of 
the costs.  In the next two chapters, I test these predictions using survey data from Sri 
Lanka and three states in India.   CHAPTER 4 
REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL PROTEST 
 
The game theoretic model developed in chapter three provides a specific set of 
predictions regarding the behavior of major party unions (MPUs) and narrow interest 
unions (NIUs).  Because they are constrained by the interests of a broader political 
constituency, the model predicts that MPUs will mobilize restraint, eschewing violence 
and refraining from industrial protest when they are unlikely to win their demands.  In 
contrast, NIUs are likely to actively seek out confrontation and to engage in violent 
protest behavior to boost their chances of winning their demands.  In other words, the 
game predicts that NIUs will employ aggressive tactics regardless of the likely outcome 
and regardless of the impacts of the protest on the economic well-being of the company.   
In this section, I test these predictions using survey data from four regions in 
South Asia:  Sri Lanka and three Indian States—Kerala, Maharashtra, and West Bengal.  I 
selected these regions based on variations in the relative dominance of MPUs versus 
NIUs in the trade union movement.  In Kerala and West Bengal, the union movement is 
dominated by two MPUs--the Center for Indian Trade Unions (CITU) and the Indian 
Trade Union Congress (INTUC).  In contrast, the union movements in Sri Lanka and 
Maharashtra are characterized by a higher concentration of NIUs and a higher degree of 
competition among MPUs and NIUs for the allegiance of the working class.   
If the hypothesis that party encompassment engenders union restraint is correct, 
we should see a lower level of aggressive union behavior in Kerala and West Bengal, 
(where MPUs dominate the union movement) and a higher level of aggressive union 
behavior in Maharashtra and Sri Lanka (where NIUs dominate the union movement).   
Two other types of variation provide an opportunity to test competing 
hypotheses.  First, South Asia boasts a great deal of variation in party systems:  some 
regions are dominated by left political parties, some by right parties, some by centrist 
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parties, and in many regions there exists a healthy competition among parties of differing 
ideologies.  These variations in party systems permit an evaluation of the role and 
importance of political ideology in shaping union behavior.   
Regions in South Asia also vary in terms of the degree of competition in the 
union movement: in some regions, one or two unions dominate the union movement 
whereas in other regions multiple unions compete for control.  These variations allow me 
to test the standard Olsonian account of union restraint, which emphasizes the 
importance of union (as opposed to party) encompassment on union behavior.    
In the next section, I define and identify MPUs and major NIUs in the four 
regions selected for this study.  In section three, I discuss survey evidence showing how 
these four regions vary in the relative dominance of MPUs, ideological composition of 
the union movement, and levels of union encompassment.  In section four, I discuss 
evidence from survey data showing that companies in Kerala and West Bengal are less 
likely to experience violent and extreme forms of protest than companies in Maharashtra 
or Sri Lanka, suggesting that the heavy presence of MPUs is related to union restraint.  
Further, since the party systems in Kerala and West Bengal are dominated by left political 
parties, I conclude that it is unlikely that a conservative, pro-business political ideology 
plays a significant role in producing union restraint.   At the same time, unions are more 
encompassing in West Bengal and Kerala than in Maharashtra or Sri Lanka, making it 
difficult to rule out union encompassment as an explanation for union restraint absent 
the company-level analysis of industrial protest that I undertake in chapter 5.  
      
4.1  Identification of MPUs and NIUs 
In order to identify MPUs and NIUs in each region, it is important to start with 
concrete definitions of these two terms.  A major party union (MPU) can be defined as 
a union with a strong affiliation to a major political party.  The term is global, referring to 104 
both the local union organization at the factory level and the broader federation to which 
the local union is affiliated.  For the purposes of this study, a ‘strong affiliation’ is defined 
by the presence of an overlapping leadership structure between the union and the party.  
A union is deemed to have a strong affiliation to a political party when its most powerful 
leaders are also leaders or influential members of the political party.  
A  major political party is a party with a reasonable chance of wielding 
substantial influence in government.  For the purposes of this study, parties are classified 
as ‘major’ political parties if they were a major coalition partner or the leading opposition 
party in a given state assembly (Vidhan Sabha) or the national assembly (Lok Sabha) during 
the period covered by the survey (1991-2002).  A ‘major coalition partner’ is defined as 
having either the first or second most number of seats of any party in an assembly and 
having at least 25% of the total number of seats required to form a majority coalition.   
I use the term narrow interest union (NIU) to refer to any union without an 
affiliation to a major political party.  In other words, an NIU is any union that is not an 
MPU.  I use the term ‘narrow interest’ to call attention to the fact that non-MPU unions 
are not constrained by the interests of a broad political constituency.  It is possible to 
identify at least three types of NIUs: 1) unions with a strong affiliation to minor political 
parties (small party unions); 2) unions with a politically independent federation 
leadership (politically independent unions); and 3) unions with a non-federated 
leadership structure, i.e. limited to an individual enterprise (enterprise unions).   
Identification of MPUs 
Based on the criteria outlined above, eight unions affiliated to as many major political 
parties in the four regions qualify as MPUs.  Table 4.1 lists these MPUs, the geographic 
regions in which they operate and the political orientation and strength of their affiliated 
parties since 1991.   
  
Table 4.1:  Political affiliations and ideological orientations of Major Party Unions (MPUs) 
Political Party  Affiliated Union  Geographic 
Region(s) 
Electoral Performance
*
Since 1991 
Political 
Orientation 
Communist Party of 
India, Marxist (CPM) 
Center for Indian 
Trade Unions 
(CITU) 
Kerala & West 
Bengal 
Kerala Assembly:  leading opposition party, 
1991-1996; leading ruling coalition 
partner, 1996-2001; leading opposition 
party 2001-present  
W. Bengal Assembly: leading ruling 
coalition partner, 1991-present 
 
Left 
Communist Party of 
India (CPI) 
All India Trade 
Union Congress 
(AITUC) 
 
Kerala  Kerala Assembly:  major ruling coalition 
partner, 1996-2001 
Left 
Congress Indian  National 
Trade Union 
Congress (INTUC) 
National 
(India) 
 
National Assembly:  leading ruling coalition 
partner 1991-1996; opposition party 
1996; leading ruling coalition partner 
1996-98; opposition party 1998-2004 
Kerala Assembly: leading ruling coalition 
partner, 1991-1996; opposition party, 
1996-2001; leading ruling coalition 
partner 2001-present 
W. Bengal Assembly: opposition party, 
1991-2001 
Maharashtra Assembly: leading ruling 
coalition partner, 1990-1995; opposition 
party, 1995-1999, leading ruling coalition 
partner, 1999-present 
 
 
 
 
 
Centrist 
1
0
5
 1
0
6
 
 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
Trinamool Congress 
(TMC) 
Indian Trinamool 
Trade Union 
Congress (INTTUC) 
 
West Bengal  W. Bengal Assembly:  opposition party, 
2001-present 
 
Centrist 
Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) 
Bharatiya Mazdoor 
Sangh (BMS) 
National 
(India) 
National Assembly: opposition party, 1991-
1996; leading ruling coalition partner, 
1996; opposition party 1996-1998; 
leading ruling coalition partner 1998-
2004   
Maharashtra Assembly: major ruling 
coalition partner, 1995-1999  
 
Right 
Shiv Sena  Bharatiya Kamgar 
Sena (BKS) 
Maharashtra  Maharashtra Assembly: opposition party, 
1990-1995; leading ruling coalition 
partner, 1995-1999; opposition party, 
1999-present 
 
Right 
Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) 
Sri Lanka Nidahas 
Sevaka Sangamaya 
(SLNSS) 
 
National  
(Sri Lanka) 
Parliament: opposition party, 1978-1994 
and 2001-2004; leading ruling coalition 
partner, 1994-2001  
 
Center-Left 
United National Party 
(UNP) 
Jathika Sevaka 
Sangamaya (JSS) 
National  
(Sri Lanka) 
Parliament: leading ruling coalition partner, 
1978-1994 ad 2001-2004; opposition 
party, 1994-2001;  
 
Center-Right 
Notes:  Data on electoral performance for parties in India are from reports by the Election Commission of India on various general elections to the 
Lok Sabha and the state assemblies of Kerala, Maharashtra and West Bengal.  Data on electoral performance of parties in Sri Lanka are from the 
Department of Elections, Government of Sri Lanka.  
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The four regions include national and regional MPUs affiliated to parties 
espousing a variety of political ideologies.  The Center for Indian Trade Unions (CITU) 
and the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) are affiliated to regionally dominant 
left political parties.  The CITU is affiliated to the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or 
CPM, a powerful force in the politics of West Bengal and Kerala.  The CPM has 
alternated Kerala’s ruling or opposition party since it broke from the Communist Party of 
India (CPI) and won a plurality (30 percent) of the seats in Kerala’s 1965 state assembly 
elections.
1  In West Bengal, the CPM has instituted a de facto one-party rule by maintaining 
its position as the state’s ruling party since 1977.  The CPI has been a less dominant force 
than the CPM, but often wins a substantial number of the seats needed to establish a left 
front coalition in Kerala’s highly fractured and competitive political landscape.
2  In 1996, 
for example, the CPI won 18 seats in Kerala’s state assembly elections--almost exactly 
25% of the 71 seats needed to form a ruling coalition in Kerala’s 140-member Legislative 
Assembly.
3    
In stark contrast to the left regionalist parties in Kerala and West Bengal, 
Maharashtra-based Bharatiya Kamgar Sena (BKS), or the ‘Indian Worker’s Army’, is 
affiliated to the right wing Shiv Sena whose leader, Bal Thackeray, has famously referred 
to himself as the “Hitler of India.”  The Shiv Sena is a Hindu nationalist party with a 
strong Maratha identity and has enjoyed regional dominance in the state of Maharashtra.  
The Shiv Sena was the opposition party in the State Assembly from 1990-1995 and from 
1999 to the present.  It was the leading coalition partner when it governed in coalition 
with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from 1995-1999.  The Shiv Sena has had some 
                                                 
1 Elections Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 1965 to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala.    
2 Based on Laakso and Taagepara’s ‘effective number of parties’ measure, Kerala’s party system has 
consistently ranked as one of the most competitive among Indian states (Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004). 
3 Elections Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 1996 to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala. 
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limited success in national politics.  Shivsainik Manohar Joshi was the speaker of the Lok 
Sabha from 2002 to 2004.     
The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) is affiliated to the Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a conservative, right-leaning party with a clear middle- and 
upper-caste/class support base.  The BJP was highly successful at the national level 
during the 1990s, serving as the opposition party from 1991-96 and from 1996-98.  The 
BJP came to power as the ruling coalition partner for a brief period in 1996 and was the 
dominant party in the Lok Sabha from 1998-2004.     
The Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) and the Indian Trinamool 
Trade Union Congress (INTTUC) are unions affiliated to what are most easily described 
as centrist political parties.  The INTUC is affiliated to the Congress Party (also known as 
the Indian National Congress (INC), Indira’s Congress, Congress (I), or simply 
‘Congress’).  The INTTUC is affiliated to the Trinamool Congress (TMC), an offshoot of 
the Congress in West Bengal.
4   
The policies of the Congress have sometimes made it difficult to place it on a left-
right spectrum.  Nehruvian development policy was clearly based on the socialist model 
of state-led development implemented by the Soviet Union, but a closed economy clearly 
benefited some capitalists whose interests sometimes dominated policy formation 
(Chibber 2003).  Indira Ghandi split the party in response to a challenge by its right wing 
in 1967 and won the 1971 elections with a populist platform and guarantees to eradicate 
poverty (‘giribi hatao’), but subsequently ruled the country through fascist diktat during the 
1975-77 Emergency period—jailing union leaders, clearing slums by force, thrusting the 
homeless into forced labor camps, and orchestrating a campaign of forced sterilization of 
the poor.  Since the 1980s, the party has continued to campaign on a populist agenda but 
                                                 
4 The Trinamool Congress is officially known as the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC).  It was formed 
by Mamata Banerjee in 1998 and recently merged with a faction of the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) to 
form the Trinamool Congress Party (TCP) in 2004. 
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has also become a staunch advocate of economic reform.  Manmohan Singh, the current 
Prime Minister in the Congress-led government is an Oxford trained economist who, as 
Finance Minister, was one of the primary architects of India’s 1991 economic reforms.   
The clearest explanation for the Congress’s schizophrenic policy agenda and the 
best justification for its ‘centrist’ label is the party’s diverse political base.  Chhibber 
(1999) characterizes the Congress as a ‘catch-all’ party that wins elections through cross-
caste/class coalitions.  Considering this broad electoral base, it is not surprising that the 
Congress sometimes pursues policies that primarily benefit the wealthiest Brahmin 
industrialists, at others those that benefit farmers, and at still others those that benefit the 
poorest scheduled caste laborers.    
Both the TMC and the Congress qualify as ‘major political parties’ according to 
the definition provided above.  In 2001, the TMC became the leading opposition party in 
West Bengal, winning 20% (60) of the 294 seats in the legislative assembly.   The 
Congress has long been one of the most powerful national parties in India.  In 2004, the 
Congress surprised political analysts predicting its permanent decline when the party and 
its allies won enough seats in the 14th Lok Sabha to form the ruling United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) coalition.
 5  The Congress was also the leading ruling coalition partner in 
the 10th (1991-1996) and 12th (1996-1998) Lok Sabhas and was the leading opposition 
party in the 11th (1996) 13th (1998-2004) Lok Sabhas.  Additionally, the Congress has 
been substantially influential in state assembly elections.  In Kerala and Maharashtra, the 
Congress has acted as the leading ruling coalition partner or leading opposition partys in 
                                                 
5 Yet it is important to note that the Congress’ leads the fifteen-member coalition with a little less than 27% 
of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, reflecting oft-noted the trend away from a centralized political system 
and the increasing dominance of regional ‘cleavage-based’ parties.  The UPA is primarily comprised of 
regionally based political parties, including the Rahstriya Janata Dal (RJD), Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
(DMK), the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDK) 
and the Kerala Congress (KC).  The alliance depends on ‘external’ support four left parties: the Communist 
Party of India, Marxist (CPM); the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Revolutionary Socialist Party 
(RSP), and the All India Forward Bloc (AIFB).     
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every in every assembly since 1991.  In West Bengal, the Congress was the leading 
opposition party until it lost this place to the TMC in 2001.  
The Sri Lanka Nidhas Sevaka Sangamaya (SLNSS) and the Jathika Sevaka 
Sangamaya (JSS) are MPUs affiliated to national parties in Sri Lanka.  The SLNSS is 
affiliated to the Sri Lankan center-left Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and JSS is 
affiliated to the center-right United National Party (UNP).  These two parties have 
traditionally alternated as the party in power and the leading opposition party.  The UNP 
was the majority party from 1978-1994 and the leading ruling coalition partner from 2001 
to 2004.  The SLFP was the leading ruling coalition partner from 1994-2001.  
Identification of NIUs 
Earlier, I identified three types of NIUs--small party unions, politically 
independent unions, and enterprise unions.  With the large number of small parties, 
would-be union ‘entrepreneurs’ and private sector enterprises in South Asia, the number 
of NIUs is potentially quite large.  However, it is possible to identify some of the bigger, 
more well-known NIUs operating in India and Sri Lanka.   
As I demonstrate below, within the four regions, the vast majority of NIUs 
operate in Maharashtra and Sri Lanka.  In Maharashtra, the vast majority of NIUs are 
enterprise-level unions.  The largest and most well-known NIU federations are the two 
formerly headed by Datta Samant—the Association of Engineering Workers (AEW) and 
the Maharashtra General Kamgar Union (MGKU).  Since Datta Samant’s violent demise 
in January 1997, the unions have been led by his younger brother, P.N. ‘Dada’ Samant.
6   
Although not substantial in terms of membership, the Bharatiya Kamgar Utkarsh 
Sabha (National Workers’ Progress Union), has garnered increasing attention in 
Maharashtra in recent years.  The union is led by Bai Jagtap, who once led the union 
                                                 
6 Datta Samant was gunned down on January 17, 1997 by a group of contract killers.  It is unclear who was 
responsible for his murder. 
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under the banner of the INTUC but was expelled for his use of violence to break existing 
unions and compel workers to join his union and sign unfavorable agreements.
7  
According to one set of reports, Jagtap stabbed workers at Pfizer Inc. in order to force 
them into a voluntary retirement scheme, taking ample payment for his ‘services.’   
In Sri Lanka, the majority of NIUs are small party unions.  The largest and most 
active of the small party unions are the Inter-company Employees’ Union (ICEU) and the 
Ceylon Industrial Workers’ Union (CIWU).  The ICEU is headed by S. Amarasinghe and 
is affiliated to the Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), or ‘People’s Liberation Front’, a 
socialist party that is currently a member of the ruling coalition.
8  The CIWU is led by 
Linus Jayathilaka is affiliated to the Nawa Sama Samaja Party (NSSP), or ‘New Socialist 
Party’, a minor left party unique in its outspoken opposition to Sri Lanka’s civil conflict 
and its advocacy of a Tamil homeland.          
A large percentage of workers also belong to the Ceylon Mercantile Union 
(CMU), led by Bala Tampoe.  While the CMU once had close ties to the Lanka Sama 
Samaja Party (LSSP), or ‘Lanka Socialist Party’, it has maintained strict political neutrality 
since it refused to join other left-affiliated unions in Sri Lanka’s 1980 general strike.  A 
much smaller percentage of workers belong the Ceylon Federation of Labor (CFL), 
which maintains a strong affiliation with the LSSP, and the Ceylon Federation of Trade 
Unions (CFTU), affiliated to the Communist Party (CP).  
                                                 
7 Reported in an interview with Ashok Paradkar, secretary of the Indian National Trade Union Congress 
(INTUC), Maharashtra Branch in July of 2003. 
8 While the JVP’s support has grown in recent years, it did not win a large enough percentage of the seats in 
parliament for it to qualify as a ‘major political party’ during the period of this study.   
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4.2  Regional variations in the structure of the union movement 
Earlier, I noted that the selection of the four regional cases was based on the 
relative dominance of MPUs and NIUs in each region.  In order to verify the relative 
dominance of MPUs in the union movements of Kerala and West Bengal and the relative 
dominance of NIUs in Maharashtra and Sri Lanka, I conducted a telephone survey of 
approximately 100 randomly selected manufacturing companies in each region.  These 
manufacturing companies were selected from local directories of manufacturers and each 
telephone interview lasted approximately 5 to 10 minutes.
9   
The survey asked company managers and directors questions about unions and 
union activity in their production units.
10  In particular, I asked managers and directors a) 
which unions (if any) were active in the company’s production units and b) what types of 
protest behavior (if any) workers had engaged in since 1991.  I selected 1991 as the cutoff 
date since the study focuses on the effects of political linkages on union behavior in 
liberal market economies and 1991 is widely recognized as the year in which India began 
its process of liberalization.
11  
Results from the telephone survey confirmed initial perceptions regarding 
regional variations in the structure of the trade union movement in the four regional 
cases.  Table 4.2 displays the percentage of companies in the survey that reported having 
active MPUs and/or NIUs in each regional case.
12
 
9 For details regarding the selection process and response rates for this survey in each regional case, see 
Appendix 2.1.    
10 Appendix 2.2 presents the telephone survey instrument.   
11 Sri Lanka began liberalizing its economy in 1978 under President J.R. Jayawardena.  
12 For results among unionized firms only, see Appendix 4.  1
1
3
 
13 Figures do not add up to 100 as companies surveyed may have more than one union.   
Table 4.2:  Political structure of the union movement in four regional cases 
Percentage of Companies Surveyed
13 Type of Union 
Sri Lanka  Maharashtra  Kerala  W. Bengal  All Regions 
          
Major Party Unions  11  30  45  74 
 
40 
 
  CITU  NA 3 33 64  NA 
 AITUC  NA  1  8  7  NA 
 INTUC  NA  16  23  40  NA 
 INTTUC  NA  NA  NA  16  NA 
 BKS  NA  13  0  0  NA 
 BMS  NA  4  17  2  NA 
 SLNSS  10  NA  NA  NA  NA 
 JSS  5  NA  NA  NA  NA 
            
Narrow Interest Unions 
 
38 48 5 13  26 
  External leadership affiliated to 
small party 
 
24 7 3 7  10 
  External leadership politically 
independent 
 
23 16 1  3  11 
  Internal leadership only 
 
0 
 
31 1  5  10 
            
Any Union  40  72  48  79  60 
          
 
 
                                                
Source: Telephone survey of 385 managers and directors.  Surveys conducted between November 2002 and May 2004.     114 
Confirming our suppositions, the results presented in Table 4.2 indicate a clear 
dominance of MPUs in West Bengal and Kerala and greater presence of NIUs in 
Maharashtra and Sri Lanka. 
Among manufacturing companies surveyed in West Bengal, 74 percent reported 
having one or more MPUs and in Kerala the figure was 45 percent.  In contrast, only 30 
percent of companies in Maharashtra and 11 percent of manufacturing companies in Sri 
Lanka reported the presence of political unions in their production units. 
In both West Bengal and Kerala, the dominant union is the CPM-affiliated CITU.  
Sixty-four percent of companies surveyed in West Bengal and 33 percent of 
manufacturing companies in Kerala reported the presence of a CITU union.  The major 
competitor to CITU in West Bengal and Kerala was the Congress-affiliated INTUC, 
which had a presence in about 40 percent of manufacturing companies in West Bengal 
and about 23 percent of companies in Kerala.  Sixteen percent of companies in West 
Bengal reported the presence of the recently formed Indian National Trinamool Trade 
Union Congress (INTTUC), a recent breakaway faction of the INTUC affiliated to the 
Trinamool Congress Party (TMC).  Eight percent of companies in Kerala and seven 
percent of companies in West Bengal reported the presence of the CPI-affiliated All India 
Trade Union Congress (AITUC).  The survey also shows that the Bharatiya Mazdoor 
Sangh (BMS), affiliated to the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has a 
relatively strong presence in Kerala, where seventeen percent of companies reported the 
presence of a BMS union.
14   
                                                 
14 The heavy presence of a BJP-affiliated union is somewhat surprising considering Kerala’s reputation as a 
bastion of secularism and that the foundation secularism is often said to be associated with the civic sense 
generated by Communist mobilization of the working class (Varshney 2002).  That 37 percent of 
manufacturing companies in Kerala reported the presence of the BMS is surprising since the union 
movement represents the heart of the historic Communist mobilization in Kerala.  This is even more 
surprising when one considers the relative inability of the BMS and its sister organization, the Shiv Sena-
affiliated Bharatiya Kamgar Sangh (BKS), to penetrate the union movement in the ostensibly less civic state 
of Maharashtra. 
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The survey results also confirm the initial perception that NIUs are rare in West 
Bengal and Kerala but represent the dominant form of worker representation in 
Maharashtra and Sri Lanka.  NIUs were present in 13 percent of manufacturing 
companies surveyed in West Bengal and only five percent of companies in Kerala.  In 
Maharashtra, by contrast, 48 percent of surveyed companies reported the presence of at 
least one NIU and in Sri Lanka the figure was 38 percent. 
The major difference between Maharashtra and Sri Lanka is the higher presence 
of small-party and politically independent parent unions in Sri Lanka than in Maharashtra, 
and a higher presence of internal unions in Maharashtra than in Sri Lanka.  In Sri Lanka, 
24 percent of companies reported the presence of a union affiliated to a small political 
party and 23 percent reported the presence of a union affiliated to a politically 
independent union center. No companies in Sri Lanka reported an enterprise-level 
leadership free from parent union control or management interference.
15  However, the 
enterprise-level union constituted a dominant form of worker representation in 
Maharashtra.  Thirty-one percent of manufacturing companies in Maharashtra reported 
the presence of internal unions.  Sixteen percent of manufacturing companies in 
Maharashtra reported having a union controlled by a politically independent union and 
seven percent reported the presence of a small-party union.
16
It is also important to note how the regions vary in terms of the ideological 
composition of the union movement.  The union movements of Kerala and West Bengal 
are more heavily dominated by unions affiliated to left political parties than the union 
movements of Maharashtra or Sri Lanka.  Although the INTUC has a strong presence in 
both Kerala and West Bengal, a larger percentage of firms in these two regions reported 
                                                 
15 Many companies reported having “workers’ councils,” which are designed to replace unions.  Since 
management sets up and heavily controls workers councils, these were not counted as unions in the survey.   
16 In Maharashtra, the AITUC was counted as a small party union since its affiliated party, the CPI, does 
not have a national political presence nor any political presence in Maharashtra.   
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the presence of CPM-affiliated CITU than that of any other union.  In contrast, the 
percentage of firms reporting the presence of unions affiliated to left or center-left parties 
in Maharashtra and Sri Lanka is marginal.  Only ten percent of companies reported the 
presence of the SLFP-affiliated SLNSS in Sri Lanka.  The only left unions in Maharashtra 
are the CITU and AITUC.  Three percent of companies surveyed in Maharashtra 
reported the presence of a CITU union and only one percent reported the presence of an 
AITUC union.   
Finally, the regions vary substantially in terms of the levels of encompassment and 
union density.  Union density and encompassment are the highest in West Bengal, where 
79 percent of companies report the presence of any union and the top two unions, CITU 
and INTUC, encompass 64 percent and 40 percent of workers in the manufacturing 
sector respectively.  In Kerala, CITU and INTUC are less encompassing than in West 
Bengal but more encompassing than any MPU in Maharashtra or Sri Lanka.  The most 
encompassing union in Maharashtra is the INTUC with 16 percent of surveyed 
companies reporting the presence of one of its unions.  The most encompassing union in 
Sri Lanka is the JVP-affiliated ICEU, a small party union.  Fourteen percent of companies 
in Sri Lanka reported the presence of an ICEU union in one or more of their production 
units.  
  
4.3  Regional variations in industrial protest 
The results of the survey indicate that regional variations in the variations in 
industrial protest closely related to regional variations in the structure of the union 
movement.  In particular, the use of violent forms of protest, including property damage, 
threats, and assaults are much less common in the two regions where political MPUs 
dominate the union movement than in the two regions where NIUs constitute the 
primary form of worker representation. 
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Table 4.3 displays the percentage of manufacturing companies experiencing 
various forms of union protest.
17  These forms of protest fall into four categories: work 
stoppage; violent or extreme protest; obstruction or occupation of company premises; 
and routine protest. 
A work stoppage can take the form of a strike, in which members of the union 
refuse to work, or a lockout, in which the employer refuses to allow union members to 
work.  Violent or extreme forms of protest include assaults by union members on 
managers or other workers, damage to company property, or threats to managers. 
Forms of obstruction or occupation of company premises include climbing and 
occupying high structures (such as water towers, antennas, or buildings), public fasting, 
sit-ins, blocking company gates, and a unique form of protest in South Asia—the 
‘gherao.’  ‘Gherao’ means ‘encirclement’ and occurs when workers surround a manager 
and confine the manager to an office or desk until the union is satisfied the management 
will adequately address demands.  Although longer in the past, a modern gherao typically 
lasts less than one working day and usually ends in a few hours. 
Routine forms of protest include go slows, in which workers do not strike work 
but slow down the production process by taking unusually long amounts of time to 
complete tasks, and gatherings in which workers hold placards and slogans.  These four 
categories are not mutually exclusive, meaning workers can engage in more than one 
form of protest during a given protest event.  For instance, when protesting for a wage 
increase, a union might strike, hold a gathering, and damage company property.
                                                 
17 For results among unionized firms only, see in Appendix 5. 
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Table 4.3: Percentage of manufacturing companies experiencing various  
types of industrial protest in four regional cases, 1991-2002 
Percent Experiencing  Type of Protest 
Sri Lanka Maharashtra Kerala  W. Bengal 
        
Stoppage of Work  51  27  24  25 
 Strike  51  19  22  22 
 Lockout  13  10  6  14 
          
Violent or Extreme Protest 22  13  3  8 
 Assault  on  Manager  2  7  0  4 
  Assault on Other Workers 4  2  0  1 
  Damage to Property 
 
8  8  3  3 
  Threats to Management  11  11  0  3 
          
Obstruction/Occupation 24  16  11  19 
 Gherao  9  13  7  12 
  Climbing High Structure  10  0  0  0 
 Fasting  2  1  1  0 
 Sit-in/Blocking  Gates  12  6  6  9 
        
Routine Protest  52  36  34  42 
 Go  Slow  1  14  12  20 
 Gathering  48  20  26  27 
        
Any Form of Protest  55  37  36  48 
        
Source: Telephone survey of 385 managers and directors.  Surveys conducted between November 2002 and May 2004.     
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In Kerala only three percent of surveyed companies reported experiencing a 
violent or extreme form of union protest in one of their production units and in West 
Bengal the figure was eight percent.  In West Bengal, four percent of companies reported 
an assault on a manager and one percent an assault by a union on another group of 
workers.  Three percent reported experiencing damage to company property and three 
percent reported experiencing threats to management.  In Kerala, the only form of 
violent or extreme protest reported by manufacturing companies was damage to company 
property, which three percent had experienced.  No companies reported any incidents of 
assault or threats to management. 
In contrast, industrial relations are much more violent and chaotic in Sri Lanka 
and Maharashtra.  Twenty-two percent of manufacturing companies in Sri Lanka and 13 
percent of manufacturing companies in Maharashtra reported experiencing violent or 
extreme protest in one or more production units.  In Maharashtra, seven percent of 
companies reported an assault on management and two percent reported an assault by a 
union on other workers.  Eight percent of manufacturing companies reported damage to 
company property.  Eleven percent reported threats experiencing threats to management. 
Sri Lanka stands out in the level of chaos experienced in its industrial relations.  
Whereas Maharashtra differs little from West Bengal and Kerala in terms of the 
frequency of other forms of protest, firms in Sri Lanka have experienced inordinate levels 
of all forms of union protest.  Fifty-one percent of companies reported a strike or 
lockout, 52 percent a routine form of protest such as a go-slow or a union gathering, and 
24 percent reported obstruction of company property.  Ten percent of companies in Sri 
Lanka reported experiencing an incident in which workers climbed to the top of a high 
structure such as a water tower refusing to come down and, in many cases, threatening to 
jump if their demands were not met.  Further, the level of violent and extreme protest 
was quite high.  Two percent of manufacturing companies reported an assault against 
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management and five percent an assault by a union on other workers.  Eight percent of 
companies reported damage to company property and 11 percent reported experiencing a 
threat to a manager.  The frequency of extreme actions on the part of the Sri Lankan 
workforce is of great interest from the perspective of this study.  This type of behavior is 
the focus of Chapter 6 in which I argue that industrial chaos in Sri Lanka resulted from 
state repression of left unions in Sri Lanka during the 1980s. 
The telephone survey data also suggest that political ideology plays a relatively 
minor, if any, role in generating worker restraint.  One might argue that since a centrist or 
center-right party must accommodate the interests of capital as well labor, they are more 
likely to be adversely affected by extreme and violent worker protest and are therefore 
more likely to encourage workers to engage in routine forms of protest.  The fact that 
extreme and violent forms of protest are least common in West Bengal and Kerala, where 
MPUs are affiliated to left political parties, and quite common in Maharashtra, where 
MPUs are primarily affiliated to right and centrist parties, calls this view into question.   
The telephone survey data do not, however, entirely rule out the possibility that 
union (as opposed to party) encompassment is the cause of union restraint.  This is 
because union encompassment is greatest in West Bengal and Kerala, the same regions in 
which left MPUs dominate the union movement.  Determining whether union 
encompassment or party encompassment is producing union restraint requires analysis of 
industrial protest at the level of the individual protest event, which I undertake in the 
following chapter. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used data from a telephone survey conducted in four regions of 
South Asia (Sri Lanka and the Indian states of Kerala, Maharashtra and West Bengal) to 
test the hypotheses developed in game-theoretic analysis in the previous chapter.  These 
data suggest that industrial protest takes more extreme and violent forms in Maharashtra 
and Sri Lanka, where NIUs dominate the union movement and more routine forms in 
Kerala and West Bengal, where the union movement is dominated by MPUs.  Since the 
dominant MPUs in Kerala and West Bengal are affiliated to parties espousing a left 
political ideology, it seems unlikely that a pro-business ideology is responsible for union 
restraint.   
However, the data do not rule out the possibility that union encompassment 
generates restraint.  To test the hypothesis that party encompassment is more important 
than union encompassment in producing restraint, we must turn to an analysis of 
industrial protest at the level of the individual protest event.  In the next chapter, I do this 
by examining the relative importance of party and union encompassment on industrial 
violence, lockouts, and the duration of industrial disputes.   
  
CHAPTER 5 
PARENT UNION CONTROL AND INDUSTRIAL PROTEST:   
QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 
 
  In Chapter 4, I presented evidence from a telephone survey of management 
conducted in four regions of South Asia to demonstrate how major party unions (MPUs) 
are more restrained in their method of protest than Narrow Interest Unions (NIUs).  
This survey evidence suggested that companies located in two regions with a high 
concentration of MPUs (Kerala and West Bengal) are less likely to experience violent or 
extreme forms of protest than companies located in two regions with a high 
concentration of NIUs (Maharashtra and Sri Lanka).  Further, I argued that the fact that 
the union movements of West Bengal and Kerala are dominated by MPUs affiliated to 
left political parties makes it unlikely that a conservative pro-business ideology is 
responsible for union restraint.   
  Although this regional analysis provides good preliminary evidence in favor of a 
positive relationship between major party affiliation and union restraint, it cannot rule out 
a number of alternative explanations.  One of these explanations is that union 
encompassment, rather than party encompassment, gives rise to the restraint witnessed 
in Kerala and West Bengal.  This is the standard Olsonian account of union restraint.  
Unions are more likely to internalize the externalities associated with militancy in the 
industrial relations arena as they encompass a larger percentage of the workforce.  If 
MPUs in Kerala and West Bengal are more encompassing than unions in Maharashtra or 
Sri Lanka, we cannot rule out the possibility that these unions restrain protest because of 
the size of their membership as opposed to their affiliation with major political parties.  
  A series of other plausible alternative explanations cannot be ruled out using 
regions as the unit of analysis.  One of these is the quite intuitive argument that the 
political status of the party, i.e., whether it is in power or out of power, rather than the 
size of the party makes a difference for the behavior of affiliated unions.  According to 
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this argument, parties that are in power are more likely to restrain the behavior of their 
affiliated unions than parties that are in the opposition.  In other words, it may be that 
holding office matters more for union restraint than seeking office.       
  A second alternative explanation has to do with union competition and rivalry.  
In chapters two and three, I argued that union leaders might use aggressive protest tactics 
in order demonstrate their muscle power and to expand their membership base.   
Attracting new members becomes a greater imperative as more unions compete over 
workers.  Thus, it may be easier for union leaders to mobilize restraint in places like West 
Bengal or Kerala, where only two unions compete for the allegiance of the working class, 
than in Maharashtra and Sri Lanka where the union movement is more competitive.   
  A third alternative explanation is the one most frequently cited by employers—
that worker restraint has to do with the size of the production unit as it affects the 
quality of management-worker relations. The larger the production unit, the less 
opportunity managers have to develop close ties with workers through frequent and 
personal interactions.  More impersonal relationships provide an opportunity for union 
leaders to objectify and vilify management.  In contrast, a closer relationship between 
workers and management in small productions units might lead to a more familial, albeit 
paternalistic, set of relationships.      
  A fourth explanation centers on prevailing economic conditions.  Quite simply, 
one might expect the frustration associated with adverse economic circumstances to give 
rise to more aggressive forms of protest.  Conversely, we might expect that workers 
would show greater patience for routine forms of protest when times are good.   
  To test the importance of party encompassment relative to these other 
explanatory factors in generating union restraint, we need to move beyond a basic 
regional comparison of industrial protest to an analysis of protest events.  In this chapter 
I analyze data from in-depth surveys of managers at individual production units to 124 
demonstrate that party encompassment is at least as good a predictor of restraint as union 
encompassment, political status of the affiliated party, union competition, the size of the 
production unit, or prevailing economic conditions. The analysis demonstrates that 
workers controlled by an MPU are a) less likely to engage in extreme or violent protest 
behavior than NIUs, demonstrating the tendency of MPUs to eschew violent methods of 
protest and b) less likely than NIUs to force a lockout, demonstrating the flexibility of 
MPUs at the collective bargaining table. 
 
5.1  Data and method of analysis 
One of the predictions of the game-theoretic model presented in Chapter 3 is that 
MPUs would never engage in violent and extreme protest behavior, but that NIUs would 
encourage violent and extreme protest when it boosted their chances of winning their 
demands.  A second prediction of the game-theoretic model is that political union leaders 
carefully weigh the costs and benefits of a strike and will thus avoid strike action if it is 
likely to put a company out of business.  In other words, it predicts that MPUs will show 
a higher degree of flexibility at the bargaining table and avoid making demands that 
would result in a long-term or permanent closure of a manufacturing facility.       
  One measure of the flexibility of unions in dispute resolution is whether they are 
prone to forcing a lockout.  A lockout occurs when the management temporarily stops 
production and refuses workers access to a factory.  Sometimes lockouts are defined as 
industrial disputes initiated by the management, but interviews in South Asia suggest that 
this is hardly ever the case.  Lockouts can occur at any time during an industrial dispute, 
and while it is theoretically possible for a management to initiate an industrial dispute by 
shutting down a production unit, typically lockouts follow some form of industrial protest 
by the workers.  Often managers declare a lockout well after a strike initiated by workers 
is under way. 125 
Thus, lockouts typically occur when the union presents a demand or set of 
demands and the management feels that bargaining with the union over the demands is 
no longer productive.  If my hypothesis about the relationship between major party 
affiliation and union restraint is correct, MPUs should prevent industrial disputes from 
ending in lockouts by facilitating a well-functioning collective bargaining process.  In 
contrast, we would expect control by an NIU or a loss of control by an MPU to increase 
the likelihood of a lockout.   
I test these hypotheses using a statistical analysis of strike violence and lockouts 
based on logistic regressions of the form, 
 
logit(π)=α +β1CONTROL+β2MPU+β3MPU*CONTROL+ξx +ε, 
 
where logit(π)is the logit function of the probability that either violence or a lockout 
occur during the course of a given protest event, CONTROL is a qualitative coding of 
the level of control the parent union exercises over the local branch union, MPU is a 
coding of whether the union involved in the protest is affiliated to a major political party 
(‘1’ if yes and ‘0’ if no), MPU*CONTROL is an interaction term, and   are other 
exogenous variables discussed below.   
x
The data for the dependent variables (the occurrence of violent or extreme 
protest and lockouts) and primary independent variables of interest are derived from in-
depth surveys of thirty-five to forty companies in each of the four regions.  A total of 149 
companies were interviewed for the in-depth surveys.  These companies were selected via 
a stratified random sample from the one hundred participants in the telephone survey. 
The strata were based on whether the company had experienced worker protest in any of 
its production units.  Companies experiencing protest comprised approximately 75 126 
percent and companies experiencing no protest comprised approximately 25 percent of 
the sample for in-depth interviews and surveys.
1  
These interviews yielded a sample of 177 events reported to have occurred 
between 1991 and 2002 at the 229 production units of the 149 companies participating in 
the in-depth interviews.  In each interview, I asked the management a series of questions 
about protest events that may have occurred in their companies.  Based on these 
questions, I determined whether the protest in which union engaged fell in the category 
of ‘violent’ or ‘extreme’ protest behavior and whether the protest resulted in a lockout.
2  
For the purposes of the logistic regressions, I coded the dependent variable ‘1’ if the 
union engaged in extreme/violent protest or forced a lockout and ‘0’ if the union did not.  
Only events occurring in unionized firms are included in the statistical analysis.       
CONTROL is a qualitative assessment by the management of the parent union’s 
control over the local union and its members.  The assessment was on a three point scale.  
The management was asked whether the parent union “always” “sometimes” or “never” 
had control of the actions and behavior of the local union.  Responses of “always” were 
coded as ‘2’, responses of “sometimes” were coded as ‘1’ and responses of “never” were 
coded as ‘0’.  MPU is coded ‘1’ if the union is affiliated to a major political party (as 
defined in chapter four) and ‘0’ if the union is an NIU.     
  The purpose of the interaction term is to narrowly test the central theory of this 
dissertation, which is that large, politically affiliated parent unions with control over local 
unions discourage violence and encourage routine forms of protest.  In the introductory 
chapter, I said that the effects of party encompassment were conditioned by the control 
of the parent union over the local union and its members.  This control is not a given.  
                                                 
1 For details regarding the selection process and response rates for the in-depth survey in each regional 
case, see Appendix 3.1.  Appendix 3.2 presents the instrument for the in-depth surveys.      
2 For a full breakdown of the types of protest behavior falling in the ‘extreme’ and ‘violent’ categories, 
see the discussion in chapter four.   127 
State or employer interference may prevent a parent union organization from exerting 
adequate control over its members.  The loss of MPU control over local unions and 
members could result in higher levels of aggressive protest behavior as workers use the 
parent union to shield themselves from legal repercussions for their actions but 
simultaneously ignore parent union calls for restraint.  I discuss this dynamic more 
thoroughly in Chapter 6 with reference to the industrial chaos produced by the loss of 
MPU control over local unions in Sri Lanka in the mid-1990s.     
Other independent variables 
  The analysis includes a series of variables to control for the alternative 
explanations outlined in the introductory section of this chapter.  It includes three sets of 
variables and interaction terms to control for the competing explanations based on the 
characteristics of the union.   ENCOMPASS is a measure of union encompassment.  It is 
the percentage of companies in the telephone survey that reported the presence of the 
union involved in the dispute.  INPOWER is an indicator variable that is coded ‘1’ if the 
political party to which the union is affiliated was a member of a ruling coalition in a state 
or national legislative body during the time of the dispute and ‘0’ if the party was in the 
opposition or did not have any representatives in office in a state or national assembly.  
LEFT is an indicator variable coded ‘1’ if the political party to which the union is 
affiliated is ideologically left and ‘0’ if it is ideologically center-left, centrist, center-right or 
right.  For a more thorough discussion of the ideological classifications of major parties in 
the four regions, see the discussion in chapter four.  Each of these three variables is 
multiplied by the value of the CONTROL variable to produce three interaction terms 
included in the analysis:  ENCOMPASS*CONTROL, INPOWER*CONTROL and 
LEFT*CONTROL.         
I include the number of active unions (UNIONS) in the production unit at the 
time of the protest event to control for the level of union competition at a given 128 
production unit.  The number of workers (WORKERS) in the production unit at the 
time of the dispute to captures the effects of a larger workforce and more impersonal 
management-worker interactions.      
  To control for the impact of economic conditions on union violence, the analysis 
includes the rates of inflation (INFLATIONt-1) and economic growth (GROWTHt-1).  
These figures are at the state level for Kerala, Maharashtra and West Bengal and at the 
national level for Sri Lanka.
3 The inflation and growth figures are lagged by one year on 
the assumption that it takes time for macroeconomic conditions to affect wages, profits 
and, therefore, the outcome of union protest over wage demands.  Finally, I included 
indicator variables for whether the event occurred in Kerala, Sri Lanka, or Maharashtra to 
control for any fixed “case effects” and allowed the state of West Bengal to serve as the 
reference category.  
  
5.2  Results 
  The results of the logistic models of strike violence and lockouts are presented in 
tables 5.1 and 5.2.  For the analysis of each dependent variable, I present a series of 
regressions including every combination of the three sets of independent variables 
associated with the characteristics of the union (ENCOMPASS, POWER, and LEFT) 
and their interaction with the CONTROL variable.       
The results of the models are presented in odds ratios and provide us with the 
change in the odds of an event occurring versus not occurring per unit change in the 
explanatory variable.  An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates an increased likelihood of an 
event occurring while an odds ratio less than 1 indicates a decreased likelihood of an 
                                                 
3 For information pertaining to inflation and growth data used to construct these variables, see data 
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event occurring.  In the remainder of this section, I discuss the results of the strike 
violence and lockout models in turn.           
Logistic model of industrial violence 
  The results of the logistic analysis of strike violence provide strong support for 
the argument that MPU control leads to greater worker restraint in the choice of protest 
tactics.  MPU, CONTROL and the interaction term are statistically significant in nearly all 
of the models.  The odds ratios of the MPU and CONTROL variables are greater than 1.  
These odds ratios are the predicted odds ratios when the focus variable equals 1 and the 
other variable in the interaction is zero (Jaccard 2001: 20).
4  In model (8), for example, 
the predicted odds of violence for an MPU are 66.42 relative to parochial firm-unions 
when the control variable equals 0.  Thus, the model predicts that the probability of a 
local MPU engaging in violence is over 66 times greater than that of a local NIU when its 
parent union exercises no control over its behavior.  In other words, the model suggests 
that the effects of the loss of MPU parent union control over local leaders and members 
are quite substantial. 
 
4 Because MPU and CONTROL are the indicator variables that form the product terms in the equation, 
the odds ratios cannot be interpreted as non-conditioned main effects.    
Table 5.1: Logistic models of extreme and violent worker protest actions 
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CONTROL 
 
4.165
.056 
(3.109) 
 
2.571
.154
(1.704) 
 
4.226
.062
(3.269) 
7.261
.005
(5.132) 
7.017
.006 
(4.947) 
5.246
.004 
(3.009) 
2.806
.138
(1.950) 
5.163
.004
(2.956) 
MPU 
 
16.32
.097 
(27.47) 
 
16.58
.061
(24.86) 
76.88
.003 
(113.4) 
38.06
.017 
(57.98) 
94.45
.001
(128.8) 
30.12
.021 
(44.58) 
63.45
.002 
(83.35) 
66.42
.001 
(84.56) 
MPU*CONTROL 
 
.1289
.103 
(.1621) 
 
.0896
.029 
(.0991) 
.0384
.003 
(.0419) 
.0599
.020 
(.0723) 
.0221
.000 
(.0225) 
.0561
.011
(.0632) 
.0308
.000
(.0295) 
.0232
.000
(.0217) 
ENCOMPASS 
 
.9914
.824 
(.0383) 
 
 .9815
.613 
(.0362) 
.9680
.355 
(.0340) 
.9719
.408
(.0335)     
ENCOMPASS* 
CONTROL 
 
.9584
.282 
(.0378) 
 
.9685
.391 
(.0361) 
.9848
.666
(.0351) 
.9846
.657 
(.0345)     
POWER 
 
9.866
.116 
(14.36) 
 
8.516
.143 
(12.44)  
4.777
.255 
(6.559)  
3.373
.345 
(4.344)    
POWER*CONTROL 
 
.1383
.104 
(.1684) 
 
.1475
.114
(.1787)  
.1934
.161
(.2270)  
.2413
.202
(.2686)    
LEFT 
 
.2018
.243 
(.2766) 
 
.2176
.215
(.2675) 
.5600
.614 
(.6434)     
.5098
.526
(.5423)  
LEFT*CONTROL 
 
4.765
.081 
(4.265) 
 
3.958
.082
(3.134) 
2.935
.180 
(2.359)     
2.663
.180 
(1.944)  
1
3
0
 1
3
1
Table 5.1 (Continued) 
UNIONS 
 
1.917
.078 
(.7076) 
 
2.068
.019
(.6414) 
1.636
.151 
(.5617) 
1.640
.144 
(.5545) 
1.525
.199 
(.5018) 
1.940
.028 
(.5864) 
1.851
.036 
(.5421) 
1.788
.043 
(.5139) 
WORKERS 
 
1.006
.000
(.0013) 
1.005
.000
(.0012) 
1.005
.000 
(.0012) 
1.005
.000
(.0012) 
1.005
.000 
(.0011) 
1.005
.000
(.0011) 
1.005
.000 
(.0011) 
1.005
.000
(.0011) 
INFLATIONt-1
 
1.032
.702 
(.0840) 
1.045
.556
(.0783) 
1.032
.689 
(.0807) 
1.046
.571
(.0826) 
1.041
.602 
(.0800) 
1.039
.603 
(.0759) 
1.040
.591
(.0755) 
1.038
.607 
(.0743) 
GROWTHt-1
 
.8875
.183 
(.0796) 
.9092
.265
(.0777) 
.8844
.144
(.0743) 
.8957
.184
(.0743) 
.8910
.152 
(.0718) 
.9091
.233 
(.0726) 
.9067
.223 
(.0728) 
.9078
.213
(.0706) 
KERALA 
 
4.887
.273 
(7.071)
 
5.081
.175
(6.093) 
5.754
.237 
(8.508) 
2.842
.440
(3.844) 
4.519
.265 
(6.113) 
5.404
.152
(6.369) 
8.252
.079 
(9.903) 
8.017
.071 
(9.238) 
MAHARASHTRA 
 
597.0
.002 
(1218.6) 
845.3
.000
(1520.9) 
520.0
.002 
(1056.3) 
214.1
.004 
(394.2) 
244.6
.004 
(460.9) 
649.3
.000 
(1096.4) 
1096.
.000 
(1963.9) 
706.9
.000 
(1200.7) 
SRI LANKA 
 
70.55
.013
(120.27) 
120.3
.001
(172.97) 
59.32
.018 
(102.8) 
39.21
.020
(61.89) 
46.73
.019
(76.69) 
122.6
.001 
(171.3) 
149.6
.001 
(216.1) 
140.5
.000 
(199.4) 
             
Number  of  Events  177 177  177 177 177  177 177  177 
%  Correctly  Classified  90 89  91 90 91 90 90 91 
Log  Likelihood  -46.45 -47.80  -47.87 -48.17 -49.20  -49.37 -49.10.  -50.22 
Psuedo R
2 .4545 .4386  .4378 .4343 .4221  .4201 .4233  .4102 
Probability > chi
2 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000 .0000  .0000 .0000  .0000 
Notes: Figures represent odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in superscript.  See text for information pertaining to data and the 
construction of variables.  
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  The interpretation of the CONTROL variable gives us some insight into the 
effects of NIU control over local leaders and members.  CONTROL takes on values of 
0, 1, and 2.  For a quantitative (as opposed to dichotomous) variable, the odds ratio 
represents a multiplicative factor by which the predicted odds change given a one unit 
increase in the predictor variable.  The odds ratio for the CONTROL variable is 
therefore interpreted as the predicted increase in the odds of violence given a one-unit 
increase in the qualitative score of union control when the MPU variable is 0.  For 
example, model (8) predicts that absent affiliation to a major party, the odds of violence 
for a firm union that is “sometimes” controlled by a parent union (a Control score of ‘1’) 
will be 5.16 times greater than for a firm-union that is “never” controlled by a parent 
union (a Control score of ‘0’), and 10.32 times greater for a firm-union that is “always” 
controlled by a parent union (a Control score of ‘2’) than for a firm-union that is “never” 
controlled by a parent union.   
  The odds ratio for the interaction term (MPU*CONTROL) is less than 1 in all of 
the models.  The odds ratio of the interaction term can be interpreted in one of two ways 
depending whether we view the MPU or CONTROL variable as the focal variable. The 
upshot of both of interpretations is that the odds of an MPU engaging in violence 
decrease as the parent union exerts greater control over its local leaders and members 
whereas the odds of an NIU engaging in violence increase as the parent union exercises 
greater control over local leaders and members. 
If we think of CONTROL as the moderator variable and MPU as the focal 
variable, the odds ratio for the interaction effect is interpreted as the multiplicative factor 
by which the odds ratio comparing the predicted odds of an MPU engaging in violence to 
the predicted odds of an NIU engaging in violence changes given a 1 unit increase in 
CONTROL.  Returning to model (8) as an example, under this interpretation, the 
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predicted odds of violence by an MPU relative to those of an NIU change by a factor of 
.023 with a one-unit increase in the CONTROL variable.   
If we interpret MPU as the moderator variable and CONTROL as the focal 
variable, the odds ratio for the interaction effect is the ratio of the multiplicative factor of 
CONTROL for MPUs divided by the multiplicative factor of CONTROL for NIUs.  
Under this interpretation, the multiplicative factor of CONTROL for MPUs in model (8) 
is .023 times that of the multiplicative factor for NIUs.  
  The logistic models of strike violence provide little evidence in support of 
alternative explanations of union violence based on characteristics of the union, union 
rivalry, or economic conditions.  ENCOMPASS, INPOWER, and LEFT are not 
statistically significant predictors in any of the models and their associated interaction 
terms are not consistently significant across models.  INFLATIONt-1 and GROWTHt-1 
are also not statistically significant predictors of violence in any of the models.    
Theories based on the size of the workforce and union rivalry also found support 
in the models of strike violence.  The number of workers (WORKERS) was a statistically 
significant predictor of union violence with an odds ratio greater than 1 in all of the 
models, lending support to the theory that the likelihood of violence increases with the 
size of the workforce.  The odds ratios were quite consistent across models and indicate 
that for each additional worker, the odds of violence increase by a factor of about 1.005, 
or 100.5 for every 100 workers--a sizeable effect.  UNIONS was statistically significant in 
more than half of the models and the odds ratios varied between about 1.5 and 1.9, 
indicating that the addition of one union in a production unit increases the odds of 
violence by about one and a half to two times.   
  The models also provide support for the argument that regional case histories 
matter.  The regional case indicator variables for Maharashtra and Sri Lanka were 
statistically significant and their odds ratios greater than one.  Specifically, the model 
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predicts that, all things equal, the odds of violence are 20 times greater if a protest even 
occurs in Sri Lanka and 43 times greater if an event occurs in Maharashtra.  These results 
suggest the importance of unique case effects that increase the likelihood of violence in 
these two regions such as the culture of violence inculcated by Sri Lanka’s extended civil 
conflicts during the 1980s and 1990s or the prevalence of powerful mafia in Maharashtra.  
Whatever the explanation for the effects, controlling for these unique case histories 
emphasizes the power of major party unions to moderate protest tactics in all four 
regions. 
Predicted probabilities for violence model
  One way to explore the substantive effects of these models is to demonstrate the 
predicted probabilities associated with the results.  Diagram 5.1 displays predicted 
probabilities of protest violence for the four ideal-type unions discussed in Chapter 1 
(Diagram 1.1) based on the results of the logistic model (8).  I calculate these probabilities 
by holding all other variables in the equation constant at their means and manipulating 
the independent variables of interest.  First, I simulated parent union control by holding 
the CONTROL variable at either its full value, a score of ‘2’ corresponding to the 
response that the parent union “always” exerts control over local leaders and members, 
or at ‘0’, the score corresponding to the response that the parent union “never” exercises 
control over local leaders and members .  Next, I simulated the effects of affiliation to a 
major political party by holding the MPU variable at ‘1’ or ‘0’, simulating the presence of 
an MPU or NIU.     
Holding all other variables constant at their means, the model predicts that 
enterprise unions (box “D”), have the lowest probability of engaging in extreme or 
violent actions during the course of a protest event—0.48%.  However, the model 
predicts that MPUs (box “A”), are just as unlikely to engage in extreme or violent protest.  
The predicted probability of protest violence for this ideal-typical case is 0.48%. 
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    In contrast, the model predicts a substantially higher probability of violent or 
extreme protest on the part of unions controlled by an NIU parent union (box “B”) and 
unions that have eschewed the control of MPU parent unions (box “C”).  According to 
the model, unions controlled by NIU external leadership have an 11.47% chance of 
engaging in extreme or violent behavior during the course a protest event.  For unions 
that an MPU fails to control, the probability of violent or extreme behavior is 24.41%.   
Logistic Model of Lockouts 
  Table 5.2 presents the results of a logistic model of lockouts. The dependent 
variable for the analysis is a coding of whether an industrial dispute, once it began, 
resulted in a lockout.  This variable is coded ‘1’ if the dispute resulted in a lockout and ‘0’ 
if it did not.  The sample of 96 events is all of the work stoppages reported to have lasted 
more than one workday between 1991 and 2002 at the unionized production units of the 
149 companies participating in the in-depth interviews.  The analyzes the effects of the 
same set of independent and control variables as the logistic model of industrial violence 
presented above. 
The results for the logistic models of lockouts are broadly similar to those of the 
logistic models of violence.  The models correctly classifies between 81 and 85 percent of 
the events, indicating a good fit.  The MPU and CONTROL variables are statistically 
significant in nearly all of the models and greater than one.  The interaction term 
(MPU*CONTROL) is statistically significant and less than 1 in all of the models. 
Table 5.2: Logistic models of lockouts
 
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CONTROL 
 
5.029
.103
(4.976) 
 
4.675
.103
(4.425) 
 
7.853
.038
(7.783) 
 
5.894
.029
(4.795) 
 
6.389
.023
(5.194) 
 
7.807
.012
(6.373) 
 
7.030
.036
(6.540) 
 
7.751
.012
(6.300) 
MPU 
 
176.3
.059
(482.7) 
 
19.99
.099
(36.31) 
 
504.1
.014 
(1275) 
 
189.3
.014 
(405.5) 
 
219.5
.007 
(435.3) 
 
39.99
.032 
(68.87) 
 
62.78
.006 
(95.46) 
 
64.72
.006 
(98.47) 
MPU*CONTROL 
 
.0397
.048
(.0648) 
 
.1314
.083 
(.1537) 
 
.0170
.007 
(.0256) 
 
.0319
.006 
(.0399) 
 
.0253
.002 
(.0300) 
 
.0751
.014
(.0791) 
 
.0545
.002 
(.0500) 
 
.0529
.001
(.0483) 
ENCOMPASS 
 
.9397
.253
(.0510) 
  
.9439
.262 
(.0486) 
 
.9415
.178
(.0421) 
 
.9647
.330 
(.0356) 
   
ENCOMPASS* 
CONTROL 
 
1.035
.243
(.0302) 
  
1.031
.268 
(.0285) 
 
1.037
.149 
(.0262) 
 
1.021
.300 
(.0207) 
   
POWER 
 
7.078
.284
(12.92) 
 
6.282
.301 
(11.16) 
 
 
6.315
.237 
(9.852) 
 
 
2.226
.538 
(2.890) 
  
POWER*CONTROL 
 
.2216
.246
(.2878) 
 
.2558
.276
(.3204) 
 
 
.2562
.222
(.2857) 
 
 
.5658
.530 
(.5137) 
  
LEFT 
 
.9200
.964
(1.705) 
 
.2843
.412
(.4362) 
 
2.774
.513 
(4.322) 
    
 
.8935
.920 
(1.002) 
 
LEFT *CONTROL 
 
1.299
.822
(1.508) 
 
2.489
.358 
(2.469) 
 
.6121
.615 
(.5972) 
    
 
1.155
.841 
(.8311) 
 
1
3
7
 1
3
8
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
UNIONS 
 
.5196
.118
(.2176) 
 
.5611
.169
(.2357) 
 
.5737
.143
(.2179) 
 
.5341
.120 
(.2155) 
 
.5743
.148 
(.2201) 
 
.6141
.207 
(.2371) 
 
.6136
.200 
(.2340) 
 
.6185
.201 
(.2325) 
WORKERS 
 
1.004
.015
(.0017) 
 
1.004
.009
(.0017) 
 
1.004
.016
(.0015) 
 
1.004
.012 
(.0016) 
 
1.004
.012 
(.0015) 
 
1.004
.008 
(.0015) 
 
1.004
.009 
(.0015) 
 
1.004
.008 
(.0015) 
INFLATIONt-1
 
.8220
.105
(.0994) 
 
.8225
.091
(.0951) 
 
.8066
.072 
(.0962) 
 
.8172
.094 
(.0986) 
 
.8039
.063 
(.0943) 
 
.8146
.071
(.0926) 
 
.8087
.064 
(.0925) 
 
.8071
.059 
(.0914) 
GROWTHt-1
 
1.263
.122
(.1905) 
 
1.211
.142
(.1577) 
 
1.163
.218 
(.1429) 
 
1.254
.120 
(.1824) 
 
1.164
.203 
(.1391) 
 
1.152
.223
(.1336) 
 
1.136
.264 
(.1293) 
 
1.132
.270 
(.1269) 
KERALA 
 
.8823
.915
(1.040) 
 
1.598
.577
(1.342) 
 
1.005
.997 
(1.163) 
 
1.011
.992 
(1.115) 
 
1.259
.825 
(1.307) 
 
1.763
.499 
(1.480) 
 
1.779
.485
(1.470) 
 
1.794
.480 
(1.484) 
MAHARASHTRA 
 
1.337
.819
(1.699) 
 
2.150
.480 
(2.329) 
 
1.726
.659 
2.135 
 
1.396
.792 
(1.764) 
 
1.802
.627 
2.184 
 
2.554
.362 
(2.627) 
 
2.633
.372 
(2.853) 
 
2.584
.358 
(2.669) 
SRI LANKA 
 
.4761
.589
(.6541) 
 
.5276
.614
(.6692) 
 
.5224
.623 
(.6895) 
 
.5751
.657 
(.7175) 
 
.5896
.665
.7192 
 
.6280
.696 
(.7486) 
 
.6142
.684 
(.7367) 
 
.6402
.706 
(.7555) 
           
Number  of  Events  96 96  96 96 96 96 96 96 
%  Correctly  Classified  85 81  83 84 84 85 85 85 
Log Likelihood  -38.38  -39.24  -39.06 -38.45 -39.29 -39.66 -39.85 -39.87 
Psuedo R
2 .3156 .3002  .3034 .3143 .2993 .2928 .2894 .2889 
Probability > chi
2 .0035 .0023  .0020 .0013 .0008 .0010 .0012 .0003 
Notes: Figures represent odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses, p-values in superscript.  See text for information pertaining to data and the 
construction of variables. 
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An interpretation of the odds ratios yields conclusions very similar to those of the 
model of strike violence. Based on the results for model (8), the predicted odds of 
violence for an MPU are 64.72 relative to NIUs when the CONTROL variable equals 0, 
indicating that the probability of a political union provoking a lockout is almost 65 times 
greater than that of an NIU when its parent union exercises no control over its behavior.  
The odds ratio for this model is extremely close to the odds ratio predicted by model (8) 
of the logistic analysis of violence (66.42).   
  The odds ratio for the CONTROL variable indicates that absent affiliation to a 
major party, the odds of violence for a firm union that is “sometimes” controlled by a 
parent union (a CONTROL score of ‘1’) will be 7.75 times greater than for a local union 
that is ‘never’ controlled by a parent union (a Control score of ‘0’), and 15.5 times greater 
for a local union that is “always” controlled by a parent union (a Control score of ‘2’) 
than for a local union that is “never” controlled by a parent union.  As with the odds ratio 
for MPU, the odds ratio for CONTROL in the model (8) of the logistic analysis of 
lockouts is similar to the odds ratio predicted by model (8) of the violence analysis 
(5.163). 
   The odds ratio of the interaction term in model (8) is .053.  As with the violence 
model, interpreting the odds ratio in the lockouts model yields the conclusion that the 
odds of an MPU forcing a lockout decrease as the parent union exerts greater control 
over its local leaders and members whereas the odds of an NIU forcing a lockout increase 
as the parent union exercises greater control over local leaders and members.  If we think 
of CONTROL as the moderator variable and MPU as the focal variable, the predicted 
odds of violence by an MPU relative to those of an NIU change by a factor of .053 with a 
one-unit increase in the CONTROL variable.   If we interpret MPU as the moderator 
variable and CONTROL as the focal variable, the multiplicative factor of CONTROL for 
MPUs in model (8) is .053 times that of the multiplicative factor for parochial unions.  
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  Both WORKERS and INFLATIONt-1 are statistically significant predictors of 
lockouts in the model.  The odds ratio for the number of workers indicates a fairly 
sizeable effect similar to that predicted in the violence model.  For each additional 
worker, the odds of violence increase by a factor of 1.004, or by 100.4 for every 100 
workers.   
  The odds ratio for INFLATION indicates that the odds of a lockout decrease by 
a factor of .82 for every one percent increase in inflation.  Another way of stating this 
result is to say that lockouts become 1.21 times less likely for every one percent increase 
in inflation.  This result is surprising considering the expectation that adverse economic 
circumstances would increase worker militancy and that employers would be more likely 
to lockout workers when times are hard.   
  As with the violence model, factors associated with characteristics of the union 
did not predict variations in the likelihood of lockouts.  ENCOMPASS, POWER, LEFT 
and their associated interaction terms were not statistically significant in any of the 
models.  Finally, the fixed case effects were not significant in the lockout model, 
suggesting that regional histories play less of a role in determining lockouts than they do 
in determining strike violence.      
Predicted probabilities of lockouts model 
  Diagram 5.2 displays predicted probabilities for the four ideal type cases based on 
the results of model (8) of the logistic analysis of lockouts.  As anticipated, the model 
predicts that enterprise unions (box ‘D’) and MPUs with control over local leaders and 
members (box ‘A’) are less likely to force a lockout than NIUs (box ‘B’) or MPUs that 
have resisted the control of parent their parent union organizations (box ‘C’).   
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More specifically, the model predicts that an enterprise union has the lowest 
probability of forcing a lockout--1.22%.  An MPU has a relatively low probability 
(11.99%) of experiencing a lockout.  In contrast, NIU has a substantially higher chance of 
forcing a lockout.  The model predicts that during the course of a protest event involving 
an NIU, the chances of a lockout are a staggering 45%.  Similarly, an MPU over which 
the parent union organization has lost control has a 44.03% chance of forcing a lockout.  
 
Conclusion 
  In this chapter, I presented evidence from surveys and statistical models to 
further test the political theory of union behavior developed in Chapter 3.  Statistical 
models of industrial violence and lockouts support the contention that unions affiliated to 
major political parties restrain worker protest whereas NIUs are more likely to pursue 
aggressive protest tactics.  Workers that are adequately controlled by their parent union 
organizations have a low probability of engaging in violent or extreme protest actions and 
a low probability of provoking a lockout by the management.  Workers controlled by 
NIUs have quite a high probability of engaging in violent protest and forcing a lockout, 
suggesting their inflexibility at the bargaining table.         
The results of the statistical models also demonstrate that competing explanations 
based on union characteristics fail to explain worker restraint.  Neither the level of 
encompassment of the union, the political status of the affiliated party (whether in or out 
of power), nor the ideology of the political party is a statistically significant predictor of 
worker violence or lockouts.     
  The results of the models do, however, suggest the relevance of the hypothesis 
that unions that are not controlled by outside leadership (enterprise, or “in house” 
unions) are quiescent.  Of all unions, enterprise unions have the lowest probability of 
utilizing violence or showing inflexibility at the bargaining table.  Thus, the conclusion 
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that a Japanese-style enterprise unionism produces labor quiescence appears to be correct.  
However, the question remains whether states can actually reproduce the East Asian 
labor-repressive model in more democratically mobilized settings.  I address this question 
in the next chapter, in which I explore the recent history of state-labor relations in Sri 
Lanka.    
 
 CHAPTER 6 
LABOR REPRESSION AND INDUSTRIAL  
VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA 
 
The vital social and political functions trade unions may perform in 
countries attempting swift economic growth are perhaps of even greater 
significance than the economic consequences of trade unionism.. . 
.Unions play a valuable role by participating in and contributing to the 
management and ordering of industrial conflict.  Aggressive trade 
unionism. . .provides an essential channel for the expression of protest 
and release of tensions which might otherwise explode in highly 
disruptive and destructive actions.   
 
–Robert Kearney, Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon, 1971 
 
Social scientists have attributed the rapid growth of East Asian economies, in 
part, to initial successes in low-end export production that depended on heavy doses of 
labor repression to keep labor costs down (Deyo 1987; Haggard 1990).  A central 
question arising from the East Asian experience is whether the labor-repressive tactics 
associated with East Asian development might be pursued in more socially mobilized 
settings (Evans 1995, chapter 10; Heller 1999, 30-36).  In other words, is the 
developmental experience of East Asia a ‘model’ for the rest of the developing world as is 
so often claimed?  Or do the repressive aspects of the East Asian development 
experience make it impossible to replicate elsewhere?   
The recent history of state-labor relations in Sri Lanka sheds fresh light on this 
discussion.  Beginning in the late 1970s, the Sri Lankan government pursued a labor-
repressive export-oriented development strategy that closely resembled that of East Asian 
countries in the initial stages of their industrial development.  The key difference between 
Sri Lanka and East Asia is that at the time of its transition to an export-led development 
strategy, Sri Lanka was home to one of the world’s most vibrant labor movements.   
An important feature of the Sri Lankan union movement at the time of its 
transition to a strategy of low-end export-based industrialization was that unions in the 
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private manufacturing sector were affiliated to Marxist parties that had been key members 
of the governing United Front (UF) coalition.  These parties had abandoned aggressive 
class confrontation in the industrial arena to focus on the pursuit of a programmatic 
agenda in Parliament.  Further, these unions were highly committed to institutionalized 
grievance resolution and negotiated a series of agreements with Employers’ Federation of 
Ceylon (EFC) covering a majority of ‘manual grade’ (blue collar’) workers in the private 
manufacturing sector.         
By repressing trade unions in the 1980s, the Sri Lankan government eroded these 
institutionalized channels of grievance resolution, the credibility of traditional left parent 
union organizations, and worker faith in the collective bargaining process.  As a result, 
traditional left unions lost their ability to strategically restrain worker militancy for the 
purposes of collective bargaining.  Additionally, workers began leaving traditional left 
unions to join a more aggressive set of NIUs affiliated to more radical left parties.  This 
process culminated in the mid-1990s with an explosion of high-profile labor protest in 
which workers employed extreme and violent protest tactics, including assaults on 
mangers, hostage takings and threatened suicides.  The extreme and violent forms of 
protest chased away hundreds of millions of dollars in much-needed new FDI and led to 
the closure of dozens of existing factories.   
The chaotic consequences of the Sri Lankan government’s repression of 
organized labor suggest two conclusions.  First, prior democratic mobilization may make 
labor repression untenable over the long-term, even if unions are successfully repressed in 
the short term.  Second, in a democratic setting, unions affiliated to mainstream left 
parties may provide a benefit to development by channeling the protest of politically and 
socially conscious workers.  These conclusions cast doubt on the notion that East Asian 
labor-repressive tactics might produce positive developmental outcomes in other regions.  
Instead, as Heller (1999) notes, the developmental strategies of East Asian states were 
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more likely “the product of a very specific state-society balance” that cannot be replicated 
in more socially and politically mobilized settings  (34).     
In the remainder of this chapter, I support these arguments by showing how 
government repression led to industrial chaos and how industrial chaos adversely affected 
investment in Sri Lanka.  I begin with a brief recounting the history of state-labor 
relations during the late 1970s and early 1980s when the UNP began systematically 
discouraging union activity and aggressively confronting worker opposition to its new 
liberalization policies.  I then demonstrate how repression led to the traditional left losing 
control over the union movement that, in turn, gave rise to extreme and violent forms of 
worker protest in the 1990s.  In the final section of the paper, I provide evidence of a 
relationship between industrial chaos and substantial losses in new and existing 
investment.  
 
6.1  A brief history of state-labor relations in Sri Lanka 
  In the late 1970s, Sri Lanka underwent a remarkable transition from a labor-
friendly to a labor- repressive state.  The transition was remarkable both in its extent and 
in its completeness.  In 1975, the dominant political force was the pro-poor, pro-working 
class United Front (UF) coalition built around the dominant Sinhalese nationalist Sri 
Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP).  Marxist political leaders controlled the majority of labor 
unions, and Marxist parties were key members of the coalition, which aggressively 
pursued a socialist welfare agenda of economic reform.
 1  
                                                 
1 Prior to the 1960s, Marxist parties had enjoyed an even more powerful political position and a greater 
degree of independence.   But after independence, the cross-class appeal of Sinhalese nationalism 
dramatically undercut the electoral position of the Marxists. In the 1947 election, the Marxist coalition 
constituted the only viable alternative to the United National Party (UNP), winning 20.5 percent of the 
popular vote and 18 percent of the seats in parliament.   By March 1960, Marxist electoral fortunes had 
changed, with Marxist parties winning only 8.6 percent of the seats in parliament (Samaraweera 1981).  
Recognizing the impossibility of forging a unique space for working-class politics, the Marxists began 
negotiating no-contest pacts and alliances with the SLFP (De Silva 1981). 
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For Marxists, 1975 was the best of times because they had achieved so much 
during their five years in the coalition government, but the worst of times because it 
marked the beginning of a period of 20 years of open and destructive conflict with the 
state.  With their agenda complete, the tolerance of the UF Marxists for the conservative 
wing of the SLFP dwindled.  By the mid-1970s, severe balance of payment problems, 
inflationary pressures, rising prices of basic food items, and an unprecedented rise in the 
price of oil bolstered arguments made by the right wing of the SLFP for limited measures 
of economic reform.  When the SLFP restored the free market on paddy and rice, the UF 
broke up after the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) left the coalition.   
  Responding to Sri Lanka’s economic failures under the UF and the constant 
deprivation of goods and services, voters elected the UNP on a platform of economic 
liberalization with an 80 percent majority of parliamentary seats in 1977.  Unwilling to 
accept the UNP victory, the expelled left took their political struggle against the UNP to 
the streets by calling out a series of nation-wide protests and strikes against the 
government.  The struggle came to a head in the general strike of 1980,
2 when the 
Marxist Ceylon Federation of Labour (CFL), Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions 
(CFTU), and the Ceylon Trade Union Federation (CTUF) combined forces with the 
center-left unions belonging to the SLFP allied Sri Lanka Nidahas Sevaka Sangamaya 
(SLNSS) to call out a strike nominally in favor of a wage increase and to protest UNP 
reform measures, but was really designed to weaken the UNP government.  D.W. 
Subasinghe, Secretary General of the Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions (CFTU) 
described the situation this way:  
“The CFTU leadership, after 1977, could not accept the victory of the 
United National Party.. . .There were a number of other like-minded trade 
unions at that time.  All were of the opinion that we should try our best to 
                                                 
2   This account of the 1980 strike is based on newspaper articles appearing in the Daily News, the Island, and 
the Sun in July of 1980 as well as multiple interviews I had with union leaders, employers and government 
officials in Sri Lanka during the 1997-98 academic year and in 2003. 
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bring the government down.. . .There was this intention of making it 
difficult to for the government to rule.  And we wanted to do our part to 
hasten the downfall of the government.. . .We didn’t think that that strike 
would cause the government to fall. . .But we wanted to discredit the 
government.”
 3
 
Perceiving the strike as a threat to its hold on power, the response of the 
government was to crack down hard.  The UNP declared the strike illegal under 
emergency regulations and sent out police, soldiers, and members of the UNP-committed 
union, Jathika Seveka Sangamaya (JSS) to harass, intimidate and physically assault the 
strikers.
4  In addition, the UNP used essential services orders under emergency 
regulations to declare strikes illegal and to expel strikers from their jobs.  The UNP 
declared all services in the manufacturing and transport sectors ‘essential’, issued a decree 
that all workers in the public sector participating in the strike had vacated their posts, and 
pressured private sector employers to follow suit.   
It is difficult to overstate the setback these dismissals represented to left unions.  
By the end of the strike, upwards of 30,000 of the unions’ most committed members, 
including key branch-level committee members, had lost their jobs and were replaced by 
UNP loyalists.  The strike also had substantial demonstration effects for the private 
sector, where employers began to view a union free environment as a legitimate goal and 
repressed organized labor knowing they could count on government support.   
Consequently, traditional left unions in the private sector lost members and traditional 
left unions became nonentities in the collective bargaining sector.
5   
                                                 
3 Interview, March 2003.   
4  There were also a number of incidents of union harassment that preceded the 1980 general strike.  For 
example, in two protests leading up the 1980 strike, workers were attacked with bats, knives, and bicycle 
chains.  An SLFP politician named Alawi Maulana and a CFTU member named Somapala suffered serious 
stab wounds.  Somapala died from his wounds.     
5 In interviews conducted in 2003, the leaders of The Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions (CFTU), the 
Communist Party union, and the Ceylon Federation of Labour (CFL), the Lanka Sama Samaja Party union 
each said that they lost over 1000 workers in the private sector because of dismissals following the 1980 
strike.  Mr. Siriwardena, the leader of the CFL, said that virtually all of those lost were branch level 
committee members.  Mr Subasinghe, the leader of the CFTU, indicated that he lost fewer branch level 
leaders since they were instructed by the parent union to return to work.    
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Following the 1980 general strike, the UNP continued its repression of worker 
protest for the entirety of its remaining 14 years in power.  This repression took two 
forms.  The first was further repression and victimization of already unionized workers.  
Cyril Mathew, Minister of Industries under the UNP and leader of the UNP-committed 
union, Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS), led the continued charge against the left and 
center-left unions.  Mathew’s aim was to transfer total control of the union movement 
from the left and center-left unions to the JSS.  To this end, Mathew transferred 
thousands of left and center-left union members in the public sector to remote locations 
and employed goons to harass and even physically assault union leaders.  Under Mathew’s 
guidance, the UNP froze union bank accounts and used essential services orders under 
emergency regulations to declare strikes illegal throughout their rule.  At one point in the 
early 1990s, the UNP introduced legislation that would make all strikes illegal with a ten- 
year prison term as penalty for violation of the law.
6   
The second strategy of reducing the strength of private sector unions involved 
discouraging the formation of unions in new firms.  In large measure, this objective was 
accomplished by the establishment of what is now known as the Sri Lanka Board of 
Investment (BOI), a government organization that has the stated purpose of facilitating 
investment but whose main function was arguably establishing a pool of docile labor for 
low-end export production.
7  The BOI shielded firms set up under its jurisdiction from 
Sri Lanka’s many laws guaranteeing workers the right to form a labor union and engage in 
                                                 
6 This legislation was withdrawn following threats of mass protest from trade union leaders and opposition 
leaders.  
7 The BOI began as the Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC) and was established by law No. 
4 of 1978 (later known as the “BOI law”).  Section 16a of the BOI law provides it with sweeping powers to 
“do all such acts or take such steps as may be necessary or conducive to the attainment of the objects [sic] 
of the Commission” (i.e., the GCEC).  Section 16f somewhat redundantly establishes the power of the 
GCEC in astoundingly broad terms: “the Commission shall have the power. . .generally to do all such acts 
or things as are incidental to or consequential upon the exercise, performance and discharge of its powers, 
duties and functions under this law.”  A great deal of this “incidental” power was used to quell trade union 
activities.  
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labor union activities by interfering with the functions of the Labour Department.
8  The 
BOI encouraged firms under its jurisdiction to actively discourage workers from 
organizing unions, to dismiss workers who successfully organized unions, and pressured 
the Commissioner of Labour not to prosecute employers who refused to recognize or 
enter into collective bargaining negotiations with labor unions.
9
Additionally, the BOI set up restricted and isolated economic zones, called 
“Export Processing Zones” (EPZs), and guaranteed employers that unions would be 
effectively banned from the zones.  In the year 2000, there were 13 such zones and parks 
(BOI, 2000).  Workers in BOI companies located within EPZs face special logistical 
difficulties in terms of organizing and carrying out protest activities.  Workers and visitors 
to factories inside the zone are not permitted to move freely in and out of the zones, 
which are surrounded by high barbed-wire fences and which require special forms of 
identification for entry. 
For obvious reasons, such isolation makes it difficult for workers to engage in 
labor union activities.  Outside union leaders cannot organize workers because they are 
prevented from meeting with them.  Even if the union leaders can organize workers in 
the zone, the isolation of companies inside of the zone diminishes the utility of traditional 
protest methods such as pickets in front of company premises.  Further, since the zones 
are in out-of-the-way rural or peri-urban locations, demonstrations attract less attention 
than pickets outside of a company in a heavily populated area.      
Another tactic the BOI uses to discourage the formation of unions in new firms 
is to encourage companies to “workers’ councils” for labor unions.  As per BOI 
                                                 
8 The right to form a trade union is guaranteed as a basic right in Chapter 3, section 18(2) of the 1978 Sri 
Lankan Constitution, and further guarantees regarding trade union activities are provided by the Trade 
Unions Ordinances No. 14 of 1935 and No. 3 of 1946, the Trade Union Acts No. 15 of 1948, No. 18 of 
1958, and No. 24 of 1970, and the Industrial Disputes Act of 1950. 
9 Reported in a letter to the Sri Lanka Government from the International Confederation of Trade Unions, 
the European Trade Union Confederation, and the World Confederation of Labour, dated June 18, 2002.  
The letter was in response to Sri Lanka’s application for special trade privileges under the EU’s Generalized 
System of Preferences.   
 151 
instructions, workers’ councils are to be elected by their peers, meet every month, and 
make representations to the employer regarding issues of concern to workers; but 
widespread abuse by employers has rendered the councils ineffective.  There are many 
reports of employers fixing elections, pressuring certain workers not to run for positions 
on the council, and pressuring workers to vote for representatives who are friendly to the 
interests of employers.  Abuse of worker’s councils has been widespread and visible 
enough to prompt a letter of complaint from the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the 
World Confederation of Labour (WCL) to the Sri Lankan government in June of 2002.   
Yet even if the councils ran free from interference from employers, it is not clear 
that workers’ councils would effectively represent worker interests because they do not 
provide any proactive means of redressing grievances.  Most notably, workers’ councils 
do not have the ability to negotiate binding contracts and do not have the right to strike.  
The BOI instructs that the councils should “work together” with the management “in a 
spirit of mutual trust for the good of the enterprise and its employees” and recommends 
that councils should “refrain from doing anything likely to impair the efficiency and 
productivity of the enterprise” (BOI 2002, 7). 
By the 1990s, the BOI controlled and confined the vast majority of workers in the 
manufacturing sector, producing what Laksiri Fernando refers to as Sri Lanka’s “new 
industrial proletariat” (Fernando 1988).  In 1995, Sri Lanka’s manufacturing sector 
employed 263,900 workers (ILO LABORSTA Database).  Of these, 217,441, or 82%, 
were employed by BOI-controlled firms.  85,847 workers, 33% of workers in the 
manufacturing sector, were employed in EPZs (BOI 2000).  This authoritarian control of 
a workforce that had once enjoyed complete freedom had dire consequences for 
industrial relations in Sri Lanka.   
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6.2  How repression resulted in industrial violence  
In January of 1995, workers at Ansell Lanka (Pvt) Ltd., a rubber company located 
in a BOI-controlled EPZ, went on strike under the banner of the CFTU with one 
demand—‘Please recognize our union.’
10  When management refused to extend 
recognition, the workers took drastic steps.  One group of workers climbed the factory’s 
water tower and began a “fast until death.”  A second group removed members of the 
management staff from their offices and led them to a remote storage area at gunpoint, 
and a third group surrounded the factory with flammable chemicals.  All would die, they 
threatened, unless their simple demand were met.  A bewildered and embarrassed CFTU 
leadership was later informed of the extreme actions taken by the local union members.   
In 1990, members of the Inter-Companies Employees’ Union (ICEU) went on 
strike at a metal packaging company outside of Colombo in support of a wage demand.
11  
During the course of the strike, union members assaulted non-striking workers and 
management, ransacked one manager’s home, and damaged company machinery.  The 
company continued to experience aggressive protest by the ICEU throughout the 1990s.  
For example, when the company refused to meet the union’s demand for a 25 percent 
wage increase in 2000, union members of the union again damaged machinery and 
obstructed the company’s gates.  
In 1992, members of the Ceylon Industrial Workers’ Union (CIWU) went on 
strike at a coir manufacturing facility in the city of Galle.
12  When the management did 
not grant the union’s demand for a 42 percent wage increase, the workers threw rocks, 
                                                 
10 Details presented in this article regarding the Ansell strike were recorded during the course of dozens of 
personal interviews with labor leaders, government officials and employers during the course of the 1997-
98 academic year.  Particularly informative were interviews with G. Weerakoon, commissioner of Labor 
from 1982 to 1995 in November 1997 and August 1998; D.W. Subasinghe, Secretary-General of the Ceylon 
Federation of Trade Unions, in October 1997; and E.F.G. Amarasinghe, Secretary-General of the 
Employers’ Federation of Ceylon in October, 1997 and July, 1998.  
11 Details pertaining to disputes at this company are taken from an interview with management, March 10, 
2003.  
12 Details regarding disputes at this company were provided during an interview with management and 
trade union leaders at the factory, February 28, 2003. 
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sticks and bottles at the management and went on a two-week go slow.  Failing to win 
their demand, the CIWU continued its agitation and led the workers on strike a second 
time in 1994 when workers staged a fast atop the company’s water tower and hurled 
missiles at management for a second time.     
These three anecdotes illustrate some important features of Sri Lanka’s industrial 
relations climate during the 1990s.  Taken together, they illustrate the prevalence of 
violent and extreme protest actions resulting from a general loss of faith among workers 
in institutionalized forms of grievance resolution and, in particular, collective bargaining.  
The anecdotes also illustrate the ways in which this loss of faith in collective bargaining 
has manifested itself in worker allegiance to traditional left unions that advocate routine 
strikes and collective bargaining, and ‘new left’ unions that advocate more aggressive 
protest tactics.      
In the first anecdote, the leaders of a traditional left union who support collective 
bargaining and denounce violence were frustrated by their inability to control the protest 
actions of local union leaders and members who took matters into their own hands.  In 
recent years, this has been a common scenario for traditional unions that faced 
government repression in the 1980s and, in particular, those affiliated to parties in the 
former UF coalition--the CFTU, CFL and SLFP (hereafter ‘UF unions’).  
In the second and third anecdotes, workers repeatedly pursued aggressive 
demands by employing extreme and violent protest tactics that, according to reports by 
managers and local union leaders, were supported rather than discouraged by parent 
union leaders.  These two anecdotes illustrate how, during the 1990s, the perceived 
inability of traditional left unions to satisfy their demands through routine protest and 
collective bargaining led workers to join the ICEU and CIWU, which appealed to 
workers through open support of violent and extreme protest tactics.    
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The loss of faith in collective bargaining and traditional left unions demonstrated 
in these anecdotes was a direct consequence of state repression.  Prior to the 1980 general 
strike, the UF unions had formed the bedrock of institutionalized grievance resolution, 
signing collective bargaining agreements that covered the majority of manual employees 
in the private organized manufacturing companies.   Following the UNP crackdown, 
traditional left unions were seldom given any opportunity to sign an agreement and by the 
mid-1980s, most manufacturing companies no longer subscribed to the manual workers’ 
collective agreements to which traditional left unions were the primary signatories 
(Amerasinghe 1994, 106-112).  On the rare occasion that left unions engaged in collective 
bargaining, the agreement was signed “from a position of absolute weakness” in which 
whatever the Employers’ Federation of Ceylon (EFC) offered was “taken without 
resistance” (Amerasinghe 1997). 
By rendering traditional union leaders powerless in the collective bargaining arena 
or, in many cases, removing leaders from factories altogether, the UNP generated a 
massive legitimacy crisis for left union leaders.  As Franklin Amerasinghe, the former 
Secretary General of the EFC puts it,  
The experience of the workers in July 1980 resulted in disenchantment 
with Trade Union leadership, which was a sad setback to the Trade 
Unions and which perhaps created a vacuum in leadership at the 
workplace level in several Companies (Amerasinghe 1994, 76).   
 
This vacuum provided a space for the emergence of more radical labor leaders who began 
fomenting violence.  This process began even before the UNP left power with the 
formation of ‘action committees’ in the mid-1980s by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP), the radical Marxist party whose bloody insurgency resulted in upwards of 66,000 
deaths between 1987 and 1989 (Shastri 1997).   
Through its action committees, the JVP instituted a reign of terror in public and 
private sector industries, forcing companies into agreements through violence and 
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intimidation.  Crucially, however, in manufacturing companies “where there were 
effective unions, the action committees did not gain a foothold” (Ameresinghe 1994, 82).  
In other words, where traditional left union leaders were not removed or stripped of 
legitimacy, companies did not experience the violence and intimidation associated with 
the JVP uprising.   
This argument is further supported by the exceptionalism of the Ceylon 
Mercantile Union (CMU), which did not participate in the 1980 strike and as a result, was 
never a target of state repression.  The CMU’s leader, Bala Tampoe continues to 
negotiate successful collective bargaining agreements with hundreds of EFC firms 
(Amerasinghe 1994, chapter 5).  Tampoe recently stated that the quality of the EFC-CMU 
relationship is so good that their last agreement was negotiated “purely by very informal 
discussions, some of which took place on the telephone.”
13        
Unlike the CMU, most traditional left unions were unable to escape UNP 
repression and consequently, most companies were vulnerable to the emergence of a 
more aggressive leadership.  Tables 6.1 and 6.2 report the results of an original telephone 
survey of 91 manufacturing firms randomly selected from the Ceylon Chamber of 
Commerce members’ directory.  In this survey, I asked managers and directors about 
which, if any unions organized workers in their production units, and whether they had 
experienced various forms of protest activity during the period 1991-2003.
14  
                                                 
13   The cordial relationship was related by Tampoe and Franklin Amarasinghe, the Secretary General of the 
Employers’ Federation, in interviews.  The quote is from a letter to Tampoe from Amarasinghe 
congratulating him on his completion of 50 years as the Secretary General of the CMU.   
14 For a full explanation of the methodology used for this survey, see Appendix 1, section A. 
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Table 6.1: Structure of the union movement in Sri Lanka 
               Union  % Unionized Companies 
  
New Left Unions  49 
  ICEU 32 
  CIWU 22 
    
Traditional Left Unions  59 
  CMU 35 
  CFTU 22 
  CFL 8 
  SLNSS 24 
  
Non-left unions  27 
 JSS  14 
 Other  16 
    
Source: Telephone survey of managers and directors of 91 companies in the Sri 
Lankan manufacturing sector.   Surveys conducted November to December of 2002.  
See data appendix for details regarding sample selection.     
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Table 6.1 displays the percentage of unionized companies in the telephone survey 
reporting the presence of new left, traditional left, and non-left unions in their production 
units.
15  The survey results demonstrate the increased dominance of the ICEU and the 
CIWU. These unions, which were nonexistent in the 1970s, now organize workers in 
nearly half of unionized companies in the manufacturing sector.  Thirty-two percent of 
unionized companies reported the presence of an ICEU-affiliated union while 22 percent 
reported the presence of a CIWU-affiliated union.    
The loss of stable, institutionalized channels of grievance resolution and the rise 
of new left unions gave rise to highly chaotic and often violent industrial relations.  Table 
6.2 presents the percentage of companies experiencing various types of protest in the 
1990s and early 2000s.  The survey results portray a highly chaotic industrial relations 
scenario during this period.  To begin, the overall level of protest during this period was 
high, with 51 percent of the Chamber’s manufacturing firms experiencing a stoppage of 
work from either a strike or lockout and 55 percent experienced at least one form of 
industrial protest.    
Violence became a fairly common feature of union-management interactions 
during this period.  Twenty-two percent of companies reported experiencing violent or 
extreme forms of protest in one or more of their production units.  Eight percent of 
companies reported an industrial dispute in which workers damaged company property 
and eleven percent reported experiencing threats made to management by union 
members.  Four percent of companies reported that union members physically assaulted 
other workers when they tried to cross the picket line.  Two percent of companies 
reported a direct assault on managers. 
 
                                                 
15 Unionized companies represented 40% of the total number of companies participating in the survey.   
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Table 6.2: Percentage of manufacturing companies experiencing 
various types of protest in Sri Lanka, 1991-2002 
Type of Protest  % Experiencing 
  
Stoppage of Work  51 
 Strike  51 
 Lockout  13 
    
Violent or Extreme Protest  22 
 Against  Managers  2 
  Against Other Workers  4 
  Damage to Property  8 
  Threats to Management  11 
  
Obstruction/Occupation
  30 
    
 Gherao  9 
  Climbing High Structure  10 
 Fasting  2 
 Sit-in/Blocking  Gates  12 
  
Routine Protest  52 
    
 Go  Slow  1 
 Gathering  48 
  
Any Form of Protest  55 
  
Source: Telephone survey of managers and directors of 91 companies in the Sri 
Lankan manufacturing sector.   Surveys conducted November to December of 2002.   
See data appendix for details regarding sample selection.             
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 The obstruction and occupation of company premises was also common, with 
thirty percent of companies reporting such an incident.  Ten percent of companies 
reported that workers had climbed to the top of high structures such as water towers or 
office buildings during the course of a dispute, typically threatening suicide.
16  Twelve 
percent reported that workers had occupied or obstructed entry to company premises.  
Nine percent of companies experienced a ‘gherao.’  ‘Gherao’ means ‘encirclement’ in 
Hindi.  It is a uniquely South Asian form of protest in which workers surround a 
manager, refusing to allow the manager to leave his/her desk (even to use the facilities) 
until their demands have been addressed. Two percent of companies reported 
experiencing a fast. 
Testing the ‘New Left’ hypothesis 
In this section, I demonstrate the empirical validity of the hypothesis that 
industrial violence in the 1990s is attributable to a loss of control by traditional left unions 
and the emergence of ‘new left’ unions through a statistical analysis of protest events.   
To begin, the argument about traditional versus new left control and union 
violence can be more concisely presented as the set of hypotheses presented in Diagram 
6.1.  The left side of the two-by-two distinguishes between those workers belonging to a 
‘new left’ union and those belonging to unions affiliated to parties that formed the United 
Front government and participated in the 1980 General Strike.  The top of the two-by-
two distinguishes between union centers exercising a high degree of control over local 
leaders and members and those with a low degree of control.    
                                                 
16 It is, therefore, no wonder Franklin Amerasinghe described the new industrial relations climate as imbued 
with a “water-tower culture” (1994, 82).   
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Cell ‘A’ of the diagram represents the hypothesis that workers are more likely to 
engage in violent protest tactics when controlled by new left unions.  The hypothesis that 
workers controlled by UF unions will primarily utilize routine protest tactics is 
represented by cell ‘B’.  In our earlier discussion, we said that one explanation for union 
violence was that a loss of control rendered traditional left unions unable to restrict 
workers to routine protest actions.  This hypothesis is represented in cell ‘D’.  Consistent 
with this logic is the prediction that a loss of control by a new left union will result in a 
lower likelihood of union violence (cell ‘C’).   
Method and basic results 
In order to test these hypotheses, I estimated a logistic model of industrial protest 
events of the form, 
 
logit(π)=α +β1NEWLEFT_HIGH+β2NEWLEFT_LOW +β3UNITEDFRONT_HIGH+
β4UNITEDFRONT_LOW +ξx +ε
 
where logit(π) is the logit function of the probability that violence occurs during the 
course of a given protest.  NEWLEFT_HIGH, NEWLEFT_LOW, 
UNITEDFRONT_HIGH, and UNITEDFRONT_LOW are a series of indicator 
variables used to test the hypothesis that workers controlled by United Front unions are 
less violent than those controlled by new left unions.  Each indicator variable 
distinguishes whether workers are affiliated to a new left or United Front union and the 
extent to which they are controlled by that union.  Thus, NEWLEFT_HIGH is coded ‘1’ 
if the workers involved in the dispute were tightly controlled by a new left union and ‘0’ if 
they belonged to a different union or if they belonged to a new left union but were only 
loosely controlled by that union.  Similarly, UNITEDFRONT_LOW is coded ‘1’ if a UF 
union loosely controlled the protesting workers and ‘0’ if the workers either belonged to 
another union or were tightly controlled by a UF union.  
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The level of control exercised by a central union leadership over enterprise-level 
leaders and members is a qualitative assessment by the management of the firm 
experiencing the protest event.  The management was asked whether the parent union 
“always” “sometimes” or “never” had control of the actions and behavior of the local 
union.  I deemed the management’s response to this set of questions to be more accurate 
than either that of the central union leadership or the local members, who have obvious 
incentives to portray the central leadership as always being in control of local leaders and 
members.   
For the purposes of this analysis, the central union leadership was coded as 
having a ‘high’ degree of control if the management responded that it “always” had 
control over firm-level leaders and members and a ‘low’ degree of control if the 
management responded that the union “sometimes” or “never” controlled the actions 
and behavior of the local union.  I collapsed the two lower categories from the survey 
(“always” and “never”) into one (‘low’) category for the statistical analysis primarily 
because there were so few cases (two for new left unions and three for UF unions) in 
which managers indicated that the central union “never” exerted control firm-level 
leaders and members.          
  The analysis includes a series of exogenous variables,x, to control for the 
alternative explanations.  I included the number of active unions (UNIONS) in the 
production unit at the time of the protest event to control for the effects of union 
competition at a given production unit.  The number of workers (WORKERS) in the 
production unit at the time of the dispute to captures the effects of a larger workforce 
and more impersonal management-worker interactions.  To control for the impact of 
economic conditions on union violence, the analysis includes the rates of inflation 
(INFLATIONt-1) and economic growth (GROWTHt-1).  The inflation and growth figures 
are lagged by one year on the assumption that it takes time for macroeconomic 
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conditions to affect wages, profits and, therefore, the outcome of union protest over 
wage demands.   
The data for the dependent variable (the occurrence of violent or extreme 
protest) and primary independent variables of interest are derived from in-depth surveys 
of 33 companies in Sri Lanka selected via a random sample of the 91 participants in the 
telephone survey.
17  These interviews yielded a sample of 61 industrial protest events 
reported to have occurred between 1991 and 2002 at the 91 companies participating in 
the in-depth interviews.  For the purposes of the logistic regressions, I coded the 
dependent variable ‘1’ if the union engaged in extreme or violent protest as defined in 
table 1 and ‘0’ if the union did not.  Although some non-unionized companies were 
sampled, only events occurring in unionized firms are included in the statistical analysis.       
 
 
17 For details regarding the selection process and response rates for the in-depth survey in each regional 
case, see the data appendix.   1
6
4
Table 6.3: Logistic model of violent and extreme protest actions in Sri Lanka 
Independent Variable  Coefficient  Standard 
Error  z P>|z|  95% Confidence 
Interval 
NEWLEFT_HIGH   1.384  1.184   1.17  .242  -.9360   3.704 
NEWLEFT_LOW -1.610  1.492  -1.08  .281  -4.533    1.316 
CONSTANT -6.790  2.691  -2.52  .012  -12.06  -1.515 
UNITEDFRONT_HIGH -2.120  1.500  -1.42  .156 -5.053    .8088 
UNITEDFRONT_LOW   .7103  1.118   0.64  .525  -1.480   2.901 
UNIONS   .1830  .4782   0.38  .702  -.7543   1.120 
WORKERS   .0066  .0018   3.69  .000   .0031   .0100 
INFLATIONt-1  .1955  .1204  1.62  .104  -.0405   .4314 
GROWTHt-1  .1679  .1657  1.01  .311  -.1569   .4926 
Number of Observations  = 61 
Percent Correctly Classified  = 80.33 
Log likelihood  =  -23.360 
Pseudo R
2 = .3529 
Probability > chi
2  =  .0013 
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  The results of the logistic models of strike violence are presented in Table 6.3.  
The results suggest initial support for the hypotheses presented in Diagram 6.1.  The 
coefficient for UNITEDFRONT_HIGH is negative whereas the coefficient for 
UNITEDFRONT_LOW is slightly positive, suggesting that the likelihood of workers 
engaging in violent or extreme protest decreases as a UF union gains greater control over 
its firm-level leaders and members.  In contrast, the coefficient for NEWLEFT_HIGH is 
positive and for NEWLEFT_LOW it is negative, suggesting that the likelihood of violent 
or extreme protest increases with greater control by a new left union over enterprise-level 
leaders and members.  Finally, the fact that the coefficient of NEWLEFT_HIGH is 
positive while the coefficient for UNITEDFRONT_HIGH is negative suggests that 
workers are more likely to be restrained under UF leadership than under the leadership a 
new left union.  
  These initial impressions can be confirmed by testing whether the differences 
between coefficients observed in the previous paragraph are statistically significant. These 
tests are presented in Table 6.4.  The observed difference between a United Front union 
with high control and one with low control (UF_High – UF_Low) is statistically 
significant at the .1 level, confirming the initial impression that a UF union with high 
control is less prone to violence than a UF union with low control.  The difference 
between a new left union with high control and one with low control (NL_High – 
NL_Low) is statistically significant at the .05 level.  We can therefore say that the 
likelihood of violent protest increases the more a new left union exerts control over firm- 
level leaders and members.  Finally, since the observed difference between a UF unions 
and new left unions with high control is statistically significant at the .05 level, we can 
confidently conclude that workers that are always controlled by a UF central leadership 
are less likely to engage in violence than workers controlled by a new left leadership.  1
6
6
Table 6.4:  Difference of Coefficients Tests 
Test Coefficient  Standard 
Error  z P>|z|  95% Confidence 
Interval 
(1) UF_HIGH – UF_LOW  -2.833  1.451  -1.95  .051  -5.677   .0113 
          
(2) NL_HIGH – NL_LOW   2.993  1.491   2.01  .045   .0707   5.915 
          
(3) UF_HIGH – NL_HIGH  -3.506  1.558 -2.25 .024  -6.560  -.4533 
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Substantive significance 
To demonstrate the substantive significance of the model, I performed Monte 
Carlo simulations based on the regression results presented in Table 6.3 using the Clarify 
software package developed by Tomz, Wittenberg and King (2001).  These simulations 
provided the predicted probabilities of violence based on union type that are presented in 
Diagram 6.2.  For each cell, the predictions were simulated by setting the relevant union 
type to 1, all other union types to 0, and setting the control variables at their means.  
These simulations generate predictions that support the hypotheses presented in 
Diagram 6.1.  The model predicts that the highest likelihood of violence is among 
workers tightly controlled by the leadership of a new left union (cell ‘A’).  More 
specifically, the model predicts the probability of violence among a group of workers 
‘always’ controlled by the central union is 47 percent.  The probability of violence among 
workers belonging to UF unions that maintain control over their protest actions (cell ‘B’) 
is much lower by comparison.  When a UF union maintains control over its members, the 
probability of violence during the course of an industrial dispute is about five percent.   
Further, the probability of violence becomes less as new left unions lose control 
over their members (cell ‘C’), and becomes greater as UF unions lose control over their 
members (cell ‘D’).  In a production unit where a new left union never controls the 
workers, the probability of violence is eight percent and a workforce that was affiliated to 
but not fully controlled by a UF parent union has about a 33 percent chance of 
experiencing violent protest.  
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6.3  The effect of industrial violence on investment 
In the short term, it is likely that repression boosted economic growth and 
investment.  By dismembering the left labor union movement, the UNP deprived the 
traditional left of its last weapon against UNP-led economic reforms.  Lacking the ability 
to call out general strikes, traditional left parties and unions were powerless to resist tough 
reform measures such as devaluations and reductions in rations.  Further, for a period of 
time, the UNP’s tough stance against unions made Sri Lanka more attractive to foreign 
investors.  
However, most of the available evidence suggests that the initial success of a 
repressive strategy was counterbalanced by the resulting destabilization of industrial 
relations in the private sector.  In particular, industrial violence had negative implications 
for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and led to a higher rate of factory closures in private 
manufacturing.   
The events of the 1990s captured attention of the international press, thereby 
hampering the efforts of the Sri Lankan government to attract new foreign investment.  
The headline of the Financial Times article reporting on the Ansell strike read “Investment 
blow to Sri Lanka.”
18  Reuters reported that South Textiles, Ltd., a Canadian Joint Venture, 
threatened to pull out after strikers assaulted its managers and, in the same story, a 
hostage taking at a Japanese porcelain factory.
19  In a report focusing on industrial 
violence in Sri Lanka’s manufacturing sector, the Journal of Commerce  focused on the 
desperate efforts of the Sri Lankan government “to calm fears of overseas investors” 
during a wave of strikes in 1994.
20
Violent and extreme protest actions generate uncertainty for investors and highly 
publicized violence tends to reduce the appeal of a country as a destination for foreign 
                                                 
18  Financial Times, January 3, 1995.  
19 “Investors want action on Lankan labour unrest,” Reuters, February 14, 1995. 
20 “Sri Lanka acts to prevent strikes in export zones,” Journal of Commerce, September 19, 1994.   
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direct investment.  It is therefore not surprising that the burst of industrial violence in the 
early 1990s resulted in a sharp decline in FDI in Sri Lanka.  Figure 6.1 displays the trend 
in FDI and violent and extreme protest events appearing in the Sri Lankan press.
21
As Figure 6.1 demonstrates, a dramatic reduction of new FDI followed directly 
on the heels of the extreme and violent protest in the mid-1990s.  FDI fell from 103 
million to 10 million constant 2000 U.S. dollars from 1993 to 1995, a decrease of about 
90% in the span of two years.  FDI eventually recovered, but the dramatic downturn put 
a substantial dent in the overall level of overall levels of FDI.  FDI inflows had gained 
quite a bit of momentum in the 1990s and the rate of growth in new FDI was quite rapid-
-approximately 86% per year during the first five years of the 1990s.  If instead of 
declining, growth in FDI inflows had continued at the average pace of the early 90s, FDI 
inflows would have amounted to about 177 million 2000 U.S. dollars in 1995.  If the 
growth had continued at the same pace through the end of the 1990s, new FDI would 
have been $2.1 in 2000 as opposed to the $173 million that Sri Lanka actually received. 
 
 
 
21 These original are from the Lake House Press archives in Colombo, Sri Lanka.  The archives maintain 
files of newspaper clippings by subject area, including industrial disputes.   1
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Figure 6.1: Trends in frequency of non-routine protest and FDI in Sri Lanka, 1978-1998 
Notes:  Extreme Actions: Original Data FDI Source: BOI Report, 2001 
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In addition to chasing away new investment, the industrial chaos of the 1990s 
resulted in the closure and withdrawal of already existing investments.  Microdevices Ltd., 
the largest joint venture electronics plant in Sri Lanka, closed up shop after a number of 
women working at the plant assaulted senior managers and did extensive damage to 
company property.
22  Two diamond-cutting factories pulled out of Sri Lanka following 
violent strikes.  Blue Diamonds, Ltd. left after workers occupied the factory.
23  Keells 
Diamonds closed after workers violently clashed with strikebreakers.
24  The wave of 
violent strikes also struck at the heart of the BOI-controlled EPZs. Regency Garments, 
Youngi and Ones, and Korea Ceylon are just three examples of BOI-controlled garment 
manufacturers that closed down due to factory occupation, hostage takings, damage to 
property or other violence.
     25 The effect of industrial violence on closures was even more 
lasting than its impact on FDI.  Figure 6.2 displays the monthly number of applications 
for closure to the Ministry of Labour in the private manufacturing sector.  The records 
show a spike in the monthly number of applications during the period of severe labor 
unrest in 1995, hovering around 10 closures per month through 1996.  This spike is 
rivaled only by the closures following the drop in demand for Sri Lankan exports in the 
early 2000s with the onset of a global recession.   
 
 
 
 
 
22 Reported in the Daily News on January13, 1996, June 12 and 18, 1996, and the Sunday Times, January 21, 
1996.   
23 Reported in the Island on November 23, 1995.  
24 Reported in the Island on June 4, 1995.   
25 The Regency Garments closure was reported in the Island on February 27, 1995.  The Youngi and Ones 
closure was reported in the Observer on February 3, 1995.  The Korea Ceylon closure was reported in the 
Daily News on June 20, 1995. 1
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Figure 2: Monthly closure applications in Sri Lanka’s private manufacturing sector: 1990-2002 
 
Source: Unpublished Ministry of Labor Closure Records    
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Conclusion 
In Sri Lanka, the result of labor-repressive policies was ultimately industrial chaos.  
Traditional left unions had once served as the foundation of a somewhat centralized 
bargaining process in the private manufacturing sector.  As a direct result of state 
repression of labor, workers lost faith in these unions and the collective bargaining 
process and began joining more radical left unions who had very little stake in the 
political process and, therefore, Sri Lanka’s macroeconomic performance.  These new left 
unions openly supported the violent and extreme protest tactics of disenchanted workers, 
which in turn chased away foreign direct investment and closed down dozens of factories. 
These findings cast doubt on the idea that East Asia represents a ‘model’ for the 
developing world.  Based on the Sri Lankan experience, it would appear that labor 
repression is untenable in more democratically mobilized settings.  Moreover, it seems 
clear that although the political activism of unions affiliated to mainstream left parties 
may temporarily impede the implementation of economic reform measures, their 
participation in politics may also benefit growth by giving these parties a stake in the 
political process.  By closing off these avenues of participation, governments risk creating 
a leadership vacuum, inviting the emergence of more radical narrow interest unions 
 
 CHAPTER 7 
DOES POLITICAL UNIONISM RESULT IN  
THE CO-OPTATION OF LABOR? 
 
So far, this dissertation has focused on the benefits of the political mobilization of 
labor. In chapters four and five, I showed how the political mobilization of labor 
generates more routine protest and a more constructive, institutionalized approach to 
resolving grievances at the collective bargaining table.  I explain this outcome by pointing 
to Olsonian mechanisms of encompassment:  MPUs have a positive effect on the 
character of industrial relations because they internalize the externalities associated with 
more violent and aggressive forms of protest.  Moreover, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, the destruction of party-union ties resulting from state repression of MPUs can 
have deleterious effects.  Labor repression resulted in industrial relations chaos in Sri 
Lanka by diminishing the control of major political parties over their member unions.   
In the next two chapters, I examine some of the potential costs associated with 
the political mobilization of labor.  In particular, I explore two somewhat conflicting, but 
commonly held assumptions about political unionism in South Asia:  1) that political 
unionism has resulted in the co-optation of organized labor and, in turn, led to union 
weakness; and 2) that pro-labor policy resulting from the political influence of labor has 
led to decreased economic output and investment.   
This chapter focuses on the issue of the political co-optation of labor.  I draw on 
a range of data, including original survey data, government statistics on the structure of 
the union movement, and government statistics on industrial disputes to demonstrate 
that, contrary to the opinion of most South Asian political economists, an array of data 
suggest that labor was never co-opted by the state and that political interference never 
substantially undermined organized labor’s bargaining power.  
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7.1  Two myths about Indian industrial relations 
There can be no doubt that shortly following Independence in 1947 unions were 
brought to heel by political parties and the state.  Indeed, the labor quiescence witnessed 
in the years immediately following Independence resulted from the intentional and 
aggressive efforts of the Indian National Congress to subdue labor at the behest of 
conservative elements of the party (Chibber 2003, chapter 5).   
Congress employed two strategies in its efforts to subdue labor.  The first was to 
create its own party affiliated union, the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) 
to compete with the communist-dominated All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC).  
The second was to set up an institutional framework designed to facilitate heavy state 
intervention in labor disputes.  The most important piece of legislation with respect to 
this new institutional framework was the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act, which required 
unions to provide fourteen days notice before going on strike and provided ‘the 
appropriate Government’ with the authority to refer disputes to courts, tribunals or 
specially constituted boards for compulsory arbitration.
1  
In the years immediately following its enactment, the state leaned on this 
legislation quite heavily to intervene in industrial disputes and thereby prevented the 
resolution of disputes through bipartite collective bargaining.  As Chibber (2003) notes, 
“[m]atters that were usually settled through collective bargaining were now dealt with 
through detailed regulations within labor law and the number of industrial disputes 
rapidly declined.  Congress, had, at least momentarily, achieved labor peace” (125).   
                                                 
1 Section 10 (1) of the Industrial disputes act reads as follows: ‘Where the appropriate Government is of 
the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing—(a) 
refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be 
connected with or relevant to the dispute to a court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter 
appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second 
Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be 
connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule 
or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication’ (Malhotra 2004).  177 
But was this a lasting peace?  Generally, social scientists have assumed that the 
political domination of unions and state interference in industrial relations that occurred 
following Independence was perpetual and permanently damaging to labor. Writing in 
1958, Charles Myers stated that “[c]ompulsory adjudication remains the cornerstone of 
labour dispute settlement in India, and is likely to continue for the near future, at least” 
(323).  Raman (1967) concludes that “political involvement of trade unionism in India has 
meant the initiation, control, and exploitation of the labor movements by political 
parties” (166).
2  
Yet, as I will show, by the 1960s portrayals of labor as quiescent and dominated 
by political parties and the state no longer reflected reality.  Nevertheless, impressions 
based on past patterns of state-labor relations continued to dominate thinking on Indian 
labor relations for decades to come.   
More specifically, it is possible to identify two myths perpetuated in social 
scientific pronouncements about Indian industrial relations over the past half-century:  1) 
that political domination fragmented the union movement, thereby generating a 
‘multiplicity’ of weak unions incapable of pursuing their collective interests; and 2) that 
political and state interference weakened organized labor in the collective bargaining 
arena.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Or, more dramatically: ‘[I]n the struggle for the control of labor, the outside leaders fitted with political 
boots have trampled the very bed of grass that they purportedly set out to develop into a Garden of Eden, 
filled with many a luscious fruit traditionally forbidden for labor to eat’ (Raman 1967, 171).   
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7.2  Was labor really co-opted?  Evaluating the myths 
The ‘multiplicity’ myth 
Perhaps the most common statement about the Indian labor movement is that 
political divisions in the labor movement have led to a multiplicity of unions and thereby 
reduced worker solidarity and the ability of workers to pursue their collective interests.   
Kennedy (1966) states that by generating “extreme fragmentation,” political 
rivalries generate unions that “are small and fatally weak in finances and claim as 
members only a minority of the work force they seek to represent” (192).  Raman (1967) 
argues that political divisions in the union movement lead to a host of ills, including “the 
wasteful application of scarce leadership and material resources; lack of loyalty to their 
unions among members; worker indiscipline; complication of the issue of union 
recognition; and organizational weakness in the struggle for the workers’ economic and 
social progress” (171). 
Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) suggest that the problem for organized labor is even 
worse than a static set of divisions that produce increased barriers to collective action.  
They contend that the labor movement in India is continually experiencing new divisions 
that result an increasingly fragmented and weak labor movement over time.  They refer to 
this process as ‘involution’ and, somewhat cryptically, to the politics it generates as an 
‘involuted pluralism.’  In recent years, the view espoused by Rudolph and Rudolph has 
become pervasive in academic, journalistic and official writings on Indian unions and 
industrial relations.  Just about every document one reads on industrial relations in India 
mentions the continual division of the labor movement and accepts its weakness as 
established fact.   
The use of government data in standard accounts 
The first major problem with this conventional wisdom is that standard accounts 
misrepresent the government statistics used to document the supposed fragmentation of 179 
labor therefore grossly overstate the problem of ‘multiplicity’ in the union movement. 
Table 7.1 presents the official figures from India’s Ministry of Labour documenting the 
growth in the number and membership of unions in India between 1960 and 1995.  
Most pronouncements about a hopelessly fragmented union movement in India 
focus on the statistic in the first column of table 7.1—the ‘number of registered unions’ 
statistic.  Indeed, the number of registered unions has increased almost six times over the 
years, from 11,312 in 1960 to 57,925.  However, the number of registered unions in no 
way accurately reflects the number of functioning unions in India.   
The Trade Unions Act of 1926, which governs the registration of unions in India, 
allows any seven individuals to register as a union but has no mechanism to verify the 
continued functioning or existence of unions that register.  The Trade Unions Act 
requires unions to submit returns, but the penalty for not submitting a return is a mere 
five rupees per week up to a total of 50 rupees (section 31) and it is not clear that fines 
are ever collected.  State ministries of labor may eventually delete a union from the 
registry, but there is set time frame in the law for doing so (section 10).  Consequently, at 
any given time, there are thousands of unions that are ‘registered’ but either do not 
function or do not exist.   
 
 1
8
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Table 7.1:  Unions and union membership in India, 1960-1995 
Year  Number of 
Registered 
Unions 
Number of Unions 
Submitting Returns 
(Functioning Unions) 
Membership of 
Functioning Unions  
Members per 
Functioning 
Union 
1960  11,312  6,813  4,013,000  589 
1965  13,248  6,932  3,787,000  546 
1970  20,879  8,537  5,120,000  600 
1975  29,438  10,324  6,550,000  634 
1980  36,507  4,432  3,727,000  841 
1985  45,067  7,815  6,433,000  823 
1990  52,016  8,828  7,019,000  795 
1995  57,925  8,162  6,538,000  801 
 
Source: Indian Labour Yearbook, various years. 
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Thus, a better indication of the number of functioning unions is the statistic in 
the second column of table 7.1--the number of unions submitting returns.  Aside from 
the period immediately following the Emergency, this number has stayed fairly constant 
at around seven or eight thousand unions.  At the same time, the membership of unions 
submitting returns has increased and, consequently, the average size of unions (or 
members per union) has in fact increased by roughly thirty percent between 1960 and 1995.   
Just as importantly, studies citing the total number of individually registered 
unions do not recognize the quite obvious fact that many registered unions are joined 
together in federations.  The number of federations submitting returns to the Ministry of 
Labor is relatively small and has been declining in recent years.  In 1987, seventy-one 
federations submitted returns.  By 1992, the number of federations submitting returns 
had fallen to forty-nine and by 1997 to nineteen.
3 
Evidence from original survey data
While they are of some limited use in analyzing trends in the number and average 
size of unions, the statistics published by the Government of India present a host of 
problems when we try to draw conclusions about the actual organizational capacity of 
organized labor.  First, union membership statistics are based on self-reported data.  This 
poses problems of reliability since unions have obvious incentives to inflate their 
membership.  Additionally, the fact that the government has no effective mechanism to 
ensure that unions submit returns also raises questions about the accuracy and 
representative nature of the numbers reported by those unions that file returns.  Finally, 
statistics of the total number of unions in a given country are far too coarse to measure 
whatever fragmentation in the union movement may be occurring in individual firms or 
productions units.   
                                                 
3 These figures are drawn from various years of Trade Unions in India, Ministry of Labour, Government of 
India.   
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A better way of discerning the structure of the union movement is to gather firm-
level data through surveys of randomly selected manufacturing companies.  In this 
section, I present results from two original surveys.  These results suggest that union 
movement in South Asia is substantially less fragmented and encompasses substantially 
more workers than official statistics suggest. 
Table 7.2 presents data on the structure of union membership in unionized firms 
in four regions of South Asia:  Sri Lanka, and the Indian states of Kerala, Maharashtra 
and West Bengal.  These data are from a survey of personnel directors and senior 
managers representing one hundred and fourteen randomly selected companies.  These 
one hundred and fourteen companies are the unionized subset of one hundred and forty-
seven companies that were (randomly) selected for in-depth interviews from a pool of 
three hundred and eighty-five randomly selected managers who participated in a 
telephone survey in these four regions of South Asia.
4   
The data presented in table 7.2 indicate that the vast majority of companies 
surveyed have one or two unions operating in their factories.  On average, companies in 
Maharashtra had the fewest number of unions operating in their factories, with forty-
eight percent of companies reporting the presence of only one union, forty-one percent 
reporting the presence of two unions, seven percent reporting the presence of three 
unions and just four percent reporting the presence of four or more unions.   
The regions with the highest percentage of companies reporting the presence of 
three or more unions were West Bengal and Kerala, but even in these states, fewer than 
thirty percent of companies reported the presence of more than two unions in their 
factories.     
 
4 The original sample was drawn from manufacturer’s directories such as the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII), the Bombay Chamber of Commerce (BCC), or the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce (CCC).  
For more details on the sources and selection of this sample, please consult Appendix 2.  One caveat is that 
these directories tend to list a disproportionate number of medium and large-scale sector firms.   1
8
3
Table 7.2: Union structure in four regions of South Asia 
  Percentage of unionized production units 
  Kerala  Maharashtra  West Bengal  Sri Lanka  Four Regions 
          
1 Union  46 48  28  33  39 
2 Unions  25 41  44  48  39 
3 Unions  18 7  19 11  14 
4+ Unions  11 4  9  7  8 
          
N  28 27  32  27  114 
Source:  Survey of 114 randomly selected personnel directors and senior managers in four regions of South Asia 
(Kerala, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Sri Lanka).  The survey was taken during interviews conducted between 
November 2002 and 2004.  For more details on these data, please consult Appendix 3.     
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Across the four regions, an equal percentage of companies reported the presence 
of one or two unions (thirty-nine percent), fourteen percent reported the presence of 
three unions, and eight percent the presence of four or more unions.   
In short, these data suggest the inaccuracy of the ‘involuted pluralism’ argument 
at the level of individual firms.  Despite the supposed presence of almost sixty thousand 
officially registered unions, unionized companies are bargaining with one or, typically, at 
most two unions in their factories.     
The survey data presented in Chapter 4 tell us about fragmentation in the union 
movement in South Asia as a whole (see table 4.2).  If we were to rely simply on 
government data as presented in previous studies of union structure in South Asia, we 
would expect that the average size of a union to be around 800 people.  This would mean 
that each union would organize one or a handful of companies and we would expect that 
most companies would report the presence of either a company-specific union or small 
union confederation.   
Defying this expectation, a large percentage of companies report the presence of 
relatively encompassing MPU federations and very few report the presence of a 
company-specific union, i.e. a union with ‘internal leadership only.’  The CITU and 
INTUC dominate the union movement in Kerala and West Bengal.  In Kerala, thirty-
three percent of companies surveyed report the presence of a CITU union and twenty-
three percent report the presence of an INTUC union.  In West Bengal, sixty-four 
percent report the presence of CITU and forty percent the INTUC.   
By contrast, a relatively small percentage of companies report the presence of 
company-specific unions.  Maharashtra is the region with the highest percentage of 
companies reporting the presence of company-specific unions.  Yet an almost equal 
number of companies in Maharashtra report the presence of MPUs.   
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Finally, if the organizational capacity of unions was truly on the wane, we would 
expect to observe low union density.  Based purely on data from voluntary returns, the 
ILO estimates union density in India to be around twenty-five percent.
5  Yet the data 
from this survey suggest that unionization rates among companies randomly selected 
from manufacturer’s directories are quite a bit higher.  The average figure across all 
regions is sixty percent with Maharashtra at seventy-two percent and West Bengal at 
seventy-nine percent.   But Sri Lanka and Kerala are far from union- free. Forty percent 
of companies in Sri Lanka reported the presence of a union and in Maharashtra the figure 
was forty-eight percent.   
Fragmentation probably generates healthy competition, not quiescence   
In addition to lacking empirical support, the argument about a multiplicity of 
unions weakening organized labor suffers from serious analytical flaws.  Quite simply, 
there is no clear argument as to why we might expect union fragmentation to prevent 
collective action.  Most likely, a degree of competition in the union movement probably 
benefits workers by producing exit options that force union and political leaders to pay 
greater attention to worker demands.  In other words, by allowing workers to ‘vote with 
their feet’, union competition prevents state and political domination of unions.        
In fact, in their discussion of the effects of the alleged fragmentation of the 
Indian labour movement, Rudolph and Rudolph inadvertently suggest the veracity of this 
claim: 
The cutting edge of fragmentation and involution is found in the private 
industrial sector, where a work force whose numbers have stagnated 
intersects with the phenomenal growth of registered unions.   
Fragmentation generates conflict.  Private-sector industrial disputes are 
about ten times as frequent as those in the public sector (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1987, 282).   
 
                                                 
5 The ILO calculates union density by taking the number of union members reported by the government as 
percentage of the number of paid employees.  In its Union Stats 2002 publication, the last year for which this 
calculation was available was 1997, when it stood at 26.2 percent.   
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Obviously, in making this statement, Rudolph and Rudolph contradict their central claim 
about the relationship between fragmentation and the strength of organized labor.  If 
union fragmentation leads to union weakness and state domination of unions, we should 
see greater union quiescence in the private sector relative to the public sector, not higher 
levels of conflict. 
Like so many authors who have addressed the subject of the structure of Indian 
labor movements, the Rudolphs have simply misjudged both the scale of union 
fragmentation and the effects of union competition on the representation of working-
class interests.  The level of competition has remained more or less constant over the past 
four decades, and as I show later, a certain degree of competition has been healthy for the 
representation of worker interests both in the industrial relations and political arenas.     
The ‘political interference’ myth 
A second myth about unions in India is that they have become ineffective or 
quiescent because they are dominated by outside political interests.  This domination is 
argued to occur in two forms.  The first is interference by political parties in the industrial 
relations arena.  For example, Raman (1967) argues that external political leadership 
infuses “extraneous political issues” in labor-management negotiations that distort 
negotiations and make employers reluctant to enter into collective bargaining agreements 
(136).  Another concern is that ‘politically engineered’ strikes such as hartals, bandhs, or 
token strikes have diverted limited union resources to activities that do not directly 
benefit unions.    
The second form of political domination is thought to occur as a result of anti-
union industrial relations policies and institutions.   A number of scholars have argued 
that the state has interfered in Indian industrial relations to the detriment of the bipartite 
resolution of disputes in the collective bargaining arena.  In E.A. Ramaswamy’s words: 
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While the state has emerged as a regulator of labour-management 
relations everywhere, there are vital differences between industrial 
relations systems in which the state enters the relationship on the 
breakdown of bipartite bargaining, and those where the state assumes the 
role of arbiter in lieu of a bargaining relationship.  It is clearly the latter 
position which obtains in India (1983, 125).  
 
In particular, there has been a concern that the Industrial Disputes Act has pushed 
conflict out of the collective bargaining arena and into the state’s industrial relations 
machinery (Chatterji 1980, 193; Chibber 2003, 121).   
This shift from collective bargaining to state mediated conflict resolution is 
thought to disadvantage unions for three reasons.  First, accounts generally assume that 
the industrial relations machinery is biased towards employers, although no evidence has 
ever been presented to support this assumption.
6  Second, cases referred for adjudication 
typically can drag on for many years due to court clog, benefiting employers who prefer 
the status quo.  Third, it is argued that the rise of tripartite (state-sponsored) negotiation 
has resulted in an increased dependence on educated external leaders who can interpret 
and negotiate complex legal machinery (Chatterji 1980, 194-5).   
Considering the motivations of the Congress Party in the 1950s, these arguments 
bear an initial plausibility.  In creating its own politically loyal union federation and in 
enacting the Industrial Disputes Act, Congress hoped to shunt disputes away from the 
uncertain and conflict-ridden realm of bipartite negotiations and into the sure-footed, 
paternalistic care of the state.  But did this strategy work?   
 
6 In a number of interviews, employers told me that they though the Ministry of Labour was biased 
towards unions.  Assuming a labor-friendly government, it seems likely that if the Ministry of Labour were 
to be biased in any direction, it would be in favor of unions. 1
8
8
Table 7.3:  Labor institutions and collective bargaining in four regional cases 
 
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE 
  Percentage of companies reporting a political strike since 1991  
   55 
  Percentage of companies reporting political intervention in an 
industrial dispute since 1991 
 
19 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING   
  Percentage of companies currently bound by a collective bargaining 
agreement 
 
60 
STATE INTERFERENCE 
  Percentage of companies reporting at least one dispute referred for 
compulsory adjudication in the last year 
 
25 
  Percentage of companies reporting at least one collective dispute 
referred to an industrial tribunal for compulsory adjudication since 
1991 
 
12 
  Percentage of companies reporting at least one dispute referred for 
voluntary arbitration proceedings since 1991 
 
16 
  Percentage of companies having at least one dispute called before the 
Ministry of Labour for conciliation proceedings since 1991  
 
35 
  Percentage of disputes successfully resolved in conciliation once 
referred to the Ministry of Labour  50 
Source:  Survey of 147 randomly selected personnel directors and senior managers in four regions of South Asia 
(Kerala, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Sri Lanka).  The survey was taken during interviews conducted between 
November 2002 and 2004.  For more details, consult Appendix 3.     
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Interference by political parties in industrial relations 
We first turn to the issue of interference by political parties in industrial relations.  
Table 7.3 presents data from an original survey of randomly selected personnel directors 
and senior managers from one hundred forty-seven manufacturing companies.  These 
companies were selected for in-depth interviews from a pool of three hundred and 
eighty-five randomly selected managers who participated in a telephone survey in the 
previously-mentioned four regions of South Asia.  
I asked two questions in my survey to measure the level of political interference in 
a given company:  whether the company had been affected by a ‘political strike’ since 
1991, such as a bandh, hartal, general strike, or token strike; and whether the company had 
experienced direct intervention by a politician since 1991.   
Fifty-five percent of companies reported experiencing a political strike.  While 
this is a substantial percentage, it is important to note that a company can be affected by a 
political strike regardless of whether its union is affiliated to the party calling the strike.  
Since  bandhs and general strikes shut down cities, a large number of companies are 
affected by political strikes because it is impossible for workers to travel and not because 
that company’s union is directly involved in supporting the strike.  Thus, a political strike 
represents an indirect form of political interference rather than an instance in which a 
political party consciously attempts to influence enterprise-level industrial relations.       
The second question more precisely addresses the level of direct political 
interference in the collective bargaining arena.  Notably, only nineteen percent of 
companies reported experiencing some form of intervention in an industrial dispute since 
1991.  The statistic in itself suggests that political interests are far from dominant in the 
collective bargaining arena.  However, it is important to note that the statistic does not 
indicate anything about the terms of these political interventions.  When I asked about 
these interventions, I was told by the vast majority of employers that they were made in 
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support of unions and not at the behest of management. In sum, a connection between 
political parties and unions does not appear to translate into overt interference by 
politicians in the collective bargaining arena to the detriment of workers.      
State interference in industrial relations 
In the same survey, I also asked a series of questions designed to measure the 
extent to which state interference industrial relations reduced the propensity to resolve 
disputes through collective bargaining.  The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 provides the 
state with a broad range of powers to settle industrial disputes.  These include a) 
voluntary mechanisms, such as voluntary nonbinding conciliation proceedings and 
voluntary binding arbitration proceedings and b) compulsory adjudication.  
Voluntary conciliation proceedings are typically presided over by a Labour 
Commissioner, but are sometimes conducted by a specially appointed board.  Labour 
courts or industrial tribunals conduct arbitration and adjudication proceedings.  While 
they have overlapping jurisdiction on some issues, labour courts are primarily responsible 
for adjudicating disputes pertaining to individual workers whereas industrial tribunals 
adjudicate collective disputes between the management and a union.
7   
In general, the survey results presented in Table 7.3 suggest that companies rely 
more on collective bargaining than the state industrial relations machinery and that state 
intervention focuses more on individual than collective disputes.   
                                                 
7 The jurisdiction of labour courts is narrower than that of industrial tribunals.  The jurisdiction of labour 
courts is spelled out in the second schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act and includes 1) the legality of an 
order given to an employee under the Industrial Employment and Standing Orders Act; 2) the application 
and interpretation of standing orders; 3) issues pertaining to the discharge, dismissal and reinstatement of 
individual workers; 4) the legality of withdrawing customary concessions or privileges; 5) the legality of a 
strike or lockout; and 6) all matters not explicitly under the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals as listed in 
schedule three of the Industrial Disputes Act.  The jurisdiction of industrial tribunals, as spelled out in 
schedule three of the act include 1) wages; 2) compensatory allowances; 3) hours of work and rest intervals; 
4) leave with wages and holiday pay; 5) bonuses, profit sharing, provident fund and gratuity allowances; 6) 
the length of shifts; 7) the classification of workers by grades; 8) rules governing the discipline and behavior 
of workers; 9) the ‘rationalization’ of work; 10) retrenchment and closure of establishments; and 11) all 
matters falling under the jurisdiction of labour courts.        
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Sixty percent of companies reported that they were currently bound by a 
collective bargaining agreement.  In contrast, only twenty-five percent of companies 
reported a dispute (collective or individual) referred to a labour court or industrial 
tribunal in the previous year. Only twelve percent reported that one or more collective 
disputes had been azreferred to an industrial tribunal for compulsory adjudication since 
1991, suggesting that the vast majority of disputes referred to labour courts and industrial 
tribunals are disputes between management and individual workers.  
The survey also suggests that voluntary state-sponsored mechanisms of grievance 
resolution do not crowd out collective bargaining.  Only sixteen percent of companies 
reported a dispute that was referred for voluntary arbitration proceedings since 1991.  
Only thirty-five percent of companies reported bringing one or more industrial disputes 
before the Commissioner of Labour for conciliation proceedings since 1991 and only half 
of these disputes were successfully resolved in conciliation.  The remainder got shunted 
back into the collective bargaining arena for bipartite negotiation. 
 
7.3  Trends in industrial conflict 
Post-Independence trends in industrial disputes provide another reason to doubt 
the typical portrayal of unions in India as increasingly divided and weak.  If, as 
conventional wisdom states, unions were undergoing a process of continual division and 
suffering from political domination in the industrial relations arena, we would expect to 
find evidence of labor quiescence in the industrial relations arena.  In fact, the available 
evidence points in the opposite direction. 
An examination of industrial dispute data indicates that the level of industrial 
disputes consistently rose from Independence until the mid-1980s.  Figure 7.1 displays 
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the volume of industrial disputes in fifteen Indian states, measured as the number of 
worker-days lost to industrial disputes per 1000 organized sector workers.
8  
The first graph in figure 7.1 displays the average dispute volume for all fifteen 
states.  The general trend is upward until the mid-1980s and a general decline thereafter.   
This trend is mirrored in just about every state.  Only Kerala displays a consistently 
downward trend in dispute volume, but it starts with unusually high levels of industrial 
conflict—between 3000 and 5000 worker-days lost per 1000 organized sector workers (or 
between three and five worker-days lost per worker). 
Regardless of the states or periods chosen, the strike volume witnessed in India is 
high by international standards.  On average, the strike volume in Indian states is 
comparable to the strike volume in European countries with routinely contentious 
industrial relations such as France or Italy.
9  Levels of strike volume in West Bengal 
during the 1980s (between six and twelve days lost per worker) compare with the 
historically high levels of strike activity witnessed in pre-war Nordic countries, before 
labor was incorporated by the state.  Even relatively peaceful states like Gujarat, Orissa, 
or the Punjab experience dispute volume levels of between 500 and 1000 worker-days 
lost per 1000 organized sector workers. 
 
 
8 Dispute volume is typically calculated as the number of worker-days lost per 1000 non-agricultural employees.  
However, India’s large informal sector makes this statistic problematic because a) it is difficult to measure 
the number of non-agricultural employees and b) the large informal sector would artificially deflate dispute 
volume and make the statistic less comparable to volume statistics in other countries. As Hibbs (1976) 
notes, dispute volume is the broadest measure of industrial disputes because it is the product of three 
measures of industrial conflict—dispute frequency (the number of disputes per 1000 workers), dispute 
duration (the number of worker-days lost per worker involved), and size (the number of workers per 
industrial dispute).   
9 For data on strike volumes in European countries through 1970, see Hibbs (1987), pp. 55-57.  
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Figure 7.1:  Dispute volume in India, 1966-1997 
  
Figure 1 (Continued) 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented a substantial amount of data that challenges 
prominent misconceptions about industrial relations in India.  Quite simply, the standard 
view of Indian labor unions as fragmented, weak, and dominated by political parties and 
the state does not stand up to scrutiny. 
The common argument that the Indian labor movement is constantly undergoing 
a process of fragmentation is based on a flawed understanding of government statistics.  
More reliable original survey data suggests that the Indian labor movement is competitive, 
but stable with a fairly limited number of union centers competing for membership at the 
enterprise level.  On average, companies tend to negotiate with one or two unions.  Only 
a very small percentage of companies bargain with more than three unions. 
Original survey data also suggests the fallacy of statements regarding the 
domination of the union movement by political parties and the state.  Most companies 
(sixty percent) are bound by collective bargaining agreements.  Only a small percentage of 
companies report direct interference by a political party in industrial relations (nineteen 
percent) and an even smaller percentage report having collective disputes referred by the 
state for compulsory adjudication (twelve percent). 
Industrial dispute data suggest that the view of Indian labor unions as quiescent 
was outdated by the 1960s, when the level of protest surpassed that of many countries in 
Europe.  Protest gradually in Indian states subsequently climbed to reach average levels 
exceeding one-and-a half worker-days lost per worker. 
To sum up, aside from a short period of time following Independence, Indian 
labor unions were never divided to extent that hampered their ability to pursue worker 
interests in the collective bargaining arena and were never co-opted or dominated by 
political parties or the state.  This chapter should serve as a useful corrective to previous 
historical accounts of the political economy of industrial relations in India.  
CHAPTER 8 
LABOR LEGISLATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
 
The preceding chapters have focused on the effects of the political incorporation 
of labor on union behavior in the collective bargaining arena.  An obvious question is 
whether the benefits of the political mobilization of the working class in collective 
bargaining are outweighed by any adverse effects of organized labor’s influence in the 
policy arena.   
Indeed, the primary argument in favor of the political exclusion of organized 
labor has been that when granted political access, unions advocate policies that interfere 
with economic performance and prevent the implementation of growth-enhancing 
reforms (Pencavel 1997).  This logic underlies the policy advice that international 
organizations provide to developing countries.  The World Bank, for example, suggests 
that unions benefit economic development when their activities are limited to the 
collective bargaining arena, or in other words, when organized labor is politically excluded 
(1995, 2005).    
With respect to India, policymakers, academics and Indian employers have been 
unanimous in their negative assessment of Indian labor law.  In a report on Indian 
development, the World Bank argues that India’s stringent labor regulations substantially 
impede the growth of the formal manufacturing sector (2000, chap 6).  Sachs et al. (1999) 
suggest that labor regulations impede the success of India’s economic reforms, while 
Stern (2001) states that India needs to reform its labor laws to encourage rapid economic 
growth.  In their econometric analysis, Besley and Burgess (2004) find that labor 
legislation substantially undermines economic performance in the organized 
manufacturing sector in the Indian states.   
Survey evidence suggests that employers are equally pessimistic about the 
implications of India’s labor laws for economic expansion.  A World Bank survey of 263 
196 197 
private sector firms conducted in the late 1990s asked employers to rate eighteen 
potential obstacles to the smooth-functioning and growth of business on four-point 
ordinal scale (‘major obstacle’, ‘moderate obstacle’, ‘minor obstacle’ or ‘no obstacle’).   
Sixty-four percent of employers felt that labor regulation represented a ‘moderate’ or 
‘major’ impediment to the operation and growth of business (World Bank 2000, 150).  By 
this calculation, labor regulation ranked second behind inflation among employers as a 
perceived obstacle to growth.   
My own research confirms the highly negative sentiment regarding labor 
regulation among employers in the manufacturing sector.   Table 8.1 reports the results of 
a survey of 116 randomly selected directors and senior managers in four regions of South 
Asia (Kerala, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Sri Lanka).  In this survey, employers were 
asked to identify twenty potential items as a ‘major obstacle’, ‘moderate obstacle’, ‘minor 
obstacle’ or ‘no obstacle’ to the functioning and growth of business.  Sixty-five percent of 
employers deemed labor regulation to be a ‘moderate’ or ‘major’ impediment to the 
operation and growth of business, placing labor regulation third in importance on the list 
of twenty obstacles.  Labor regulation was deemed to be only slightly less important than 
corruption and infrastructure.  Sixty-eight percent of employers rated infrastructure as a 
moderate or major obstacle to growth while 67 percent rated corruption as a moderate or 
major obstacle to growth.     
This chapter examines this ‘race to the bottom’ thesis, i.e., the common 
perception that labor regulation hinders investment and growth, and that the success of 
economic liberalization is contingent on dramatic labor law reform.  I undertake this task 
through a reanalysis of the data Besley and Burgess (2004) use to support their conclusion 
that economic performance in some Indian states has suffered as a result of stringent 
labor laws.  I focus on Besley and Burgess’s analysis because theirs is the most 
comprehensive econometric treatment of the subject to date.  198 
 
 
 
Table 8.1:  Employer perceptions of obstacles to growth 
POTENTIAL OBSTACLE 
 
Percent responding 
'moderate obstacle’ or 
‘major obstacle' 
 
 1) Infrastructure  68 
 2) Corruption  67 
 3) Labor Regulation  65 
 4) Policy Instability/Uncertainty  57 
 5) Other taxes  56 
 6) Labor protest/strikes  55 
 7) Worker absenteeism  50 
 8) Functioning of judiciary  43 
 9) Inflation  41 
10) Financing  38 
11) Customs administration  37 
12) Environmental regulations  36 
13) Customs Duties  35 
14) Riots/political instability  35 
15) Income Tax Administration  30 
16) Import restrictions  26 
17) Income taxes  25 
18) Street crime/theft  21 
19) Organized crime  21 
20) Foreign currency/exchange 
regulations 
 
16 
Source: Survey of 116 randomly selected directors and senior managers in four regions 
of South Asia (Kerala, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Sri Lanka).  Directors and 
managers were asked to identify each item as ‘no obstacle,’ a ‘minor obstacle,’ a 
‘moderate obstacle,’ or a ‘major obstacle’ to business and economic growth. The 
survey was taken during interviews conducted between November 2002 and May 
2004. For more details on these data, consult the Appendix 3. 
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My reanalysis of these data suggests three broad conclusions.  First, left/labor 
mobilization does not appear to result in higher levels of labor regulation.  Although the 
political mobilization of labor by left parties resulted in high levels of labor regulation in 
West Bengal, the same has not occurred in other ‘red states’.  Second, rather than 
assuming that all types of labor regulation affect economic performance equally, it is 
important to examine the economic impacts of specific types of labor regulation.  Put 
simply, some types of labor regulations are more likely to affect economic performance 
than others.  I find that the negative impacts of the most common forms of labor 
regulation appear to be quite limited.  Restrictions on labor mobility appear to affect 
economic performance in West Bengal but not other states, and that the mechanisms 
linking restrictions on mobility to decreased performance in West Bengal remain unclear.  
Finally, I demonstrate that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the benefits of economic 
reform are not contingent on reforming India’s labor law.  India’s 1991 reforms have 
substantially boosted investment, productivity and wages without respect to differences in 
levels of pro-worker labor regulation.     
 
8.1  Measuring labor regulation: a critique of Besley and Burgess 
Under India’s Constitution, industrial relations are jointly governed by the federal 
government and the states.  The Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 is the primary 
piece of legislation governing the formal procedures to be followed by employers and 
unions in the event of an industrial dispute.  Originally enacted at the federal level, state 
governments have amended various subsections of the act.  The amendments vary 
substantially in their economic implications from those that make minor changes in the 
qualifications of industrial tribunal judges to those that place heavy restrictions on the 
ability of employers to hire and fire workers.   200 
   Taken together, these amendments lead to a large amount of spatial and temporal 
variation in the balance of pro-worker versus pro-employer labor regulation.  Besley and 
Burgess (2004) suggest that this variation in the volume of labor regulation can illuminate 
debates about the impact of labor regulations on economic performance that have been 
difficult to answer in cross-national studies.  To this end, Besley and Burgess code each 
amendment to the IDA as ‘pro-worker’ or ‘pro-employer’ to arrive at a measure of the 
balance of pro-labor versus pro-employer legislation in given year for each state for the 
period 1957-1992.   
The procedure Besley and Burgess use to arrive at this measure is as follows.  
Each pro-worker amendment receives a coding of ‘1’, each pro-employer amendment a 
coding of ‘-1’, and each neutral amendment a coding of ‘0’.  Then, the general direction 
of change in labor legislation for a given year is determined by adding the figures 
together.  If the direction of change is positive, meaning that the balance of legislation in 
a given state/year is pro-worker, the state receives a score of ‘1’ for that year.  If the 
direction of change is negative, meaning that the balance of legislation was pro-employer, 
that state receives a -1 for that year.  If there is no overall trend for that year, the state 
receives a score of ‘0’.  These scores are then added to the previous year’s score to 
measure the cumulative trend in pro-worker versus pro-employer regulation over the 35-
year period.   
For example, as of 1972, Gujarat had not experienced any change in the balance 
of pro-worker versus pro-labor regulations.  In 1973, an amendment to section 30 of the 
IDA made the failure of employers to nominate representatives to the company’s 
industrial relations councils punishable by a 50 rupee fine.  This was the only amendment 
to the IDA in Gujarat that year, so the balance of regulation is coded pro-worker so that 
Gujarat receives a score of ‘1’ for that year.  Since Gujarat experiences no further shifts in 201 
the balance of pro-worker versus pro-employer legislation, Gujarat also receives a score 
of ‘1’ for every year after 1973.   
There are two problems with using this coding scheme to measure the level of 
labor regulation.  First, Besley and Burgess’s coding measures the direction of change 
(pro-worker or pro-employer) in the years in which amendments to the IDA were 
enacted, not the overall cumulative balance of pro-worker versus pro-employer legislation 
in a given state/year.  Second, while it is interesting to demonstrate overall trends in labor 
regulation, for the purposes of econometric analysis, it is important to be clear about the 
impact of specific types of regulation on economic performance.  Besley and Burgess’s 
method leads to an overly broad measure of labor regulation, grouping together a number 
of substantive areas of legislation, some of which may affect economic performance and 
some which may not.   
The remainder of this section engages in a more detailed discussion of the 
problems with Besley and Burgess’s analysis, provides an alternative method of measuring 
labor regulation, and discusses some of the implications and benefits of this alternative 
method.    
Problem #1: The measure does not accurately reflect overall levels of regulation  
While the logic of evaluating the balance of pro-worker versus pro-employer 
makes sense, Besley and Burgess’s method of coding suffers from a number of defects.  
One major problem is that their cumulative score of the balance of labor legislation in a 
given year fails to capture employer concerns with respect to the overall levels of pro-
worker versus pro-employer labor regulation.  For example, in 1980, West Bengal passed 
a total of 15 pro-worker amendments and only 1 pro-employer amendment to the IDA.  
According to Besley and Burgess’s coding scheme, this year gets coded as ‘1’, the same 
coding that Gujarat receives for its single piece of pro-worker legislation in 1973.   
Similarly, West Bengal’s cumulative score increases from ‘1’ in 1979 to ‘2’ in 1980.       202 
Clearly, a simpler additive index would more accurately depict variations in levels 
of pro-worker versus pro-employer labor legislation across states and over time.  With 
reference to the example of West Bengal, a simple additive index would code 1980 as ‘14’ 
rather than ‘1’ and West Bengal’s cumulative score would shift from ‘1’ in 1979 to ‘15’ in 
1980.  Figure 8.1 presents this index of the balance of pro-employer versus pro-worker 
legislation for each year in each state based for the period 1957-1997.  In this index, I 
retain Burgess and Besley’s coding of amendments as ‘pro-worker’ or ‘pro-employer’, but 
amend the scores for each state/year as described above.     
The figure provides some unanticipated results.  First, there is no obvious 
relationship between levels of left mobilization and the balance of pro-worker versus pro-
employer labor regulation.  One might have easily predicted that West Bengal, a ‘red state’ 
with a long history of labor mobilization and strong left political parties, would 
accumulate the largest balance of pro-worker versus pro-employer amendments to the 
IDA.  However, it is surprising to find that Kerala, home of the first freely elected 
communist government in the world, would on balance demonstrate a marginally pro-
employer record of amendments to the IDA.  Similarly, there is no pro-worker bias in the 
regulatory environment of Assam, another red state.   2
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Notes: Scores based on coding of amendments to the Industrial Disputes (ID) Act in 15 Indian states.  Pro-worker amendments receive a score 
of ‘1’ while pro-employer amendments receive a score of ‘-1’.  See text for more details on coding scheme. 
 
Figure 8.1:  The balance of pro-worker versus pro-employer amendments to the ID Act in 15 Indian states, 1960-1997 
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Second, there appears to be no relationship between the balance of pro-employer 
versus pro-worker legislation and investment flows in Indian states.  Table 8.2 ranks 15 
major Indian states according to their annual average growth in real invested fixed capital.  
Gujarat, the highest ranked state with an average annual growth rate in real invested fixed 
capital of 12 percent, has had a marginally pro-worker regulatory environment since the 
mid-1970s.  Regulatory environments also do not appear to explain the recent success of 
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, which have attracted large amounts of investment since 
the early 1990s.  Karnataka had no more of a pro-employer bias than Kerala in the 1990s, 
which ranks third from the bottom of the list.  Andhra Pradesh’s regulatory environment 
was neutral during the 1990s.    
 
Table 8.2:  Investment growth ranking 
 
State  Annual Average Growth in 
Real Fixed Capital, 1973-1997 
Gujarat 12.37 
Assam 12.04 
Andhra Pradesh  10.34 
Karnataka 9.88 
Uttar Pradesh  9.87 
Rajashthan 9.71 
Madhya Pradesh 8.82 
Orissa 8.79 
Maharashtra 8.39 
Punjab 7.74 
Tamil Nadu  7.62 
Haryana 7.51 
Bihar 7.11 
West Bengal  6.63 
Kerala 5.85 
Source: Calculated from fixed capital figures reported in the 
Annual Survey of Industries and deflated using a wholesale 
price index.  For more details, see Appendix 1. 
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By the same token, there appears to be no relationship between a neutral 
regulatory environment and investment growth.  Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Punjab, and 
Uttar Pradesh are five states that displayed no pro-worker or pro-employer bias in their 
amendments to the IDA.  Assam and Uttar Pradesh saw relatively high levels of 
investment growth between 1973 and 1997, but Punjab, Haryana and Bihar fall in the 
bottom half of the ranking.   
Problem #2: Labor regulations do not have cumulative effects across issue areas 
While it is interesting to examine variations in the overall balance of pro-worker 
versus pro-employer labor regulation, it is important to specify how particular types of labor 
regulation might affect economic performance.  By grouping all amendments to the IDA 
without respect to the substantive area of legislation, Besley and Burgess provide an 
overly broad specification of labor regulation.  Quite simply, regulation in some areas is 
more likely to affect economic performance than regulation in others.  It is unrealistic to 
expect, for example, that legislation placing onerous restrictions on the closure of 
production units would have the same effect on economic performance as a small fine 
imposed on an employer for failing to appoint a representative to a works council.  In this 
subsection, I outline three main areas of legislation covered by amendments to the IDA 
and suggest how regulations in these areas are likely to affect economic performance.     
The IDA is comprised of seven chapters and 40 sections (Malik, 2004).  Between 
1949 and 1997, there were 113 state-level amendments to individual sections of the IDA.  
Detailed summaries of these amendments are presented in Appendix 6.  The state-level 
amendments to the IDA can be grouped into three main areas of legislation.  The first is 
a relatively small group of amendments to sections 2, 3 and 9C that govern issues 
pertaining to worker and employer representation in the collective bargaining process.  
For most states, this area of legislation has been relatively unimportant.  Out of the nine 
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amendments in this area of legislation, seven were passed in Rajasthan, one in West 
Bengal and one in Gujarat.   
A second set of amendments pertain to the government’s power to intervene in 
industrial disputes.  These amendments span a number of sections of the IDA, with the 
bulk of them pertaining to sections 2, 7, 10, and 11.  This body of legislation includes 
amendments that grant the government the power to declare ‘essential services’ orders to 
limit strikes in the public sector (sections 2 and 10), define the requisite qualifications of 
presiding officers of industrial tribunals and judges of labor courts (section 7), restrict or 
enhance the ability of workers to bring claims to labor courts (section 2), and restrict or 
enhance the power of labor courts, industrial tribunals and conciliation officers to 
intervene in industrial disputes (sections 10 and 11).   
With 52 amendments in 14 states, labor regulation in this area was the most 
voluminous. At the same time, it is difficult to derive any solid predictions about the 
effects of this body of legislation for one main reason: whether government intervention 
benefits employers or workers may depend on whether the party in power is pro-labor or 
pro-employer.  Besley and Burgess code amendments to the IDA that facilitate 
government intervention as pro-employer.  However, it seems likely that intervention in 
industrial disputes by conciliation officers and labor court judges appointed by a left 
government may produce different results than intervention by officers and judges 
appointed by a right government.  Thus, even though I retain Besley and Burgess’s 
original coding of amendments that facilitate intervention as ‘pro-employer’, I remain 
skeptical that such amendments have systematic impacts on economic performance.   
A third set of amendments deal with restrictions on the freedom of employers to 
hire and fire (but mainly fire) workers at will.  These restrictions on labor mobility are 
governed primarily by amendments to section 25 of the IDA and by a handful of 
amendments to section 2.  Amendments restricting labor mobility have been quite 
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numerous and widespread.  Forty-one amendments in eight states pertained to 
restrictions on labor mobility and 35 of these were amendments to section 25.        
There are reasons to expect that this group of amendments would have the most 
substantial impact on economic performance.  In some states, amendments to the IDA 
have placed fairly onerous restrictions on the ability of employers to shed labor.  For 
example, in 1980 Maharashtra passed an amendment to section 25C that requires 
employers to pay workers 100 percent of their wages for a period of 45 days if they are 
laid off for any reason aside from a failure in the supply of electricity.    In 1984, 
Rajasthan passed an amendment to section 25Q stipulating that employers who lay off 
workers or reduce the size of their workforce without the permission of the government 
are subject to a penalty of up to three months imprisonment and /or a fine of up to 2000 
rupees.  In 1980, West Bengal passed an amendment to section 25C stipulating that laid-
off workers are entitled to receive 50 percent of their salary indefinitely.   
 
8.2  Method and results of basic models 
To analyze the effects of these three types of labor regulation on economic 
performance in the manufacturing sector, I reproduced the panel regressions estimated 
by Besley and Burgess, but used the categorical measures of labor regulation described in 
the previous section instead of a single measure of labor regulation.  These regressions 
include data from 15 major Indian states
1 for the period 1960-1997
2 and are of the form, 
st t s st st st st st l a b y ε δ α ξχ μ μ μ β + + + + + + + = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 , 
where  is a measure of economic performance,  st y 0 β  is a constant,
3   is the measure of 
labor regulation governing collective bargaining (BARGAINING),  is the measure of 
labor regulation governing the adjudication of industrial disputes (ADJUDICATION), 
st b
st a
                                                 
1Due to severe data limitations, we exclude the smaller states and Jammu and Kashmir.     
2 Burgess and Besley analyze the period 1957-1992.  I omit 1957-60 due to data limitations.   
3 In their models, Burgess and Besley appear to omit constants, but provide no justification for doing so.   
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st l  is the measure of labor regulation placing restrictions on labor mobility (MOBILITY), 
st χ  are a series of controls.  Each of the regulatory measures is lagged by one period to 
account for the delay between the enactment and implementation of the legislation.  I 
estimated the models with robust standard errors clustered by state.     
The model also includes fixed effects for 14 states ( s α ), allowing West Bengal to 
vary freely, and years ( t δ ), allowing 1997 to vary freely.  The fixed state effects control 
for unique geographical, cultural or historical factors that might affect economic 
performance.  The fixed year effects control for economic or institutional shocks 
common to all states in a given year.   
The measures of economic performance used as dependent variables include the 
per capita amount of fixed capital investment in manufacturing (INVESTMENT), the 
per capita number of factories (FACTORIES), value added per worker in manufacturing 
(PRODUCTIIVITY), the per capita number of workers employed in manufacturing 
(EMPLOYMENT), wages per worker in manufacturing (WAGES), total output in the 
manufacturing sector (OUTPUT), output in the formal (or ‘registered’) manufacturing 
sector (FORMAL), and manufacturing output in the informal (or ‘unregistered’) sector 
(INFORMAL).  All of these variables are expressed as natural logarithms.      
  The control variables in the analysis include logged per capita development 
expenditure (DEVEXP) to control for varying levels of infrastructural development,
4 
logged population (POPULATION), and a series of four indicator variables 
(CONGRESS, LEFT, JANATA, and REGIONAL) to control for the political ideology 
of dominant parties in the state legislative assemblies (Vidhan Sabhas).  These variables are 
based on the categorizations provided by Butler, Lahiri, and Roy (1991) and the data are 
                                                 
4 Burgess and Besley include installed electrical capacity as an additional control for infrastructural 
development.  I decided to omit this control from my analysis due to the poor quality of the data reported 
in the Statistical Abstracts of India.  More specifically, for a number of states, the same figures are repeated 
year after year, suggesting that the data are not consistently gathered on annual basis.   
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taken from reports by the Election Commission of India on elections to the Vidhan 
Sabhas.  The CONGRESS grouping includes the Indian National Congress, the Indian 
National Congress (Urs), and the Indian National Congress (Organization).  The 
JANATA grouping includes Lok Dal, Janata, and the Janata Dal.  The LEFT grouping 
includes the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist).  The 
REGIONAL grouping includes any party listed as a regional party in the election 
commission reports.  These variables were coded ‘1’ if, in a given year, a party in the 
grouping held at least 50 percent of the seats in a given state’s legislative assembly and ‘0’ 
if no party in the grouping held at least 50 percent of the seats.  For more information 
regarding the sources and construction of the dependent and independent variables in the 
analysis, see Appendix 1.   
Results for basic models 
The results of the basic models of economic performance are presented in Table 
8.3.  In general, the reanalysis of the data provides very little support for the contention 
that labor regulations result in decreased economic performance.  None of the three 
regulation variables (MOBILITY, ADJUDICATION, or BARGAINING) are statistically 
significant predictors of investment, labor productivity or wages.  While a pro-worker 
bias in regulations governing the adjudication of industrial disputes correlates with 
decreased employment at the .1 level, ADJUDICATION is not a statistically significant 
predictor of any other measure of economic performance.   2
1
0
 
Table 8.3:  Effects of labor legislation on investment, productivity, employment and output in 15 Indian states, 1960-1997 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 INVESTMENT  FACTORIES PRODUCIVITY EMPLOYMENT WAGES  OUTPUT  FORMAL  INFORMAL
                
MOBILITY 
 
0.037 
(0.04) 
0.055 
(0.04) 
-0.033 
(0.03) 
-0.012 
(0.03) 
0.017 
(0.02) 
-0.080*** 
(0.03) 
-0.068** 
(0.03) 
-0.071* 
(0.04) 
ADJUDICATION 
 
-0.094 
(0.08) 
-0.091 
(0.06) 
-0.025 
(0.06) 
-0.085* 
(0.05) 
-0.108 
(0.07) 
-0.027 
(0.05) 
-0.085 
(0.05) 
0.044 
(0.07) 
BARGAINING 
 
-0.040 
(0.13) 
-0.257*** 
(0.09) 
-0.012 
(0.11) 
-0.034 
(0.08) 
0.073 
(0.10) 
0.369*** 
(0.07) 
0.174** 
(0.08) 
 0.427*** 
(0.13) 
DEVEXP 
 
0.610** 
(0.24) 
0.193 
(0.17) 
0.379*** 
(0.11) 
0.074 
(0.09) 
0.153 
(0.16) 
0.097 
(0.08) 
0.051 
(0.11) 
0.161 
(0.14) 
POPULATION 
 
1.961 
(1.73) 
-0.460 
(1.45) 
1.705** 
(0.85) 
1.267 
(0.81) 
3.434*** 
(1.09) 
1.042 
(0.97) 
1.165 
(0.95) 
1.265 
(1.75) 
CONGRESS 
 
0.107 
(0.10) 
0.012 
(0.03) 
-0.155** 
(0.08) 
0.183*** 
(0.05) 
0.096 
(0.09) 
0.017 
(0.06) 
0.032 
(0.05) 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
LEFT 
 
-0.608*** 
(0.16) 
-0.466*** 
(0.10) 
0.022 
(0.09) 
-0.194 
(0.18) 
0.023 
(0.17) 
-0.246* 
(0.13) 
-0.212 
(0.25) 
-0.249 
(0.21) 
JANATA 
 
0.127 
(0.11) 
-0.004 
(0.11) 
-0.133** 
(0.06) 
0.148*** 
(0.04) 
0.065 
(0.08) 
0.043 
(0.05) 
0.083 
(0.06) 
-0.022 
(0.07) 
REGIONAL 
 
0.280* 
(0.16) 
-0.098 
(0.11) 
-0.258*** 
(0.09) 
0.387*** 
(0.10) 
0.028 
(0.11) 
0.140 
(0.09) 
0.138* 
(0.08) 
0.178 
(0.14) 
Constant 
 
-35.18 
(28.2) 
-2.788 
(23.9) 
-24.59* 
(13.9) 
-9.591 
(13.30) 
-53.51*** 
(17.5) 
-7.496 
(17.2) 
-9.571 
(17.1) 
-13.51 
(31.6) 
Fixed state effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Fixed year effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
R-squared  .91 .90  .92  .96  .88 .97 .96  .91 
N 510  492  510  510  509  505  505  505 
Notes:  Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are reported in parentheses, * significant at 10 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.  
For information regarding the construction of variables and data used to in this analysis, see Appendix 1.   
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Further, pro-worker legislation governing representation in the collective 
bargaining process correlates with increased output in manufacturing and a decreased 
number of factories.  We should treat these results with caution since so many of the 
amendments in this area of legislation were adopted in one state (Rajasthan).  However, 
one potential explanation of this set of relationships may lie in the fact that pro-worker 
amendments in this area expand the role of collective bargaining by broadening the 
definition of what constitutes a union member or an employer.  Two of these 
amendments expand the definition of worker and employer to include owners and 
employees who have contracted with the company but are not directly employed by the 
company.  Legislation that expands the definition of what constitutes and employer and a 
union member to include contract agents may decrease incentives for outsourcing, 
thereby increasing economies of scale and output while limiting the proliferation of less 
productive small-scale production units.   
Pro-worker regulations governing labor mobility are negatively correlated with 
output (models 6-8), but the precise mechanisms through which restrictions on labor 
mobility affect output are unclear.  There are at least three ways that restrictions on labor 
mobility could potentially affect output.  First, onerous restrictions on the ability of 
employers to reduce the size of their workforce could discourage investment.  If this were 
the case, we would see a statistically significant negative relationship between MOBILITY 
and INVESTMENT, but model (1) suggests no relationship between the two variables.  
Second, by granting workers too high a degree of job security, labor mobility could 
reduce labor productivity, but model (3) suggests that restrictions on mobility are not a 
statistically significant predictor of labor productivity.  Finally, restrictions on labor 
mobility might induce employers to contract a higher percentage of their production to 
less regulated units small-scale units in the informal sector.  In this case, we would expect 
to see a decrease in output in the formal manufacturing and a rise in output in the 
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informal sector; but models (6)-(8) suggest that labor regulation correlates with an overall 
decrease in production rather than a shift in production from the formal to the informal 
sector.   
One possible explanation for why the story about the relationship between 
restrictions on labor mobility and manufacturing output does not add up is that West 
Bengal, which has seen an inordinately large number of pro-worker amendments to the 
IDA restricting labor mobility (see figure 8.1), is driving the results.  I test this possibility 
by estimating the output models after excluding West Bengal.  The results, presented in 
Table 8.4, demonstrate that when the data from West Bengal are dropped, the 
relationship between restrictions on labor mobility and output disappears.  This finding 
suggests that only extremely high levels of pro-worker restrictions on labor mobility cause 
a decrease in output and that the mechanisms through which this occurs are unique to 
West Bengal; however, the precise nature of these mechanisms remains unclear.   
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Table 8.4:  Output models excluding West Bengal 
 OUTPUT  FORMAL  INFORMAL 
MOBILITY -0.048 
(0.04) 
-0.023 
(0.04) 
-0.074 
(0.06) 
ADJUDICATION 0.018 
(0.06) 
-0.024 
(0.07) 
0.052 
(0.09) 
BARGAINING 0.417*** 
(0.11) 
0.240** 
(0.09) 
0.421** 
(0.14) 
DEVEXP 0.071 
(0.08) 
0.005 
(0.10) 
0.176 
(0.15) 
POPULATION 0.820 
(1.07) 
0.800 
(0.93) 
1.382 
(1.76) 
CONGRESS 0.013 
(0.06) 
0.021 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(0.09) 
LEFT 0.044 
(0.06) 
0.390*** 
(0.10) 
-0.569** 
(0.18) 
JANATA 0.041 
(0.05) 
0.071 
(0.06) 
-0.009 
(0.08) 
REGIONAL 0.155 
(0.09) 
0.148 
(0.08) 
0.197 
(0.14) 
Constant -3.117 
(17.29) 
-1.460 
(14.90) 
-16.30 
(29.59) 
      
Fixed state effects  YES  YES  YES 
Fixed year effects  YES  YES  YES 
R-squared .97  .97  .91 
N 468  468  468 
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8.3  Labor regulation and economic reform   
So far, I have demonstrated that, generally speaking, three of the most common 
types of labor regulation do not affect economic performance.  It is possible, however, 
that labor regulations matter to economic outcomes under a more specific set of 
circumstances.  For example, it has been argued that the labor market rigidities brought 
about by excessive regulations are more likely to effect economic performance in a liberal 
market than a closed market economy.  In particular, it is said that privatization puts 
pressure on states to dumb down labor regulations because private investment is more 
mobile than state-directed investment.  According to this ‘race to the bottom’ thesis, 
states that fail to reduce labor regulations lose out on new investment in the 
manufacturing sector.     
A related argument is that labor reform in India is crucial to the success of the 
more general economic reforms undertaken in 1991.  According to this hypothesis, the 
beneficial effects of privatization, the liberalization of trade, and the liberalization of 
capital markets may be hampered by labor market rigidities.  The liberalization of capital 
markets will likely fail to stimulate growth if stringent labor laws serve as a disincentive to 
investment.  Similarly, more competitive markets cannot stimulate growth if 
manufacturers are shackled by downwardly inflexible wages or a bloated workforce.   
These hypotheses can be tested with conditional effects models of the form,  
st t s st st r r st st r r y ε δ α ξχ θ ω θ μ β + + + + + + + = − − ) * ( 1 1 0 , 
where  is some form of labor regulation,  1 − st r r θ  is an indicator variable for the post-
reform period (REFORM) coded ‘1’ for all years after 1991 and ‘0’ for 1991 and all 
previous years, and  ) * ( 1 − st r θ ω  is an interaction term.  If the positive effects of economic 
reforms were contingent upon favorable labor regulations and the negative effects of 
labor regulations contingent upon economic reforms, we would expect this interaction 
term to be statistically significant.   
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Since we know that restrictions on labor mobility are the form of regulation most 
likely to have deleterious effects on economic performance, I estimate these models using 
the MOBILTIY variable in the interaction term.  The results are presented in Table 8.5.  
While the reform variable is a statistically significant predictor of increased investment, 
greater productivity and higher wages, the interaction term (MOBILITY x REFORM) is 
only statistically significant the investment model.  This suggests that a) that the benefits 
of economic reform are not contingent on the absence of regulations governing labor 
mobility and b) that the effects of restrictions on labor mobility are not any greater in the 
post-reform period than in the pre-reform period.   Table 8.5:  Economic reform, labor legislation and economic development in 15 Indian states, 1960-1997 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 INVESTMENT  FACTORIES PRODUCTIVITY EMPLOYMENT WAGES  OUTPUT  FORMAL  INFORMAL 
               
MOBILITY 0.041 
(0.03) 
0.045 
(0.03) 
-0.025 
(0.02) 
-0.009 
(0.03) 
0.029 
(0.02) 
-0.081*** 
(0.02) 
-0.071** 
(0.03) 
-0.070** 
(0.03) 
REFORM 4.550*** 
(0.71) 
0.881 
(1.30) 
3.790*** 
(0.69) 
0.167 
(0.91) 
3.420*** 
(0.79) 
0.129 
(0.77) 
0.449 
(0.45) 
-0.814 
(1.56) 
MOBILITY x 
REFORM 
0.025* 
(0.01) 
0.029 
(0.02) 
0.008 
(0.02) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
ADJUDICATION -0.085 
(0.07) 
-0.095 
(0.06) 
-0.012 
(0.06) 
-0.081 
(0.05) 
-0.092 
(0.08) 
-0.028 
(0.05) 
-0.088 
(0.06) 
0.044 
(0.08) 
BARGAINING -0.230** 
(0.10) 
-0.281*** 
(0.10) 
-0.177* 
(0.10) 
-0.045 
(0.09) 
-0.081 
(0.11) 
0.370*** 
(0.08) 
0.178** 
(0.08) 
0.427*** 
(0.13) 
DEVEXP 0.230 
(0.18) 
0.121 
(0.13) 
0.061 
(0.06) 
0.059 
(0.08) 
-0.133 
(0.15) 
0.097 
(0.08) 
0.052 
(0.11) 
0.161 
(0.15) 
POPULATION -0.988 
(1.43) 
-1.071 
(1.94) 
-0.724 
(0.78) 
1.178 
(1.21) 
1.246 
(1.19) 
1.040 
(0.98) 
1.154 
(0.96) 
1.266 
(1.74) 
CONGRESS 0.104 
(0.09) 
0.013 
(0.03) 
-0.158** 
(0.08) 
0.183*** 
(0.05) 
0.093 
(0.09) 
0.017 
(0.06) 
0.033 
(0.05) 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
LEFT -0.511** 
(0.21) 
-0.434*** 
(0.11) 
0.093 
(0.11) 
-0.197 
(0.19) 
0.080 
(0.09) 
-0.246* 
(0.13) 
-0.208 
(0.25) 
-0.250 
(0.20) 
JANATA 0.146* 
(0.08) 
-0.003 
(0.11) 
-0.115** 
(0.05) 
0.150*** 
(0.04) 
0.083 
(0.08) 
0.043 
(0.05) 
0.082 
(0.06) 
-0.022 
(0.07) 
REGIONAL 0.225* 
(0.13) 
-0.121 
(0.11) 
-0.296*** 
(0.08) 
0.390*** 
(0.10) 
-0.001 
(0.09) 
0.139 
(0.10) 
0.134 
(0.09) 
0.178 
(0.14) 
Constant 
 
18.96 
(23.7) 
8.367 
(33.1) 
20.04 
(13.6) 
-7.915 
(20.7) 
-13.32 
(19.8) 
-7.591 
(16.7) 
-9.961 
(16.6) 
-12.72 
(30.2) 
Fixed state effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Fixed year effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
R-squared .93  .90 .93  .96 .88  .97  .96  .91 
N 510  492  510  510  509  505  505  505 
2
1
6
 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are reported in parentheses, * significant at 10 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.  
For information regarding the construction of variables and data used to in this analysis, see Appendix 1.     217 
These impressions are confirmed by calculating conditional coefficients.  Table 
8.6 presents the conditional effects of labor regulation on economic performance.  The 
conditional coefficients of INVESTMENT, FACTORIES, PRODUCTIVITY, 
EMPLOYMENT, and WAGES are not statistically significant.  Although the conditional 
coefficients of the output variables (OUTPUT, FORMAL, INFORMAL) are statistically 
significant, the confidence intervals of the pre-reform and post-reform coefficients 
overlap substantially in each case, making it very likely that the effect of restrictions on 
labor mobility are the same in the pre- and post-reform periods.    
 
Table 8.6:  The conditional effects of labor regulation on 
economic performance 
 
Dependent variable  Period 
    
  Pre-reform Post-reform 
    
INVESTMENT 
 
0.04 
(-0.03, 0.11) 
0.07 
(-0.02, 0.15) 
FACTORIES 
 
0.04 
(-0.02, 0.11) 
0.07 
(-0.01, 0.16) 
PRODUCTIVITY 
 
-0.03 
(-0.07, 0.02) 
-0.02 
(-0.06, 0.03) 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
-0.01 
(-0.06, 0.04) 
-0.02 
(-0.08, 0.05) 
EARNINGS 
 
0.03 
(-0.01, 0.06) 
0.02 
(-0.02, 0.07) 
OUTPUT 
 
-0.08*** 
(-0.13, -0.04) 
-0.08** 
(-0.14, -0.02) 
FORMAL SECTOR 
 
-0.07** 
(-0.14, -0.01) 
-0.07* 
(-0.14, 0.01) 
INFORMAL SECTOR 
  
-0.07** 
(-0.14, -0.00) 
-.0.07 
(-0.16, 0.02) 
Notes:  95 percent confidence intervals reported in parentheses, * significant at 10 
percent, **significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 8.7 presents the conditional effects of economic reform on investment.  
The conditional coefficients of INVESTMENT, PRODUCTIVITY, and EARNINGS 
are statistically significant, but since the confidence intervals of the low, mean, and high 
values substantially overlap, it is likely that the effect of these variables is the same 
regardless of the level of restrictions on labor mobility.  The conditional coefficients of 
FACTORIES, EMPLOYMENT, and the output variables are not statistically significant.   
 
Table 8.7:  Conditional effects of economic reform on investment, 
productivity, employment, wages and output 
 
Dependent variable  Level of restrictions on labor mobility 
      
  Low value  Mean value  High value 
      
INVESTMENT 
 
4.55*** 
(3.16, 5.94) 
4.57*** 
(3.17, 5.96) 
4.83*** 
(3.42, 6.24) 
FACTORIES 
 
0.88 
(-1.67, 3.43) 
0.90 
(-1.65, 3.45) 
1.19 
(-1.42, 3.81) 
PRODUCTIVITY 
 
3.79*** 
(2.44, 5.14) 
3.80*** 
(2.44, 5.15) 
3.87*** 
(2.42, 5.33) 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
0.17 
(-1.61, 1.94) 
0.16 
(-1.62, 1.94) 
0.08 
(-1.77, 1.94) 
EARNINGS 
 
3.42*** 
(1.88, 4.96) 
3.42*** 
(1.88, 4.96) 
3.38*** 
( 1.78, 4.98) 
OUTPUT 
 
0.13 
(-1.38, 1.64) 
0.13 
(-1.38, 1.64) 
0.14 
(-1.34, 1.62) 
FORMAL SECTOR 
 
0.56 
(-1.37, 2.50) 
0.57 
(-1.37, 2.50) 
0.62 
(-1.41, 2.66) 
INFORMAL SECTOR 
  
-.81 
(-3.88, 2.25) 
-.81 
(-3.87, 2.24) 
-.82 
(-3.70, 2.06)  
Notes:  95 percent confidence intervals reported in parentheses, * significant at 10 percent, **significant at 
5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I addressed the question of whether the benefits of the political 
incorporation of labor in collective bargaining might be outweighed by any adverse 
affects of union influence in the policy arena.  I investigated state-level amendments to 
the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, the key piece of legislation governing industrial 
relations in India.  This analysis resulted in three important discoveries.  First, left/labor 
mobilization does not appear to result in higher levels of labor regulation.  Although 
West Bengal has extremely high levels of labor regulation, Kerala and Assam (also ‘red 
states’) do not.  Second, state-level labor regulations have had a relatively minor impact  
on economic performance.  The negative impacts of labor regulation appear to be limited 
to restrictions on labor mobility in the state of West Bengal.  Further the mechanisms 
linking labor regulation to decreased output remain unclear.  Finally, the results of my 
analysis suggest that the benefits of economic reform are not contingent on labor reform.  
India’s 1991 reforms have substantially boosted investment, productivity and wages 
without respect to differences in levels of pro-worker labor regulation.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
Social scientists and policymakers have long been suspicious of the mobilization 
of the working class by political parties.  Specifically, the relationship between political 
parties and unions has been subject to two, somewhat contradictory critiques.  Some 
observers worry that party-union ties will automatically result in ‘political interference’ in 
the industrial relations arena and the cooptation of working-class interests by political 
parties.  Others worry that party-union ties provide unions with too much power, thus 
facilitating working-class opposition to beneficial economic policies.   
The results of this study of unions and political parties in South Asia suggest 
reasons to be more optimistic about the political and economic implications of strong 
party-union ties.  This dissertation has demonstrated that in a free market democracy, ties 
between unions and major political parties contribute to the stability of the industrial 
relations environment because major parties moderate the behavior of affiliated 
organizations, including unions.  This moderating tendency is explained by the 
encompassing nature of major political parties.  As Mancur Olson put it, “a party whose 
clients comprise half or more of the society naturally is concerned about the efficiency 
and welfare of the society as a whole” (51).    
South Asia is a region well suited for studying the effects of party-union ties in 
developing democracies.  India, the world’s most populous democracy, has also been one 
of the developing world’s most successful and stable democracies.  With the success of its 
recent market reforms and its vibrant history of labor activism, India is arguably the most 
important ‘case’ for understanding the dynamics of union-party ties in a free market 
democracy.  South Asia is also home to less stable democracies and countries that have 
been governed for long spells by authoritarian regimes.  The less democratic experiences 
of these countries permit explicit comparison of the effects of India’s voluntary party-
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union ties with the strategy of political domination, repression and exclusion of organized 
labor typically practiced by authoritarian regimes.  In this dissertation, India’s democratic 
experience was contrasted with that of Sri Lanka, where state-labor relations were 
characterized by a high degree of repression and exclusion during the 1980s and early 
1990s.   
The central finding of the dissertation is that major party unions (MPUs) react to 
adverse economic circumstance quite differently than what I have referred to as narrow 
interest unions (NIUs), or unions without ties to major political parties.  The relevant 
changes in the Indian economy were discussed in Chapter 2.  The political mobilization 
of rural constituencies resulted in a series of policies designed to provide rural, small-scale 
manufacturers with a competitive advantage over urban medium- and large-scale 
industries.  At the same time, the politicization of food prices resulted in a shift in the 
terms of trade toward agriculture and, consequently, a rise in the wages of organized 
sector workers.  The new competitive pressures from the small-scale sector undercut the 
pricing power of urban manufactures at the same time that wages were rising, making it 
impossible for unions to win wage demands with routine strikes and collective bargaining.   
Faced with a decline in their bargaining power, unions in India face a choice:  they 
could either ‘mobilize resistance’ by resorting to more aggressive bargaining and protest 
or they could ‘mobilize restraint’.  In Chapters 3-5, I showed that MPUs tend to opt for a 
strategy of mobilizing restraint whereas NIUs are more likely to mobilize resistance.   
Moreover, MPU leaders mobilized restraint in collective bargaining without co-opting the 
working class (Chapter 7) and without substantially endangering development by forcing 
the implementation of economically counterproductive policies (Chapter 8).  Indian 
MPUs protest and win wage demands, but only when doing so does not substantially 
endanger the health of a company.  MPUs may advocate pro-worker policies, but the 
evidence suggests that doing so has not endangered economic progress.  MPUs tend to 222 
mobilize restraint regardless of the ideology of the party.  Put simply, left parties are not 
immune to the pressures of a broader constituency that are in turn shaped by the 
structural power of capital.  The leaders of left parties cannot win elections if they alienate 
a large percentage of the electorate by encouraging militant union behavior that results in 
the capital flight or a capital strike (the refusal to invest) and, thereby, chase away ‘good 
jobs’.      
In contrast, as I demonstrated through an examination of the history of Sri 
Lankan state-labor relations in Chapter 6, the forcible exclusion of the working class from 
politics can give rise to a union movement dominated by NIUs, which tend to be guided 
by the interests of one or a handful of union leaders.  NIUs tend to behave more 
aggressively than MPUs because the leadership benefits from a show of force but is not 
constrained by the broader interests of a political party.  NIUs are therefore more likely 
to present larger demands and utilize violent and extreme forms of protest in order to 
enhance their reputation for toughness and extract larger rents from the management.  
Ultimately, because NIU leaders have fewer incentives to concern themselves with the 
health of the company and the broader investment climate, negotiations with NIUs are 
more likely to end in a lockout of the workers or the closure of a production unit.   
The remainder of this chapter draws out some of the implications of these 
findings.  Section 9.1 spells out the implications of these arguments for debates about the 
relationship between democracy and development in the social sciences and discusses the 
policy implications of the dissertation.  Section 9.2 discusses some of the limitations of 
the study and areas for future research.   223 
9.1  Implications for academic and policy debates 
The findings of this dissertation have implications for debates about the 
relationship about the quality of democracy and economic development.  As Przeworski 
and Limongi (1993; 1997) demonstrate, there is no simple relationship between 
democracy and development.  Economic success stories are equally distributed among 
democracies and dictatorships.  Likewise, democracies and dictatorships are equally prone 
to economic failure.  Democracy has largely failed to bring about rapid economic growth 
in Latin America, but there is no paucity of authoritarian regimes that have driven 
economies into the ground.   
On the other hand, the quality of government matters enormously for economic 
success.  More specifically, much of the development literature suggests that, rather than 
regime type, the key to rapid economic growth is ‘state autonomy’—the ability of state 
actors to implement economic policy absent substantial interference from powerful 
distributional coalitions.  One view holds that the authoritarian exclusion of these 
distributional coalitions is the key to state autonomy (e.g. Haggard 1990).  Yet as Peter 
Evans (1995; 1996) suggests, a state strategy that relies entirely on repression and 
exclusion is ultimately less likely to succeed than one that relies on ‘embeddedness’ or the 
development of ‘synergistic’ ties between the state and powerful distributional coalitions.  
Understanding how the quality of democratic governance relates to economic 
growth is becoming more urgent as more developing countries adopt democratic 
institutions and market reforms.  This dissertation has argued that the Olsonian logic of 
encompassment is relevant in addressing how voluntary ties between parties and unions 
are likely to affect the stability of industrial relations and, ultimately, economic progress.  
It has also suggested that the effects of party encompassment on union behavior are 
contingent upon the presence of free markets and democratic elections.  Posed as a set of 
counterfactuals, this argument can be stated as follows:  1) in the absence of free and fair 
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elections, political parties have little reason to be concerned with the externalities 
associated with militant unionism; and 2) in the absence of free markets, the costs 
associated with aggressive unionism are mitigated by the absence of product competition, 
which allows firms to pass on the costs of increased wages and benefits to the consumer.  
In other words, the freer markets and elections become, the greater the importance of 
synergistic ties between parties and unions.   
In India, the synergistic ties between political parties and unions were ultimately 
the result of a two-part expansion of democratic participation that counterbalanced the 
power of urban labor and capital.  First, as I explained above and in Chapter 2, the 
political mobilization of rural areas diminished the monopoly power of urban industry 
and thereby organized labor.  Second, as I explained in Chapter 3, the rise of Hindutva 
created a powerful coalition of middle class voters who favored greater economic reform.  
Both of these developments provided the state with a degree of autonomy that permitted 
the successful implementation of India’s economic reforms.     
At the same time, in India, ties between major political parties and unions meant 
that many workers have not been excluded from the political process.  Instead, parties 
have been able to draw on their connections with unions to decrease opposition of 
reforms and to restrain union behavior in the collective bargaining arena.  To a large 
extent, this restraint has helped to foster an industrial relations climate that is more 
conducive investment and growth.   
The importance of synergistic ties between organized labor and political parties 
during the process of democratization can be emphasized by envisioning a scenario in 
which no unions in India had ties to political parties.  This dissertation has demonstrated 
that unions without ties to parties, or narrow interest unions (NIUs), tend to respond to 
declining bargaining power by upping the ante—increasing their wage demands and 
engaging in violent forms of protest.  My findings suggest, then, that if the deepening of 225 
democracy that limited labor’s influence had occurred absent strong ties between parties 
and unions, industrial relations in India would have been highly chaotic.  In other words, 
without MPUs, the experience of India would have been much closer to that of Sri Lanka 
in the 1990s.     
Implications for current practices and policy recommendations  
The findings of this dissertation have important policy implications.  By 
demonstrating the potential economic costs of the political exclusion and/or repression 
of organized labor, the dissertation questions the repressive practices of most developing 
countries and challenges standard policy advice given by international organizations like 
the World Bank to exclude unions from the political arena.  My findings suggest that a 
strategy of repression and exclusion is inferior to a strategy of ‘mobilizing restraint’, i.e. a 
strategy that not only permits, but encourages the political mobilization of the working 
class.   
The importance of policies that foster a stable industrial relations environment 
cannot be overstated.  A successful strategy of economic growth depends on rapid 
industrialization which, in turn, depends on investment in manufacturing.  From the 
perspective of Indian development policy, one might argue that the key problem has been 
a lack of focus on the growth of the organized manufacturing sector.  Instead of making 
the infrastructural investments and policy adjustments conducive to the development of 
organized manufacturing, the Indian government has alternatively focused on fostering 
growth in the informal and small-scale sectors or on growth in the service sector and 
particularly the high-wage, high skill information (IT) sector.  Francine Frankel aptly 
refers to this latter aspect of the Indian development strategy as an attempt to “leapfrog 
the industrial revolution” (Frankel 2005).   
Ultimately, developmental strategies that ignore the health of the organized 
manufacturing sector are bound to fail.  Jobs that provide low-skill workers with good 226 
pay and benefits cannot be found in the informal economy and the spillover benefits of 
IT are unlikely to be enough to benefit the vast majority of South Asians.  In India, the 
output of the IT sector represents just three percent of GDP and the vast majority of IT 
employees are relatively well-off university graduates.  Comparing the Indian economy 
with China’s, Dréze and Sen state the argument this way: 
 
[E]ven if the India were to take over the bulk of the world’s computer 
software industry, this would still leave its poor, illiterate masses largely 
untouched.  It may be much less glamorous to make simple pocket knives 
and reliable alarm clocks than to design state-of-the-art computer 
programmes, but the former gives the Chinese poor a source of income 
that the latter does not provide—at least not directly—to the Indian poor 
(1995, 39).  
  
Thus, in the opinion of Dréze and Sen, one the most important tasks for the Indian 
government is a higher level of investment in primary education so as to produce a easily 
trainable workforce that can produce manufactured products for export.   
However, it is obvious that basic education is only one aspect of training a 
productive workforce.  Training is an ongoing process, and worker productivity depends 
in large measure on the industrial relations climate at individual companies.  As the 
anecdotes in Chapter 3 suggest, organized labor cab play a key role in assisting 
management in fostering an industrial relations climate and in negotiating productivity-
linked wage agreements.  In this respect, the role of unions in providing a productivity-
based industrial relations environment in manufacturing is critical to South Asia’s 
developmental success.  It is therefore important for governments in South Asia and 
other regions to consider how their relationships with unions affect the behavior of 
unions and the industrial relations climate.   
Does capital respond to better industrial relations? 
A remaining question is whether changes in industrial relations climates translate 
into better economic performance.  In other words, if policymakers transform their 227 
industrial relations environments, will an influx of capital follow?  The answer to this 
question depends, in part, on the importance of legacies and the effectiveness of public 
relations campaigns.  How much stock do investors put in the history of a region’s 
industrial relations and to what extent can memories of previously turbulent industrial 
relations?  This question is difficult to answer with a small number of cases, so I will only 
outline an answer here through an examination of the post-reform experiences of Kerala 
and West Bengal.  The basic conclusion of this section is that the historical legacy of 
labor militancy matters and that in the most militant settings, the benefits of a strategic 
withdrawal of militancy may take time to accrue.   
In this dissertation, West Bengal and Kerala witnessed the most dramatic 
turnaround in their industrial relations policies and practices.  Prior to the onset of India’s 
economic reforms, Kerala and West Bengal were home to two of the most militant union 
movements in the world.  Following the reforms, both governments embarked on a 
campaign to radically transform their industrial relations culture and to attract private 
manufacturing investment to their states.  Although the strategies of the two state 
governments were identical, they appear to have had dramatically different post-reform 
experiences. 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 present data on growth in manufacturing sector investments 
and gross state domestic product (GSDP) for 15 major Indian states.  The figures in the 
columns represent average annual growth rate for two periods, a pre-reform period 
(1980-91) and a post-reform period (1992-97).  The figures in parentheses represent the 
ranking of each state, with ‘1’ representing the state with the highest growth rate and ‘15’ 
representing the state with the lowest growth rate. 
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Table 9.1:  Average annual per capita growth in investment in manufacturing 
State  1980 to 1991  1992 to 1997 
Andhra Pradesh  21.60 (1)  9.31 (15) 
Assam  14.62 (7)  24.21 (3) 
Bihar  4.45 (15)  10.27 (14) 
Gujarat  13.72 (10)  31.49 (1) 
Haryana  11.03 (12)  14.26 (10) 
Karnataka  10.61 (13)  29.90 (2) 
Kerala  10.53 (14)  19.65 (5) 
Madhya Pradesh  16.82 (3)  15.25 (9) 
Maharashtra  13.80 (9)  18.55 (6) 
Orissa  19.81 (2)  16.35 (8) 
Punjab  13.94 (8)  10.58 (13) 
Rajasthan  11.06 (11)  22.00 (4) 
Tamil Nadu  16.15 (4)  17.32 (7) 
Uttar Pradesh  14.82 (6)   13.85 (11) 
West Bengal  15.41 (5)  13.16 (12) 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, Central Statistical Office (Industrial Statistics Wing), Department of 
Statistics, Ministry of Programme Implementation, Government of India 229 
Table 9.2:  Average annual per capita growth in state domestic product  
State  1980 to 1991  1992 to 1997 
Andhra Pradesh  9.048 (5)  4.95 (7) 
Assam  10.93 (2)  3.72 (10) 
Bihar  17.28 (1)  10.51 (2) 
Gujarat  3.93 (12)  10.45 (3) 
Haryana  4.53 (10)  3.80 (9) 
Karnataka  6.71 (8)  3.42 (13) 
Kerala  3.95 (11)  5.86 (5) 
Madhya Pradesh  4.81 (9)  13.37 (1) 
Maharashtra  3.41 (13)  3.48 (12) 
Orissa  9.40 (3)  5.35 (6) 
Punjab  7.32 (6)  3.51 (11) 
Rajasthan  6.81 (7)  7.32 (4) 
Tamil Nadu  3.26 (14)  3.87 (8) 
Uttar Pradesh  9.07 (4)  2.76 (15) 
West Bengal  -0.07 (15)  3.24 (14) 
Source: Estimates of State Domestic Product, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government 
of India 
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Although West Bengal achieved higher per capita GSDP growth in the post-
reform period, it did not make any gains relative to other states.  With a growth rate of 
3.24 percent, West Bengal had the second lowest growth rate of any Indian state in the 
post-reform period.  Further, West Bengal experienced decline, both in absolute terms 
and relative to other states, in the rate of investment growth in manufacturing.  West 
Bengal had the fifth highest average annual investment growth in manufacturing (15.41 
percent) in the pre-reform period but was third to last in the post-reform period with its 
annual investment growth in manufacturing falling to 13.16 percent.     
Kerala, on the other hand, had a much more positive post-reform experience.  In 
fact, it climbed from being the fourteenth-ranked state in terms of investment growth in 
manufacturing to replace West Bengal in the fifth-ranked position.  In absolute terms, 
average annual investment in Kerala’s manufacturing sector climbed from an average of 
10.53 percent in the pre-reform period to 19.65 percent in the post-reform period.   
Kerala also ranked fifth among major Indian states with respect to its overall (GSDP) 
average growth rate of 5.86 percent.  
Why did Kerala experience such a dramatic turnaround in the post-reform period 
whereas West Bengal did not?  The answer may lie in the historical legacies of 
mobilization in Kerala and West Bengal.  While Kerala is often categorized as a so-called 
‘red state’, the levels of left mobilization in Kerala have historically been lower than in 
West Bengal. This has been true in the industrial relations arena (see figure 7.1) as well as 
in the political arena.  West Bengal’s party system has essentially been a one-party system 
dominated by the CPM or Communist Party of India (Marxist), which has been in power 
continuously since 1977.  In Kerala, the party system is something like a two-party 
democracy with CPM-led left front coalitions competing for power against Congress-led 
coalitions.  Further, the dominance of the CPM in West Bengal manifests itself in an 
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unusually large volume of pro-worker legislation that is not found in Kerala (see figure 
8.1).        
These historically differing levels of mobilization have two important 
consequences.  First, the higher levels of mobilization against capital in West Bengal in 
the pre-reform period negatively impacted the ability of left parties to engineer a strategic 
withdrawal of militancy.  This is evidenced by the more complete transformation of 
Kerala’s industrial relations (see table 4.3).  In Kerala, only three percent of companies 
experienced any form of violent or extreme protest and no companies reported an assault 
on management.  In West Bengal, by contrast, eight percent of companies had 
experienced violent or extreme protest.  Other forms of non-routine protest, such as 
gheraos and sit-ins were also more common in West Bengal than in Kerala.  Finally, in 
West Bengal, general strikes or bandhs, continue to be a typical form of protest.  The 
consensus of employers with whom I spoke was that production is affected by bandhs 
approximately six times per year.  While these strikes a short, typically half a day or less, 
they cause a highly visible interruption of production that may not occur in other states.   
The second major implication of West Bengal’s historically higher levels of 
mobilization is that investor perceptions of West Bengal as a ‘red state’ may be more 
durable than those of Kerala.  Thus, it may be that even though West Bengal has better 
industrial relations than Maharashtra or Gujarat, investors will perceive Maharashtra to be 
a more investor friendly state simply because workers in West Bengal were some of the 
most militant in the world for the many years preceding market reform.     232 
9.2  Limitations and areas for future research 
The central purpose of this dissertation was to test a series of hypotheses about 
how political ties affect union behavior using data from four regions in South Asia.   
While this dissertation substantially furthers our knowledge about the relevance and 
importance of party ties for union behavior in free market democracies, it (like all studies) 
has limitations.  In this section, I identify some of these limitations and discuss how they 
can be addressed through future research. 
Generalizability  
One of the most common problems of social scientific research is the extent to 
which generalizations are limited by the geographical and temporal scope of the available 
data.   This study is no exception since the data were collected from four regions in South 
Asia.  While it would appear that these findings could be generalized to other regions, 
there is no way to be certain without conducting further empirical work.   
One way to expand the scope of the study would be to conduct a broader cross-
regional analysis within South Asia.  Through such a study, we could discover whether 
the differences between MPUs and NIUs observed in West Bengal, Kerala and 
Maharashtra are also observed in other major Indian states.  We might also fruitfully 
expand the inquiry to include other countries in the region.  Like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh 
and Pakistan have transitioned in and out of democracy.  By examining these cases, we 
could discover whether the argument about the effects of repression in Sri Lanka travels, 
i.e., whether industrial relations in Bangladesh and Pakistan are more unstable during 
times of democratic rule due to the political repression and exclusion of unions during 
times of authoritarian rule.     
Discovering how far we can generalize the findings of this study beyond South 
Asia will involve generating a cross-national dataset.  This dataset could use many of the 
same questions and techniques I used in the surveys I conducted in South Asia.  Such a 
 233 
survey would provide data on industrial relations events and union affiliations at the level 
of individual production units.  Ultimately, such a large-N study would be usefully 
combined with in-depth interviews with employers and union leaders in a select group of 
countries.    
Remaining puzzles  
While I have sought to be as thorough as possible in terms of explaining the 
motivations for the behavior of workers, union leaders and employers, there remain a 
handful of issues that, due to time and resource constraints, have not been dealt with in 
the dissertation.  My aim is not to provide definitive answers to these questions.  Rather, 
it is to acknowledge that they are important issues requiring further study and to sketch 
some tentative responses.    
One important question is why union leaders choose to become and/or remain 
affiliated to political parties rather than forming their own, independent unions.  More 
specifically, why would a union leader choose to lead an MPU when ostensibly breaking 
away and forming an NIU is so much more profitable?  One possibility is that some 
union leaders are more risk averse than others.  While a union leader can eventually profit 
from leading a successful NIU, the burden of organizing the union is entirely his own and 
the outcome is less certain.  Additionally, the strategy of using of violence to ratchet up 
pressure on employers is laden with risk since it can result in retaliation.  It is largely 
rumored, for example, that Datta Samanth’s killers were hired by a group of vengeful 
employers.  While MPU leaders cannot become rich by leading their unions, they bear 
less of the burden of organizing their union and have the potential to rise up the party 
ranks and eventually become political leaders themselves.  While these payoffs are less 
immediate, they are more certain than those associated with leading and NIU.   
A second issue, related to the first is why workers remain members of NIUs if the 
outcome for them is ultimately worse?  In other words, if workers are rational and have 234 
full information, they should all join MPUs realizing that NIU leaders are in it for 
themselves and may eventually put them out of a job by running the company into the 
ground.  Unlike with union leaders, it is hard to explain the behavior of workers by 
appealing to risk aversion with the obvious reason being that such an explanation would 
require groupthink.  Individual workers might take on risks to get a bigger wage 
settlement, but it is hard to explain how all workers in a union would have the same 
preference for risk.  A better explanation would rely on informational asymmetries 
between union leaders and members or coercion.  Naturally, workers have less of an 
understanding of market conditions and profit margins than union leaders, who spend all 
of their time negotiating contracts.  Some workers may be tempted to challenge the 
authority of an NIU leader, but this challenge is unlikely if the NIU leader is violent.  
A third item requiring clarification is the precise set of mechanisms linking voter 
preferences for jobs and the actions of party leaders.  In the Indian context, it may appear 
puzzling that party leaders act with such unity of purpose when the common perception 
is that Indian politics are patronage- rather than issue-based.  If each politician pursues 
his own interest in mobilizing votes through patronage, how do we explain the ability of 
party leaders to overcome a collective action problem to restrain the militancy of their 
particular working-class selectorates?  Is the conventional view of Indian politics as 
primarily patronage- rather than issue-based is outdated?  Might party discipline on some 
issues be stronger than commonly presumed?  
A series of recent political events suggest that this may be the case.  In many 
ways, the great agrarian mobilization of the late 1970s and 1980s discussed in Chapter 2 
was an exercise in issue based politics, the primary issue being a more rural-oriented 
development policy.  The rise of caste politics centered on the recommendations of the 
Mandal commission in the early 1990s would appear to be another example.  In the late-
1990s, the BJP had great success in using Hindu nationalist rhetoric to mobilize a national 235 
coalition of middle class/forward caste voters in favor of economic reform.  Finally, as 
discussed in Chapter 8, the sheer volume of pro-worker employment regulations speaks 
of a strong, working-class politics in India.   
The exploration of these broader issues can help to link the concerns raised in 
this dissertation regarding the influence of political parties on union behavior to other 
research agendas.  For example, exploring the relationship between NIU leaders and 
members can help to shed light on the broader issue of corruption and economic 
development.  A better understanding of how voter preferences for jobs influence how a 
party responds to the demands of an affiliated union will shed further light on whether 
issue-based voting is important in the world’s largest developing democracy.  Ultimately, 
the research presented in this dissertation will prove useful to the extent that party-union 
ties have implications for broader sets of political and economic relationships and, thus, 
the extent to which it influences broader social-scientific debates.               APPENDIX 1 
SECONDARY DATA SOURCES  
The secondary-source data for the statistical analyses in this dissertation come 
from a variety of sources.
1 They include data at the national and data from fifteen major 
Indian states: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, 
and West Bengal.   
Dispute frequency is the number of industrial disputes per 1000 workers.   
Dispute duration is the number of workdays lost per striking (or locked out) worker.  
National-level data on the annual number of disputes, workdays lost, and number of 
workers involved in disputes in the manufacturing sector are available in the Laborsta 
database, published online by the International Labour Organization.  National-level data 
on the number of workers in manufacturing are taken from the Annual Survey of 
Industries, Central Statistical Organisation (Industrial Statistics Wing), Department of 
Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Programme Implementation, Government of India.  
State-level calculations of duration and frequency pertain to the entire organized sector.  
This is because the Government of India does not publish data on industrial disputes in 
specific sectors at the state level.  State-level data on dispute duration and frequency in 
the organized sector is from various volumes of the Indian Labour Yearbook, Labour 
Bureau, Ministry of Labour, Government of India.  State-level data on the number of 
workers in the organized sector is from the Employment Review, Directorate General of 
Employment and Training, Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour, Government of India.     
The gross agriculture-industry terms of trade is measured by the ratio of 
agriculture to manufacturing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or State Domestic Product 
                                                 
1 The research for this project was greatly aided by two databases compiled by the Economic and 
Political Weekly Research Foundation--Annual Survey of Industries (1973-97) and Estimates of State 
Domestic Product (1960-2001)—and by a specially commissioned database on organized sector 
workers compiled by Indiastat.com. 
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(SDP) deflators. Data on manufacturing and agriculture output used to calculate GDP 
deflators are from the National Accounts Statistics while data used to conduct SDP 
deflators are from Estimates of State Domestic Product, both of which are published by 
the Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India.      
The  product wage in manufacturing is the total wage bill in manufacturing 
divided by the number of production worker days deflated by the wholesale price index 
(WPI) of manufactured products. Data on wages and production worker days in 
manufacturing are from the Annual Survey of Industries.  The WPI is calculated and 
published by the Department of Statistics.  Since 1970, this index has been published in 
three series, each with a different base year.  The first has a base year of 1970/71 and 
covers the period 1970-82.  The second has a base year of 1981/82 and covers the period 
1982-93.  The third has a base year of 1993/94 and covers the period 1993-97.  I spliced 
these three series to create a single series at 1990/91 prices.   
The real wage for manufacturing workers is the total wage bill in manufacturing 
divided by the number of production worker days deflated by the consumer price index 
for industrial workers (CPIIW).  Data on wages and production worker days in 
manufacturing are from the Annual Survey of Industries.  The CPIIW is published in a 
wide variety of Government of India publications.  I use the figures published in the 
Indian Labour Yearbook.  
The  SSI output index is the ratio of total output produced in small-scale 
industrial (SSI) units to total output in the manufacturing sector.  At the national level, 
data on SSI output comes from Small Scale Industries in India, Office of the 
Development Commissioner, Ministry of Small Scale Industries, Government of India 
and data on total output in manufacturing is from the National Accounts Statistics.  At 
the state level, the variable is constructed by taking the ratio of output in ‘registered’ 
manufacturing to output in ‘unregistered’ manufacturing.  The Factories Act of 1948 238 
defines registered manufacturing as production units with ten or more employees using 
power or twenty or more workers not using power.  Unregistered manufacturing is 
defined as those production units falling below these cutoffs, i.e. having power and fewer 
than 10 workers or not using power and having fewer than 20 workers.  State-level data 
on output in registered and unregistered manufacturing comes from the Estimates of 
State Domestic Product, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of 
India. 
Value-added is the increment to the value of goods and services contributed by a 
given factory.  It is calculated by subtracting the value of depreciations and inputs from 
the value of output.  Profits are the share of value-added accruing to capital.  Fixed 
capital is the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by a factory on the closing date of 
the accounting year.  Fixed assets are defined as assets that have a normal productive life 
of more than one year.   Workers are defined to include all persons employed directly or 
through an employment agency engaged in any manufacturing process, whether for 
wages or not.  Employees include all workers in the factory, any other persons receiving 
wages and supervisors.  Data on value-added, profits, fixed capital and the number of 
workers and employees in manufacturing all come from the Annual Survey of Industries. 
Data on the percentage of employment, investment and total output in rural areas have 
been published in the Annual Survey of Industries since 1987. The population data used 
to express this variable in per capita terms come from the 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001 
Census of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Government of India and 
are interpolated between years.       
The unemployment index presented in figure 5 and used in the national time-
series regression models is a sector-specific measure of unemployment among 
manufacturing workers.  More specifically, it is ratio of employed to unemployed workers 
in the manufacturing sector.  The number of unemployed workers in manufacturing is 239 
reported in the Laborsta database, published online by the International Labour 
Organization to Number of unemployed workers.  These data come from employment 
exchanges in India and are based on the previous work experience of unemployed job 
applicants.  The number of employed workers in the manufacturing sector comes from 
the Annual Survey of Industries.   
The fragmentation of the union movement is measured as the number of unions 
submitting returns to the Ministry of Labour.  These data are taken from the Indian 
Labour Yearbook and an unpublished ILO compilation of country trade union statistics by 
(http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library / downloads/FAQ/UNIONSTATS2002.pdf).  
Union density is the percentage of paid employees who belong to unions.  The 
number of paid employees is taken from the ILO Laborsta database while the number of 
unions is from the Indian Labour Yearbook and an unpublished ILO compilation of country 
trade union statistics by (http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library / 
downloads/FAQ/UNIONSTATS2002.pdf).APPENDIX 2 
TELEPHONE SURVEY 
2.1  Selection and response rates 
Kerala 
The sample for the Kerala telephone survey was drawn from two sources—the 
Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) member directory and the Kerala State 
Industrial Development Corporation (KSIDC) Manufacturer’s Directory.   
There were 515 companies listed in the KSIDC directory and 83 companies listed 
in the CII directory.  I drew a random sample of 50% of the 515 firms without 
replacement from the KSIDC directory and took all 83 companies from the CII directory 
for a total sample of 292 companies.   
These 292 companies yielded 102 completed surveys.   
The breakdown of the 292 selected firms for the purposes of calculating the 
minimum response rate is as follows: 
 
(A)  Completed          102 
  
(B) Non-interviews (explicit “no’s”)      6 
 
(C) Unknown Eligibility        137 
   
  No Answer/Wrong Number       102 
 No  Contact/Avoidance         29 
  Language/Communication Problems      8  
    
(D)  Ineligible         44 
 
  Not in Private Sector           9     
 No  Manufacturing/Manufacturing 
  in  Another  Region      24   
  Not in Organized Sector          7   
 C l o s e d            1  
  Listed Twice Under Different Names                3 
 
Based on the standards of the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(AAPOR), the minimum response rate should be calculated as (A)/((A)+(B) +(C)), or the 
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number of completed interviews divided by the number of completed interviews plus the 
number of non-interviews plus the number of cases of unknown eligibility.   
Using the AAPOR standard, the response rate of the survey is 41.63%.   
Maharashtra 
The sample for the Maharashtra telephone survey was drawn from the Bombay 
Chamber of Commerce (BCC) member directory.   
There were 777 companies listed as manufacturers in the BCC directory.  I 
randomly selected a sample of 20% without replacement from this list of 777 
manufacturers for an initial list of 156 firms.  When this list was exhausted, I selected 
25% of the remaining 621 companies without replacement for an additional sample of 
156 firms.  This yielded a total sample of 312 companies from the initial list of 777.    
These 312 companies yielded 102 completed surveys.   
The breakdown of the 312 selected firms for the purposes of calculating the 
minimum response rate is as follows: 
 
(A)  Completed          102 
 
(B) Non-interviews (explicit “no’s”)      7 
 
(C) Unknown Eligibility        113 
   
  No Answer/Wrong Number       52 
 No  Contact/Avoidance          58 
  Language/Communication Problems      3  
    
(D)  Ineligible         90 
 
  Not in Private Sector           0     
 No  Manufacturing/Manufacturing 
  in  Another  Region      78   
  Not in Organized Sector            2   
 C l o s e d            3  
  Listed Twice Under Different Names                7 
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Based on the standards of the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(AAPOR), the minimum response rate should be calculated as (A)/((A)+(B)+(C)), or the 
number of completed interviews divided by the number of completed interviews plus the 
number of non-interviews plus the number of cases of unknown eligibility.   
Using the AAPOR standard, the response rate of the survey is 45.95%.   
Sri Lanka  
The sample for the telephone survey of manufacturing firms for Sri Lanka was 
drawn from the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce (CCC) member directory CD ROM.   
First, I selected all manufacturing firms from the directory using the CD ROM’s 
automatic sorting function.  This yielded 243 manufacturing firms. 
From the 243 manufacturing firms, I selected an initial sample of 124 firms 
randomly without replacement.  When this list was exhausted, I selected an additional 74 
firms from the remaining unselected 170 manufacturing firms in the CCC directory, 
randomly and without replacement.  Thus, a total of 198 firms were selected for 
participation from 243 manufacturing firms listed in the directory.   
Of these 198, 120 interviews were completed and 29 were lost due to a computer 
failure, yielding a total of 91 completed surveys.  
The breakdown of the 198 selected firms for the purposes of calculating the 
minimum response rate is as follows: 
 
(A)  Completed          120 
 
(B) Non-interviews (explicit “no’s”)      6 
 
(C) Unknown Eligibility        31 
   
  No Answer/Wrong Number       17 
 No  Contact/Avoidance       12 
  Language/Communication Problems      2 
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(D)  Ineligible       41 
 
  Not in Private Sector          4   
 No  Manufacturing/Manufacutring 
  in  Another  Region    23 
  Not in Organized Sector            0 
 C l o s e d            2  
  Listed Twice Under Different Names              12 
Based on the standards of the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(AAPOR), the minimum response rate should be calculated as (A)/((A)+(B) + (C)), or 
the number of completed interviews divided by the number of completed interviews plus 
the number of non-interviews plus the number of cases of unknown eligibility.   
Using the AAPOR standard, the response rate of the survey is 76.43%.   
West Bengal 
The sample for the West Bengal telephone survey was drawn from two sources—
The Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) member directory and the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CII) member directory.   
The BCCI member directory listed 49 manufacturers and the CII member 
directory listed 201 manufacturers.  The two directories listed twenty-four manufacturers 
in common, leaving 226 manufacturing firms listed by the two directories.  These 226 
companies were sampled at 100%, meaning I contacted all 226 companies to request 
participation in the survey.    
These 226 firms yielded 92 completed surveys.   
The breakdown of the 226 selected firms for the purposes of calculating the 
minimum response rate is as follows: 
 
(A) Completed  92 
 
(B) Non-interviews (explicit “no’s”)      15 
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(C) Unknown Eligibility        67 
   
  No Answer/Wrong Number       41 
 No  Contact/Avoidance       20 
 Language/Communication  Problems     6 
    
(D)  Ineligible       52 
 
  Not in Private Sector        7    
 No  Manufacturing/Manufacturing 
  in  Another  Region       35 
  Not in Organized Sector                                   4 
 C l o s e d            2    
  Listed Twice Under Different Names                4 
 
Based on the standards of the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(AAPOR), the minimum response rate should be calculated as (A)/((A)+(B) + (C)), or 
the number of completed interviews divided by the number of completed interviews plus 
the number of non-interviews plus the number of cases of unknown eligibility.   
 
Using the AAPOR standard, the response rate of the survey is 52.87%.   
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2.2—Survey instrument 
 
Company    ________________ 
 
Name of representative  _________________ 
 
Capacity    _________________ 
 
Length of time with company  _________________ 
 
1) Which trade unions, if any, operate in your company? 
 
2) I would like to know whether these unions have a political affiliation.  Does (said 
union) have a political affiliation?    Would you characterize this affiliation as strong, 
moderate, or weak? 
3) Since 1991, have there been any strikes in your firm?   
 
If yes: 
 
a)  How many? 
 
 
b)  On approximately what dates? 
 
 
c) Which trade unions, if any, were involved in these strikes? 
 
 
4) Since 1991, were any disputes been settled prior to a strike or lockout, through 
collective bargaining, or through conciliation or arbitration by a third party? 
 
If yes: 
 
a) On approximately what date(s) did this/these dispute(s). 
 
 
b) Which trade unions, if any, were involved in this/these dispute(s)? 
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5) Since 1991, have workers employed by your company used violent tactics, such as 
hostage taking, attacks on management, or attacks on property in an effort to further 
their demands? 
If yes: 
 
a) Was a trade union involved in this use of violence?  If so, which union? 
 
 
b) What type of violence was used?   
 
 
c)  When did the dispute in which the union used violence occur? 
 
6) Since 1990, have workers employed by your company resorted to desperate acts, such 
as a fast unto death, a threatened suicide, or a climbing to the top of a water tower in an 
effort to further their demands?    
If yes: 
 
a) Was a trade union involved in this use of this tactic?  If so, which union? 
 
 
b) What type of tactic was used?   
 
c)  When did the dispute in which this tactic was used occur? 
 
7)  Since 1990, have workers employed by your company engaged in other non-routine 
forms of protest such as occupying company property, a hunger strike, or a gherao in an 
effort to further their demands? 
If yes: 
 
a) Was a trade union involved in this use of this tactic?  If so, which union? 
 
b) What tactic was used?   
 
c)  When did the dispute in which this tactic was used occur? 
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8) Since 1990, have there been any lockouts at your firm? 
 
9)  Since 1990, have there been any simple marches or picketing outside of the company 
premises?  
a) Was a trade union involved in this use of this tactic?  If so, which union? 
 
b)  When did the dispute in which this tactic was used occur? 
 
This concludes the survey.  Thank you very much for your time.  In the future, I will be 
conducting in-depth interviews of select companies.  If I were to select your company for 
such an interview, would you be willing to participate?  (Yes/No)    
 APPENDIX 3 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
3.1—Selection and response rates 
Kerala 
I selected 55 of the 102 companies participating in the telephone survey to 
contact for in-depth interviews.  The firms were selected with a stratified random sample, 
the strata being whether the workers had engaged in any form of protest.  I selected 
100% of the 35 firms experiencing protest and randomly selected 30% of the 67 firms 
not experiencing protest.   
These 55 companies yielded 37 completed interviews.  One additional company 
was chosen for an interview, but was not randomly selected, for a total of 38 completed 
interviews. 
The breakdown of these interviews for the purposes of calculating response rates 
is as follows:   
 
(A)  Completed          37 
 
(B) Non-interviews (explicit “no’s”)       4 
 
(C) No Contact/Avoidance        14    
 
Based on the standards of the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(AAPOR), the minimum response rate should be calculated as (A)/((A)+(B) +(C)), or the 
number of completed interviews divided by the number of completed interviews plus the 
number of non-interviews plus the number of cases of unknown eligibility.   
Using the AAPOR standard, the minimum response rate to the surveys selected 
from respondents to the telephone survey was 67.27%.   
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Maharashtra 
 
I selected 89 of the 103 companies participating in the telephone survey to 
contact for in-depth interviews.  Because of the lower response rate in Maharashtra 
relative to other regional cases, these companies were selected in four stages of sampling 
as each list of companies became exhausted.     
The first set of companies were selected in four stages with a stratified random 
sample, the strata being whether the workers had engaged in any form of protest.  I 
selected 100% of the 38 firms experiencing some form protest and randomly selected 
15% of the 65 firms that did not experience protest for a total of 48 firms to contact.   
When the first list of companies was exhausted, I selected an additional 30% of 
the 55 remaining firms not experiencing protest for an additional 17 firms to contact.   
In the third stage of sampling, I selected 25% of the remaining 38 companies for 
an additional 10 firms to contact.   
In a fourth stage of sampling, I selected 50% of the remaining 28 companies for 
an additional 14 firms to contact.        
These 89 companies yielded 37 completed interviews 
The breakdown of these interviews for the purposes of calculating response rates 
is as follows:   
 
(A)  Completed          37 
 
(B) Non-interviews (explicit “no’s”)        6  
 
(C) No Contact/Avoidance        46  
   
Using the AAPOR standard, the minimum response rate to the surveys selected from 
respondents to the telephone survey was 41.57%.    
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Sri Lanka  
I selected 54 of the 91 companies participating in the telephone survey to contact 
for in-depth interviews.  The firms were selected with a stratified random sample, the 
strata being whether the workers had engaged in any form of protest.  I randomly 
selected 90% of the 50 firms experiencing protest (for a total of 46 firms that experienced 
protest) and 20% of the 42 firms that did not experience protest (for a total of 8 firms 
that did not experience protest) to contact for in-depth interviews.   
These 54 companies yielded 39 completed interviews.  The breakdown of these 
interviews for the purposes of calculating response rates is as follows:   
 
(A)  Completed          39    
 
(B) Non-interviews (explicit “no’s”)        1 
 
(C) No Contact/Avoidance        14  
   
Using the AAPOR standard, the minimum response rate to the surveys selected from 
respondents to the telephone survey was 72.22%. 
A number of events were of special interest from the perspective of this study 
and so I decided to include a small number of companies experiencing extreme or violent 
protest reported on in the press.  Thus, an additional twenty-four companies were 
selected randomly from a list of firms reported to have experienced strike protest in the 
Sri Lankan press that were not selected for the telephone survey.  Unfortunately, most of 
these companies had closed since the time of the event reported in the press and this 
process only resulted in five completed interviews.  The breakdown of the interviews 
selected from the list of firms selected from the newspaper is as follows: 
 
(A)  Completed              5 
 
(B) Non-interviews (explicit “no’s”)        0 
 
(C)  No  Contact/Avoidance         1 
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    (D) Wrong numbers/Closed           17 
 
The minimum response rate for the surveys selected from firms listed in the newspapers 
was 21.74%. 
 
West Bengal 
I selected 58 of the 92 companies participating in the telephone survey to contact 
for in-depth interviews.  The firms were selected with a stratified random sample, the 
strata being whether the workers had engaged in any form of protest.  I selected 100% of 
the 44 firms experiencing protest and 30% of the 48 firms that did not experience protest 
(for a total of 14 firms that did not experience protest) to contact for in-depth interviews.     
These 58 companies resulted in 40 completed interviews.  The breakdown of 
these interviews for the purposes of calculating response rates is as follows:   
 
(A)  Completed          40 
 
(B) Non-interviews (explicit “no’s”)       7 
 
(C) No Contact/Avoidance        11  
   
 
Using the AAPOR standard, the minimum response rate to the surveys selected from 
respondents to the telephone survey was 68.97%.  
  
3.2—Survey instrument 
 
Part I (Written):  
Please categorize the following items according to the degree to which they are obstacles to the smooth operation and growth of 
business.  Circle the categorization that best applies.   
 
Income tax administration    no obstacle    minor obstacle   moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
 
Customs duties     no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Labor protest/strikes    no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Import restrictions    no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Industrial relations      no obstacle    minor obstacle    moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
 
Policy Instability/Uncertainty    no obstacle    minor obstacle   moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
 
Street crime/theft    no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Infrastructure     no obstacle    minor obstacle   moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
 
Labor Regulation    no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Income taxes     no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Other taxes        no obstacle    minor obstacle   moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
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2 Inflation     no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle       major  obstacle 
  
 
Worker Violence    no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Corruption     no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Environmental regulations    no obstacle    minor obstacle   moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
 
Foreign currency/ 
exchange regulations    no obstacle    minor obstacle   moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
 
Organized Crime    no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Customs administration    no obstacle    minor obstacle   moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
  
Financing     no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Worker absenteeism    no  obstacle   minor  obstacle   moderate  obstacle     major  obstacle 
 
Functioning of judiciary    no obstacle    minor obstacle   moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
 
Riots/political instability    no obstacle    minor obstacle   moderate obstacle     major obstacle 
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Part II (Oral) 
1) Size, number, and location of manufacturing units. 
2) If you have a question regarding industrial relations law, is there someone outside of your firm that you typically contact first?  If so, 
whom? 
3) Is your firm affiliated with any employers’ association organization? 
  a.  if so, which one? 
  b.  how would you characterize your affiliation with this organization?  1) Stongly affiliated; 2) moderately  
  moderately affiliated; or 3) loosely affiliated? 
4) Has your firm signed a collective bargaining agreement with any unions in your firm?   
a.  If so, have there been any violations of this agreement? 
b.  How many?   
5) Has your firm had any disputes with any union referred to the Ministry of Labour for conciliation since 1991?   
  a.  If so, how many? 
  b.  How many have been resolved in conciliation? 
  c.  How many have failed in conciliation? 
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6) Unions and percentage membership, length of operation 
Union(s)    % of Workers Belonging     Length of Operation 
F1) 
F2)  
F3)  
F4)  
F5)  
7)  Union structure at the time of disputes mentioned in press or in survey response.  For this question, I will ask which unions were 
active at the time of the events mentioned in the press and/or survey response, the causes of the disputes, and how long those unions 
had been in operation at the time of the disputes. 
Date    Action     Union Cause Length  Stoppage    Length of Operation of Union 
F1) 
F2)  
F3)  
F4)  
F5)  
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8) Since 1991, have there been any work stoppages or protests in your factories in support of a political issue?  If so: 
 Which  Unit(s)?    D a t e     Which  Union(s)? 
9) Since 1991, were any strikes in any of your production units mandated by political leaders?  If so: 
Which Unit(s)?    D a t e     Which  Union(s)? 
 10) Since 1991, have there been any work stoppages or protests in your firm in support of a token strike? If so: 
Which Unit(s)?    D a t e     Which  Union(s)? 
11) Since 1991, have there been any work stoppages or protests in your firm in support of a general strike? 
Which Unit(s)?    D a t e     Which  Union(s)? 
12) Since 1991, have any disputes gone for arbitration? 
Which Unit(s)?    D a t e     Which  Union(s)? 
13) Since 1991, have any disputes required police intervention?  If so, when?  Which unions were involved?   
Which Unit(s)?    D a t e     Which  Union(s)? 
14) Since 1991, have there been any disputes at your firm in which a minister or other politician has intervened?  If so, when?  Which 
unions were involved? 
Which Unit(s)?    D a t e     Which  Union(s)? 
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15)  In the last year, how many disputes from your firm have gone before a labor tribunal? 
F1) 
F2) 
F3) 
F4) 
F5) 
16) Since 1991, have you had any disputes go before and industrial court? 
Which Unit(s)?    D a t e     Which  Union(s)? 
17) During ___(X dispute)___, what level of control did the parent union exercise over the protest tactics/protest behavior of the 
branch union involved in the dispute?  Would you say that the parent union 
a) exercised a great deal of control  
b) exercised a moderate amount of control  
c) exercised very little control  
over the branch level union’s protest behavior? 
Unit   Dispute  Date    U n i o n     Level  of  Control    
a.                    a       b      c   
b.                    a       b      c 
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c.                    a       b      c 
d.                    a       b      c 
e.                    a       b      c 
f.                    a       b      c 
18) In  ___(X dispute)___, the union employed       (tactic X)     .  Is it your impression that the use of this tactic was utilized after 
consultation with the parent union, or that the decision to use this tactic was made at the branch level?   
Unit    Dispute  Date   Union   Tactic   Branch/Parent    
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e 
f 
19) Was the parent union informed of __X dispute   ? If so, was it informed of the dispute before or after the union began 
protesting/stopped work?   
Unit    Dispute  Date   Union    Involvement  (Before/After/None) 
a. 
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b. 
c. 
d. 
e 
f 
20) Did the parent union of   union X   attempt to engage you in negotiations before the branch level union stopped work/began its 
protest action? 
Unit    Dispute  Date    U n i o n     Y e s / N o  
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e 
f 
21) During   X dispute   did the parent union inform you in advance of the protest actions the branch level union was going to take? 
Unit    Dispute   U n i o n    Action   Yes/No 
a .            y e s / n o  
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b .            y e s / n o  
c .            y e s / n o  
d .            y e s / n o  
e .            y e s / n o  
f .            y e s / n o  
22) Generally speaking, to what extent does the parent union have control over the actions of the branch union?  Would you say that 
the parent union  
a) always has control over the actions/behavior of the branch level union? 
b) sometimes has control over the actions/behavior of the branch level union? 
c) never has control over the actions/behavior of the branch level union? 
 Union     A n s w e r  
a.          a    b   c 
b.          a    b   c 
c.          a    b   c 
d.          a    b   c 
23)  What was your most recent dispute with         (union X)      ?   
24)  In this most recent dispute with         (union X)      , did the branch union 
2
6
0
  
a) resolve the dispute on its own 
b) rely somewhat on the parent union for help 
c) allow the parent union to handle the negotiations entirely 
 Union     A n s w e r  
a.          a    b   c 
b.          a    b   c 
c.          a    b   c 
d.          a    b   c 
25) When there is a dispute with            (union X)      over salary or bonus, does the branch-level union typically  
a) resolve the dispute on its own 
b) rely somewhat on the parent union for help 
c) allow the parent union to handle the negotiations entirely 
 Union     A n s w e r  
a.          a    b   c 
b.          a    b   c 
c.          a    b   c 
d.          a    b   c 
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26)  When there is a dispute with          (union X)      over hiring and firing of individual workers, does the branch union typically  
a) resolve the dispute on its own 
b) rely somewhat on the parent union for help 
c) allow the parent union to handle the negotiations entirely 
 Union     A n s w e r  
a.          a    b   c 
b.          a    b   c 
c.          a    b   c 
d.          a    b   c 
27) Do representatives of the parent union of          (union X)       ever meet with branch level union leaders?  If so, how often? 
Union    Y e s / N o     Frequency 
28)  Do representatives from the parent union of          (union X)      visit the factory to speak to the workers?  If so, how many times 
has it occurred in the past year?  How often does it occur?   
Union    Y e s / N o     Frequency 
29) Has the leader of the parent union of          (union X)      ever come to address the workers?  When was the last time this leader 
came?  
Union    Y e s / N o     Frequency 
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30) What is labor cost as a percentage of turnover?  If possible at each factory? 
F1) 
F2) 
F3) 
F4) 
F5) 
31)  In the past year what was the annual percentage of labor turnover at each factory? 
F1) 
F2) 
F3) 
F4) 
F5) 
32) In the past year, what was the average daily rate of absenteeism at each factory? 
F1) 
F2) 
F3) 
F4) 
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F5) 
33) In the past year, what was the average monthly salary per worker at each factory? 
F1) 
F2) 
F3) 
F4) 
F5) 
34)  What percentage of manual grade workers are men?  What percentage are women? 
F1) 
F2) 
F3) 
F4) 
F5) 
35)  Do you have regular meetings with the workers?  How frequent are these meetings? 
36)  Are there any formal grievance procedures in place at your firm?   
37)  Is there anything special that you provide for the workers in your firm in terms of material benefits or other benefits? 
38) Does the director have a particular political affiliation?  
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39) Has the firm ever given a gift to the leadership or the general fund of     (union X )   ?  
40) Have the unions in your firm become better or worse bargaining partners since 1991?   
Union      Better/Worse 
41) What percentage of company revenue comes from exports? 
42) If given a choice between a violent protest and a long, drawn-out strike, which would you choose? 
43) Would it be possible to interview the local union leaders at one of your factories?   
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Potential topics for more general discussion: 
A. How important is labor relations relative to other business concerns? 
B. Some people say that each union educates its workers differently?  How do union leaders educate workers in your company?     
C. Corruption among union leaders. 
D. If workers have used violence or extreme actions in the company, why have they done so? 
E. Why do workers join certain unions and not others?  Do workers ever switch unions? 
F. What role might the government play in industrial relations?   
G. What role have political parties played in IR?  Are political parties in IR, on balance, good or bad?   
H. Some say unions are bad for labor relations.  Some say they help to facilitate a smooth-functioning industrial relations.  What is your 
opinion, are trade unions generally good or bad for industrial relations?   
I.  What do political parties get out of unions and vice-versa. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 
STRUCTURE OF UNION MOVEMENT AMONG UNIONIZED FIRMS 
Table A4:  Regional Variations in the Structure of the Union Movement  
Percentage of Unionized Companies
2   Type of Union 
Sri Lanka Maharashtra  Kerala  W. Bengal 
        
MPUs 27  41  91  93 
 
  CITU  NA  4 70  81 
  AITUC  NA  1 17 8 
  INTUC  NA  22 50 49 
  INTTUC  NA 0 0  19 
  BKS  NA 18 0  0 
  BMS  NA 5  37  3 
  SLNSS  24 NA  NA  NA 
  JSS  14 NA  NA  NA 
          
NIUs 
 
92 66  11  17 
  External leadership affiliated 
to small party 
 
59 10  7 9 
  External leadership 
politically independent 
 
57 22  2 4 
 
  Internal leadership only 
 
0 42  2  6 
        
Source: Telephone survey of 385 managers and directors.  Surveys conducted between November 2002 and May 2004.    
                                                 
2 Figures do not add up to 100 as companies surveyed may have more than union.  
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APPENDIX 5 
INDUSTRIAL VIOLENCE AMONG UNIONIZED FIRMS 
Table A5: Percentage of Unionized Manufacturing Companies Experiencing 
Various Types of Protest, 1991-2002 
Percent Experiencing  Type of Protest 
Sri Lanka Maharashtra  Kerala  W. Bengal 
        
Stoppage of Work  87  37  44  28 
  Strike 87  26  40  24 
  Lockout 24  14  10  18 
          
Violent or Extreme Protest  37  18  6  6 
  Assault on Manager  5  10  0  4 
  Assault on Other Workers  5  3  0  1 
  Damage to Property  11  3  6  3 
  Threats to Management  21  12  0  4 
          
Obstruction/Occupation 50  22  23  24 
  Gherao 13  18  15  15 
  Climbing High Structure  24  0  0  0 
  Fasting 5  1.3  2  0 
  Sit-in/Blocking Gates  24  8  13  11 
        
Routine Protest  89  48  60  51 
 Go  Slow  3  19  21  24 
 Gathering  84  33  42  34 
        
Any Form of Protest  89  49  65  56 
        
Source: Telephone survey of 400 managers and directors.  Surveys conducted between November 2002 and May 2004.    
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LABOR LEGISLATION IN THE INDIAN STATES
3
 
Bargaining process 
State Year  Section  Description  Class 
Gujarat  1973 2  Insertion of exact definition of council as being a Joint Management 
Council  0 
Rajasthan  1960 2 
Member is defined as someone who is an ordinary member of a Union and 
who has paid a subscription of not less than four annas per month and 
who is not in arrears as regards these payments.  Such an exact definition 
does not exist under the central act 
-1 
Rajasthan  1960 2 
The definition of employer in the context of an industrial dispute also 
includes owners who have contracted with persons for the execution of 
work as a part of the industry. 
1 
Rajasthan  1960 2 
Registrar is defined as the person appointed to be the Registrar of Unions.  
This makes it clear who is involved in the bargaining process on behalf of 
the unions.  This definition does not appear in the central act and hence 
might be subject to interpretation. 
-1 
Rajasthan  1960 2 
Union is defined to be a trade union of employees registered under the 
Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926.  This makes it clear who is involved in the 
bargaining process on behalf of the unions.  This definition does not 
appear in the central act and hence might be subject to interpretation. 
-1 
Rajasthan  1960 2 
The definition of a worker in the context of an industrial dispute also 
includes workers who have contracted with employers for the execution of 
work as part of the industry. 
1 
West Bengal  1980 2  Workers involved in sales promotion are included in the definition of 
workers.  This category of employment is not specified in the central act.  1 
2
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3 Adapted from Besley and Burgess (2004). 
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Rajasthan   1960 3 
The state government has to appoint a Registrar of Unions and may also 
appoint Assistant Registrars of Unions to work in local areas.  This makes 
it clear who can represent unions within work communities. 
-1 
Rajasthan  1970 9C 
This describes the supervisory duties of the Registrar of Unions and the 
rules for registration of unions (which is obligatory).  One duty of the 
Registrar is to ensure that only one union (that with the largest 
employment represents a single unit within an industry 
-1 
Adjudication and state intervention in industrial disputes 
State Year  Section  Description  Class 
Andhra Pradesh  1949 2 
Allows the appropriate government to declare any industry as a public 
utility if a public emergency or public interest requires so.  In the central 
act only industries in the First Schedule (public utilities) may be declared 
thus.  Public utilities are more limited in having strikes and lock-outs and 
the government has greater power to refer industrial disputes in public 
utilities service to the appropriate court. 
-1 
Andhra Pradesh  1968 2 
Any services in hospitals or dispensaries are classified as a public utility. 
Public utilities are more limited in having strikes and lock-outs and the 
government has greater power to refer industrial disputes in public utilities 
service to the appropriate court.  In the central act these services are not 
classified as public utilities.  
-1 
Tamil Nadu  1949 2 
Allows the appropriate government to declare any industry as a public 
utility if a public emergency or public interest requires so.  In the central 
act only industries in the First Schedule (public utilities) may be declared 
thus.  Public utilities are more limited in having strikes and lock-outs and 
the government has greater power to refer industrial disputes in public 
utilities service to the appropriate court. 
-1 
Andhra Pradesh  1987 2A 
In the case of an industrial dispute involving an individual worker he has 
the right to apply directly to the Labor Court for adjudication.  No such 
right is specified in the central act. 
1 
  
Tami Nadu  1988 2A 
In the case of an industrial dispute involving an individual worker he has 
the right to directly apply to the Labor Court for adjudication.  No such 
right is specified in the central act. 
1 
Assam  1962 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Bihar  1959 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Gujarat  1977 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Haryana  1976 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Karnataka  1963 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Kerala  1971 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Madhya Pradesh  1989 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Maharashtra  1974 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Orissa  1960 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
2
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West Bengal  1958 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
West Bengal  1990 7A 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Assam  1962 7C 
The presiding officer serving in a Labor Court, tribunal, or national 
tribunal who has attained the age of 65 is allowed to serve for a further six 
months if he has pending cases. 
0 
Punjab  1957 7C  The retirement age of the presiding officer serving in a Labor Court, 
tribunal or national tribunal is changed from 65 to 67.  0 
West Bengal  1959 7C 
The presiding officer serving in a Labor Court, tribunal, or national 
tribunal who has attained the age of 65 is allowed to serve for a further six 
months if he has pending cases. 
0 
Gujarat  1962 7D 
Reduction of the qualifications of presiding officer to serve on an 
Industrial Tribunal.  Involves both a reduction in the years of experience 
and judges from lower levels of the judicial system being allowed to serve. 
0 
Andhra Pradesh  1949 10 
States that where a Tribunal has been constituted under this Act for the 
adjudication of disputes in any specified industry or industries and a 
dispute exists or is apprehended in any such industry then the employer or 
majority of workmen may refer the dispute to that Tribunal.  This 
facilitates referral of disputes to Tribunals as the process does not need to 
be intermediated by government.  In the central act both sides have to 
apply to the government so it can refer the dispute to a court. 
-1 
Karnataka  1949  10  Pertains to the fact that Karnataka broke away from the state of Madras  0 
Karnataka  1988 10 
In the case of an industrial dispute involving an individual worker he many 
within a six month period have the right to apply directly to the Labor 
Court for adjudication.  No such right is specified in the central act.  
1 
2
7
2
  
Madhya Pradesh  1982 10 
This amendment refers to part A of the second schedule instead of the 
whole second schedule.  The second schedule describes matters within the 
jurisdiction of labor courts.  The schedule for Madhya Pradesh is 
renumbered so actually the change is only technical. 
0 
Tamil Nadu  1949 10 
States that where a Tribunal has been constituted under this Act for the 
adjudication of disputes in any specified industry or industries and a 
dispute exists or is apprehended in any such industry then the employer or 
majority of workmen may refer the dispute to that Tribunal.  This 
facilitates referral of disputes to Tribunals as the process does not need to 
be intermediated by government.  In the central act both sides have to 
apply to the government so it can refer the dispute to a court. 
-1 
West Bengal   1989 10 
In the case of an industrial dispute involving an individual worker if no 
settlement is arrived at within sixty days the party raising the dispute can 
apply directly to a conciliation officer.  Within sixty days from the 
conciliation officer’s certificate they can apply to refer the dispute to Labor 
Court.  No such right is specified in the central act. 
1 
Andhra Pradesh  1982 10A-K 
If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to 
do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for 
maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment 
it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe 
the terms and conditions of an order. (ii) prohibits strikes and lockouts in 
connection with any industrial dispute. 
-1 
Karnataka  1988 10A-K 
The state government obtains the power to transfer any industrial dispute 
pending before a tribunal to any other tribunal constituted by the state 
government for adjudication. 
-1 
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Karnataka  1988 10A-K 
If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to 
do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for 
maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment 
it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe 
the terms and conditions of an order. (ii) prevents any public utility service 
from closing. 
-1 
Kerala  1979 10A-K 
If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to 
do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for 
maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment 
it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe 
the terms and conditions of an order. (ii) prevents any public utility service 
from closing. 
-1 
Rajasthan  1970 10A-K 
The state government has the right to refer an industrial dispute to an 
Industrial Tribunal if it is satisfied that (i) public peace or safety is 
threatened, serious or prolonged hardship of part of the community is 
likely to be caused or thei industry concerned is likely to be seriously 
damaged, (ii) the industrial dispute is unlikely to be settled by other means 
or (iii) it is in the public interest to do so. 
-1 
Rajasthan  1970 10A-K 
If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to 
do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for 
maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment 
it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe 
the terms and conditions of an order. (ii) prevents any public utility service 
from closing. 
-1 
2
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Tamil Nadu  1982 10A-K 
If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to 
do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for 
maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment 
it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe 
the terms and conditions of an order. (ii) prevents any public utility service 
from closing. 
-1 
Karnataka  1988 11 
Increases the power of the conciliation officer in terms of enforcing 
attendance at hearings regarding industrial disputes, compelling the 
production of documents and issuing commissions for the examination of 
witnesses.  Also makes clear what the penalties are for non-attendance or 
failure to produce relevant documents. 
-1 
Tamil Nadu  1988 11 
Increases the power of the conciliation officer in terms of enforcing 
attendance at hearings regarding industrial disputes, compelling the 
production of documents and issuing commissions for the examination of 
witnesses.   
-1 
Andhra Pradesh  1982 11A-D  A Labor Court or Tribunal is granted the power of a Civil Court to execute 
its award or any settlement as a decree of a Civil Court.  -1 
Madhya Pradesh  1982 11A-D 
In the case of criminal cases the Labor Court shall have all the powers 
under the Code of Criminal Procedure of a Judicial Magistrate of the First 
Class 
-1 
West Bengal  1980 11A-D  A Labor Court or tribunal is granted the power of a Civil Court to execute 
its award or any settlement as a decree of a Civil Court  -1 
West Bengal  1980 12 
A report of the outcome of conciliation proceedings must be submitted 
within 60 days of the commencement of conciliation proceedings.  In the 
central act the same report must be produced within 14 days. 
1 
West Bengal   1986 15 
Provides greater detail on the duties of Labor Courts, Tribunals, and 
National Tribunals with respect to procedure, hearings, commencement of 
award and the amount of interim relief admissible to workers that have 
been discharged, dismissed, or retrenched. 
1 
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West Bengal   1980 17A 
(i) Provides greater detail on the procedures for making awards from 
Labor Courts or Tribunals including necessary signatories and the timing 
of awards.  (ii) The state government also retains the right to reject, modify 
any award made by a Labor Court or Tribunal 
1 
West Bengal  1981 19  Refers to a section of the central act which was added as the result of an 
amendment introduced by this state.  0 
West Bengal  1980 20 
In the case of public utility service, the conciliation proceeding is deemed 
to start on the day, the notice of a strike or lockout is received by a 
conciliation officer.  In the case of other industries the conciliation 
proceeding is deemed to start on the date conciliation officers asked the 
parties to join a conference.  Under the central act the conciliation 
proceeding in all industries have to start on the day that notice of a strike 
or lockout is received by a conciliation officer 
1 
Terms and conditions of employment 
State Year  Section  Description  Class 
Andhra Pradesh  1987 9A  If an employer wants to change the conditions of service applicable to any 
worker he has to give him a notice of forty-two days (instead of 21)  1 
West Bengal  1980 9A  If an employer wants to change the conditions of service applicable to any 
worker he has to give him a notice of forty-two days (instead of 21)  1 
Hiring and firing of workers and restriction of closure 
State Year  Section  Description  Class 
Gujarat  1984 2  Insertion of definition of closure which was repealed in the same year 
when the amendment was incorporated into the wording of the central act. 0 
Maharashtra  1981 2 
Discontinuation or reduction of power supply to an industrial 
establishment can be used as a reason for lay-off (for which workers will 
receive compensation).  Under the central act only shortage of coal, power 
or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the breakdown of 
machinery are listed as valid reasons for lay-offs. 
1 
2
7
6
  
West Bengal  1974 2 
Any worker who presents himself and is given employment for that day 
cannot be laid off for that day.  However, if he didn’t receive a work within 
two hours he is deemed as being laid off.  Under the central act only the 
second condition holds. 
1 
West Bengal  1980 2 
Retrenchment, which means termination of employment of a worker, does 
include workers terminated on grounds of continued ill-health.  In the 
central act termination for these workers is excluded from the definition of 
retrenchment. 
1 
West Bengal  1989 2A 
Refusal of employment is added as grounds for an individual worker to 
enter into an industrial dispute with his/her employer.  Only discharge, 
dismissal, retrenchment or other termination of employment are 
mentioned as grounds in the central act. 
1 
Maharashtra  1981 25C  If being laid off is not due to electricity problems, then the workers receive 
100% of their wages as compared to the normal 50%  1 
West Bengal  1980 25C  The limit of 45 days for workers receiving 50% of their wages upon being 
laid off (if they worked more than one year) is removed.  1 
West Bengal  1980 25E 
Where a lay-off extends for more than seven days then the worker only has 
to present himself once a week at the plant in order to be entitled to 
compensation as opposed to daily as stipulated under the central act 
1 
Andhra Pradesh  1987 25FFF 
Prior payment of compensation to the worker is a condition precedent to 
the closure of an undertaking.  Under the central act payment of 
compensation does not need to be made prior to closure. 
1 
West Bengal  1980 25FFF 
Prior payment of compensation to the worker is a condition precedent to 
the closure of an undertaking.  Under the central act payment of 
compensation does not need to be made prior to closure. 
1 
Andhra Pradesh  1987 25H 
Where a closed firm is re-opened, workers who were on the roll or a given 
unit should be given the opportunity to offer themselves for employment 
in preference to others.  Under the central act retrenched workers are 
given preference but there is less specificity regarding rehiring workers 
from the same unit. 
1 
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West Bengal  1980 25H 
Where a closed firm is re-opened, workers who were on the roll or a given 
unit should be given the opportunity to offer themselves for employment 
in preference to others.  Under the central act retrenched workers are 
given preference but there is less specificity regarding rehiring workers 
from the same unit. 
1 
Andhra Pradesh  1987 25HH 
Where a worker is reinstated by an award of a Labor Court or tribunal, his 
wages will be paid from the date specified in that award whether or not he 
has been reinstated by the employer 
1 
West Bengal  1980 25HH 
Where a worker is reinstated by an award of a Labor Court or tribunal, his 
wages will be paid from the date specified in that award whether or not he 
has been reinstated by the employer 
1 
Karnataka  1988 25K 
The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the 
discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments 
of a seasonal character and which employ more than 100 but less than 300 
workers.  Under the central act these rules only apply to permanent 
establishments, which employ more than 300 workers.  
1 
Maharashtra  1981 25K 
The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the 
discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments 
of a seasonal character and which employ more than 100 but less than 300 
workers.  Under the central act these rules only apply to permanent 
establishments, which employ more than 300 workers.  
1 
Orissa  1983 25K 
The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the 
discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments 
of a seasonal character and which employ more than 100.  Under the 
central act these rules only apply to permanent establishments, which 
employ more than 300 workers.  
1 
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Rajasthan  1984 25K 
The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the 
discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments 
of a seasonal character and which employ more than 100 but less than 300 
workers.  Under the central act these rules only apply to permanent 
establishments, which employ more than 300 workers.  
1 
West Bengal  1980 25K 
The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the 
discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments, 
which employ more than 50 workers.  Under the central act these rules 
only apply to establishments which employ more than 300 workers 
1 
Rajasthan  1984 25L 
Under the central act the central government is deemed as the 
“appropriate government” for dealing with rules for lay-offs, retrenchment 
and closure.  This amendment changes this definition to read “the state 
government shall have no powers.” 
0 
Rajasthan  1984 25M 
(i) Substitutes “state government” for “appropriate government” as being 
the government which has the power to grant permission to lay off 
workers.  (ii) The expression “(Amendment) Act 1976” should be 
substituted with “(Rajasthan Amendment) Act 1984.”  (iii) The state 
government (as opposed to central government) has the right to refer lay-
off matters to a labor court. 
0 
Rajasthan  1984 25M 
Under the central act where workers in a mine have been laid off for 
reasons of fire, flood or gas explosion the employer doesn’t have to receive 
prior consent.  However, the employer has to apply for permission to 
continue the lay off beyond 30 days.  Here that condition is removed. 
-1 
West Bengal  1980   25M 
The period after which, if the appropriate government has not responded, 
the employer can commence layoffs (i.e. treat his application as if granted,) 
is extended from 2 to 3 months 
1 
Rajasthan  1984 25N 
Union representatives have to be involved in any negotiations concerning 
retrenchment of workers.  Their involvement is not stipulated under the 
central act 
1 
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Rajasthan  1984 25N 
(i) The state government is deemed the appropriate government in dealing 
with negotiations regarding retrenchment of workers.  (ii) The expression 
“(Amendment) Act 1976” should be substituted with “(Rajasthan 
Amendment) Act 1984.” 
0 
Madhya Pradesh  1983 25O 
(i) Undertakings dealing with construction of buildings, bridges, roads, 
canals, dams or other construction work are no longer exempted from 
procedures for closing down undertakings.  (ii) State government as 
opposed to central government is deemed the appropriate government in 
dealing with negotiations regarding procedures for closing down 
undertakings. 
1 
Maharashtra  1983 25O 
Any employer or worker affected by the decision to close down an 
enterprise is permitted for 30 days from the date of permission to close 
being granted appeal to an Industrial tribunal to overturn the decision. 
1 
Orissa  1983 25O 
Any employer or worker affected by the decision to close down an 
enterprise is permitted for 30 days from the date of permission to close 
being granted appeal to an Industrial tribunal to overturn the decision. 
1 
Rajasthan  1984 25O 
Undertakings dealing with construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, 
dams or other construction work are no longer exempted from procedures 
for closing down undertakings. 
1 
West Bengal   1989 25O 
In their application to close down an undertaking the employers have to 
demonstrate the ability to discharge their liability for payment of 
compensation to workers. 
1 
Rajasthan  1984 25P 
In the central act government can order undertakings closed down before 
the commencement of the Industrial Dispute (Amendment) Act of 1976 
to reopen.  This amendment stipulates that such decisions can be referred 
to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. 
0 
West Bengal  1989 25P 
In the central act government can order undertakings closed down before 
the commencement of the Industrial Dispute (Amendment) Act 1976 to 
reopen.  This amendment stipulates that such decisions can be referred to 
an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. 
0 
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Rajasthan  1984 25PP 
Special provisions were put into place to reinstate workers who had been 
retrenched in the six months prior to passing the Industrial Disputes 
(Rajasthan Amendment) Act 1984.  This section was only in force for six 
moths hence unlikely to have long-term effects. 
0 
Rajasthan   1984  25Q 
The maximum penalty for lay-off and retrenchment of workers without 
permission is increased to imprisonment for three months or a fine of two 
thousand rupees or both (from the one month imprisonment or a fine of 
one thousand rupees or both) which are the terms stipulated in the central 
act. 
1 
Madhya Pradesh  1983 25R 
Amendment is required given that the section of the central act referring 
to procedures for closing down undertakings has been amended.  
Effectively no change 
0 
Maharashtra  1983 25R 
Amendment is required given that the section of the central act referring 
to procedures for closing down undertakings has been amended.  
Effectively no change 
0 
Orissa   1983 25R 
Amendment is required given that the section of the central act referring 
to procedures for closing down undertakings has been amended.  
Effectively no change 
0 
Rajasthan  1984 25R 
Amendment is required given that the section of the central act referring 
to procedures for closing down undertakings has been amended.  
Effectively no change 
0 
Gujarat  1984 25S 
Declaration that notwithstanding anything conta9ined in any other law 
being in force in the state providing for the settlement of industrial 
disputes the rights and liabilities of employers and workers in relation to 
closure will be determined in accordance with the provisions of this law. 
0 
Rajasthan  1984 25S 
The procedures for lay-off and retrenchment specified in Chapter V-A of 
the central act are deemed to be applicable to industrial establishment of a 
seasonal character and which employ more than 100 but less than 300 
workers.  Under the central act these rules only apply to permanent 
establishments which employ more than 300 workers 
1 
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Miscellaneous 
State Year  Section  Description  Class 
Andhra Pradesh  1987 29A 
Failure to comply with an order by the state government which constrains 
industrial dispute activity in the interests of the public is punishable with 
imprisonment for a period that is not less than six months and with a fine. 
-1 
Kerala  1979 29A 
Failure to comply with an order by the state government which constrains 
industrial dispute activity in the interests of the public is punishable with 
imprisonment for a period that is not less than six months and with a fine. 
-1 
Tamil Nadu  1982 29A 
Failure to comply with an order by the state government which constrains 
industrial dispute activity in the interests of the public is punishable with 
imprisonment for a period that is not less than six months and with a fine. 
-1 
Gujarat  1973 30-30A 
Failure of the employer to nominate his representatives to Councils within 
firms I punishable by a fine of 50 rupees and in the case of continuing 
failure to do so the employer will pay an additional fine which may extend 
to 50 rupees per day for every day that such failure continues. 
1 
Rajasthan  1970 30-30A 
Failure to comply with an order by the state Government which constrains 
industrial dispute activity in the interests of the public is punishable with 
imprisonment for a period, which may extend to one year or with a fine, 
which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both. 
-1 
Andhra Pradesh  1987 33C 
In place of the Collector, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief 
Metropolitan Magistrate are given the power to recover from an employer 
money owing to a worker as the result of settlement of an industrial 
dispute. 
1 
Rajasthan  1970 33C 
Widens the scope of awards for which the worker can obtain judicial help 
with securing money owed by an employer to include awards made as the 
result of an order issued by the state Government to constrain industrial 
dispute activity in the interest of the public. 
1 
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West Bengal  1980 33C 
In place of the Collector, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief 
Metropolitan Magistrate are given the power to recover from an employer 
money owing to a worker as the result of settlement of an industrial 
dispute. 
1 
Madhya Pradesh  1982 34 
Labor Court is given the power to deal with every offence punishable 
under the Labor Disputes Act as well as under a range of other central acts 
dealing with labor issues. 
-1 
West Bengal  1989 38  Change needed as the result of another amendment being made by this 
state.  0 
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